




Title of the 
Dissertation CONSTRUCTING CIVIL SOCIETY IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA: CASE STUDIES OF ONE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY 
AND ONE NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTE FOR 
PEASANT EDUCATION  
  
 Yan Liu,  Doctor of Philosophy,  2007 
  
Directed By: Professor Jing Lin,   Department of Education Policy and 
Leadership,  University of Maryland 
 
 
The political shift in China in the last two and a half decades, from an emphasis 
on ideological orthodoxy and centralized economic control, to an emphasis on 
national economic development for modernization, has made it possible for non-
governmental actors to enter into fields previously controlled by the government and 
to take initiatives in making social changes. This dissertation examines the capacity 
that non-governmental organizations demonstrate in their fight against all odds and 
their promotions of a civil society in China, using two non-governmental 
organizations working in the field of education as examples. The cases are analyzed 
from a historical institutionalism perspective to show how organizations’ actions are 
affected by the contextual factors and meanwhile how their actions influence the 
institutions. In the case studies, the interaction between the society and the state 
government is carefully studied; moreover, the associational, ideological and 
cognitive dimensions of the civil society construction in China are comprehensively 
examined. 
Two non-governmental institutions are examined in this study. Their increasing 
participation in educational practices provides alternatives to the educational model in 
 
government-managed organizations. The dissertation also examines the development 
of the two organizations and pays special attention to the constraints imposed on the 
organizations by the existing political and educational system: The government is 
alert to their increasing power and attempts to restraint it. However, both 
organizations were successful in negotiating spaces for their survival and gained 
increasing influence in the society. Case analysis showed that the most important 
feature in the state-society interaction in China is trust-building which requires 
sophisticated strategies. While sticking to their non-state identity, these organizations 
have made significant efforts in establishing channels of discourse with the 
government, and won their trust in this way. Overall, the civil society groups in China 
showed divergence in their goals and practices from other countries, but also share 
certain convergence in their features and strategies for the redefinition of state-society 
boundary. 
In the dissertation, a dynamic interaction between the institutional factors and 
the agency of social actors is discovered. The institutional contexts shaped the social 
actors’ vision and strategies, and the institutional environment was also transformed 
by the action of social groups. The direction of political and social reform is co-
steered by the state-government and the society, instead of being determined by the 
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1.1  Social, Economic Changes and Civil Society 
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China (CCCPC), in December 1978, marks the decisive break with the past and the 
beginning of China’s reform era. It was at this meeting that Deng Xiao Ping 
effectively rose as the paramount leader after the demise of China’s Cultural 
Revolution1, thereby creating the potential for more flexible and pragmatic policies 
away from the highly rigid and orthodox implementation of Marxist theory in China. 
The earlier years of reform (1979~1983) were characterized by a shift of 
administrative priority from ideological control and class struggles toward economic 
development, and reintegration of human resources2. State-Planned economic policies 
3still dominated the economic activities of the country during this period. In 1984, a 
reform toward modest market economy was initiated by the then Premier Zhao 
                                                 
1 It was launched by the Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong on May 16, 1966, officially 
as a campaign to rid China of its "liberal bourgeoisie" elements to continue revolutionary class struggle. 
Vice-Chairman Lin Biao and Mao's wife Jiang Qing, acting on Mao’s instructions, organized a mass 
youth militia called the Red Guards to overthrow Mao's perceived enemies and seize control of the 
state and party apparatus, and to enforce Mao's cult of personality. The movement for criticism of party 
officials, intellectuals, and “bourgeois values” turned violent. In the chaos and violence that ensued, 
many revolutionary elders, authors, artists, and religious figures were purged and killed, and millions 
were persecuted and possibly as many as half a million people died (Harding, 1997). The Cultural 
Revolution also caused economic disruption, and altered the country's moral, historical, and social 
perceptions in their entirety. 
2 During the Culture Revolution in 1960s and earlier 1970, millions of urban youth were sent to 
countryside to receive “physical and spiritual re-education” from local poor peasants. In late 1970s, 
these intellectual youth were allowed to return to the cities. In addition, thousands of intellectuals and 
officials who were politically oppressed during the Cultural Revolution were “rectified” and 
rehabilitated from 1978 to early 1980s. 
3 During 1950s to late 1970s, the economy in China featured the state mandating enterprise what to 
produce and how much to produce, and the state was responsible for buying the outputs and 
redistribution.   
1 
Ziyang, which featured price system reform and expanding autonomy in management 
of state enterprises. As economic reform deepened gradually, corruption, as a result 
of government officials using their political power to manipulate resources and 
opportunities for personal benefits, became a serious social problem, which led to the 
Tiananmen Square incident in June 19894. The government’s policies marked a shift 
back to the pre-reform conservative policies of tight state control on the society and 
economy. But, at the beginning of 1992, the speech given by the then paramount 
leader, Deng Xiaoping in his visit to Shen Zhen, a southern coastal city, and other 
coastal regions, stimulated a new round of economic reform and opening to the 
world 5 . The term “socialist market economy” was officially recognized and the 
existence of “diverse ownership systems” was encouraged by the state (Naughton, 
1996). Chinese politics embarked again onto an era of relaxing control of the state 
and granting of more autonomy to the society.  
What happened in China in recent years attracted the attention of political and 
economic researchers. Among the communist countries that have undertaken the 
transition from a centralized planning system to a free market system, China has 
treaded a unique path. China did not take the “shock therapy,” which was suggested 
by the International Monetary Fund, and which was adopted by Soviet Union and 
                                                 
4 In June 1989, hundreds of thousands of college students gathered in Tiananmen Square, protesting 
corruption and incapability of government for containing corruption and demanding for political 
reform, democracy and freedom.  
5 In the spring of 1992, Deng made his famous southern tour of China, visiting several Special 
Economic Zones such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and spending the New Years in Shanghai, in 
reality using his travels as a method of reasserting his economic reform agenda after his retirement 
from office. On his tour, Deng made various speeches and generated large local support for his 
reformist platform. He stressed the importance of economic construction in China, and criticized those 
who were against further economic and openness reforms. He asserted that the advantage of one 
regime is to see whether it develops the production capacity and promote the living standard of people 
(Zhao, 1993). 
2 
some other communist countries. The “shock therapy” approach features a series of 
rapid, fundamental reforms to dismantle the former communist economic structure 
and to eliminate as many dysfunctions in the political structure as quickly as possible. 
Instead, China’s approach was for gradual, evolutionary changes and the country 
completed the transition from a highly centralized, state-dominated economy to a 
market-oriented economy taking more than two decades. In this way, it avoided the 
social unrests and instability that occurred in other transitional countries, while 
simultaneously achieving a high rate of economic growth. This economic 
achievement has been cited by many to justify the stagnancy in many areas of China’s 
political reform. Until today China remains a one-party system and the suffrage 
system has not been established. However, researchers have pointed out that delaying 
democratic reform has had negative effects on the country’s economic development 
and social stability (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein, 2005). Some researchers believe 
that even though delaying political reform in China is justified during its transitional 
period in order to efficiently mobilize social resources and achieve high speed of 
growth, it is not a long-term strategy after all (Mok, 2000).  
Inspired by the global civil society movement that is sweeping many countries 
(Cohen & Rai 2000; Colάs, 2002), researchers turn their attention to the “third sector” 
or “civil society sector” that may become the force to push for democracy, as is the 
case in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and other Eastern Europe countries. To 
challenge the stereotypical assertion that Chinese culture is inimical to democracy 
and that civil society can not develop in the Chinese context, researchers traced the 
existence of civil society in the history of contemporary China, to argue that civic 
3 
culture and civic associations has a longer tradition in China than people have 
presumed. Recently, with the deepening of China’s economic reform which is, for 
example, legalizing the protection of private ownership under a socialist framework 
through revision of the constitution, some phenomenal social changes are taking place, 
further encouraging the search for civil society in China. Researchers are examining 
non-governmental activities of independent intellectual groups, and study popular 
resistance against the authority to argue for an emerging civil society that has the 
capacity of reconstituting a new, post-communist social order in China (Goldman, 
1999; Nathan, 1990; Strand 1990; Perry 2001). However, other researchers are 
skeptical about this optimism. They argued that what happened in China has a long 
distance from what is conceptualized as a “civil society” or a “public sphere” as seen 
in the West, for in China, autonomy of social organizations and intellectual groups 
was limited; popular resistance was easily pacified or co-opted by the government; 
there is a lack of a united front among different social classes; and most importantly, 
there is no critical discourse on the political structure (Wakeman, 1993; Chamberlain, 
1993; Huang, 1993). Critics regard that the presence of a strong party-state and the 
political culture that emphasized unity and stability over power sharing and freedom 
are primary obstacles to the existence of civil society in China.  
According to Marx, civil society is not a natural thing or ideal imagination, nor 
is it a fixed feature of any political regimes. The existence of civil society is itself an 
object of historical development. Civil society development is a dynamic process: It 
keeps responding to political and social changes, while at the same time it contributes 
to political and social changes. It China, there has been lack of political willingness 
4 
and cultural resistance in copying the western model of state-civil society dichotomy. 
However, this does not mean that China rejects all discourses of civil society or 
excludes possibilities of constructing alternative models of civil society. Actually 
both the state and the society are exploring, fumbling and testing new possible ways 
of interacting with each other.   
1.2 Objectives of This Research 
This study is an effort to study the nature of civil society in China. The 
overarching research question is:  What is the nature of civil society in China, with 
the tension between the party-state’s emphasis on control, and the quest of social 
forces for autonomy and democracy? And how has the state-society relationship 
changed along with the broad economic and social transformations since 1978?    
This study intends to study two non-governmental educational institutions. One 
is a private university located in Xi’an, Shaanxi province, which focuses on training 
talents to meet the increasing market demand for high-skill professionals; the other is 
an institute for rural development located in Dingxian, Hebei province, which worked 
with the local people to experiment on ecological economy and cooperative economy. 
By looking at their struggle for survival, their negotiation with the government, and 
their efforts to expand and carve a space for their institutions, we want to achieve an 
understanding of the nature of civil society and the change of state-society 
relationship in China.  
The University, since its emergence in Europe in Middle Ages, is deemed as a 
site of intellectual training, a hotbed of ideas and innovation, and reflection of social 
5 
progress. Autonomy and academic freedom is highly valued in an ideal university. 
However, in Communist countries universities have been administrated and regulated 
by the party–state for nation building and ideological control. During the transition to 
a market-oriented economy, as a result of increasing demand for higher education and 
the financial constraints of the government, social groups are encouraged to establish 
and run higher learning institutions. These educational institutions help to address 
diverse social needs and concerns. However, for fear of losing control on how 
universities educate people, the party-state imposes strict constraints on these non-
governmental universities, one of which was preventing them from becoming formal, 
comprehensive and prestigious universities by limiting their roles to preparatory or 
technical postsecondary training institutions. However, the private university 
described in this dissertation succeeded in applying for upgrading to the status of a 
comprehensive university with bachelor degree programs.  
Adult education in rural areas in China has gone through several stages. During 
the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation, adult education is a mass social 
movement initiated by the Communist Party to mobilize political awareness. After the 
economic reform was launched, adult education entered a new stage and become a 
new arena of different interests: the mainstream adult education managed by the 
government branch focused on agriculture technology or employment-oriented skills 
that was thought necessary for citizens to be engaged in modern production, such as 
computer skills and driving; during 1980s, groups of scholars and students went to 
rural areas to facilitate villagers to hold competitive elections, nominate candidates 
and elect their village leaders.  Hence, adult education is imbedded in this process to 
6 
transfer knowledge of electoral procedures and to cultivate village citizenship. 
Recently, participatory development is a popular method used by many international 
and domestic non-government organizations as a way to promote democratic decision 
making. Thus, since the economic reform adult education has shifted from the state-
dominated arena to a sphere with multiple actors and groups, people bring diverse 
meanings into adult education and connect it with distinct goals. These goals are not 
conflicting to each other, but they reflect the different understanding of the rural 
problems and the relationship between the rural society and the whole political and 
economic context. The Dingxian Institute on Peasant Education focuses on adult 
education for forming peasant organizations and experimenting on an ecological 
economy. Since peasant organization is such a sensitive subject in China, the 
government keeps a close eye on the Institute. But the Institute has succeeded in 
facilitating the establishment of dozens of peasant organizations around the country.   
These two educational institutions have different academic goals, with the 
former focusing on skill training to enable its students to become more competitive in 
the job market, and the latter focusing on training peasants with both skills 
development and critical thinking to make them leaders for rural development. Both 
institutions are recognized to be successful in achieving their academic goals. And 
both institutions have been negotiating with the government for autonomy and 
support for a long time. By comparing these two cases, I hope to explore the multiple 
dimensions of state-society conflicts in the process of modernization. I intend to 
investigate the politics of these two institutions in their establishment and 
development process, and relate these processes to the broader concept of civil 
7 
society development. Specifically, the following subset of research questions will be 
asked: 1) How did the non-governmental educational institutes connect their 
academic goals with social problems and concerns? 2) How did the non-
governmental educational institutes try to carve out a space for their development? 3) 
How did they relate to the state? 4) What institutional contexts have been affecting 
how politics play out between the state and non-governmental educational institutes? 
And generally the answer of these questions will lead to the overarching question: 
What is the nature of civil society in China? How the relationship between civil 
society and the state evolves over time? 
1.3 Conceptual Framework for This Research 
To construct a conceptual framework one needs to build a connection among 
normative construction of civil society, the structural features of civil society, and the 
institutional contexts. For this dissertation research, first, theories of civil society are 
reviewed, which have emphasis on different normative dimensions of civil society. 
Classic philosophers and thinkers of civil society, including Locke, Kant, and Hegel, 
focused on ethical construction of civil society and attempted to address the problem 
as to how individual being and social being are compatible in the rising market 
economy and what principles guide human interaction and association. Marxist and 
Gramsian theories focused on the real working of power in civil society. They drew 
our attention to the influence of institutional frameworks, such as means of economic 
production or forms of cultural production, on human interaction. Marx and Gramsci 
influenced the civil society movement in 20th century that focused on reforming 
institutions in society, and also inspired new-leftist theorists who emphasize 
8 
participatory structure of decision-making and a more inclusive civil society. Neo-
Liberals emphasize the “voluntary” nature of civil society. They argue that civil 
society’s role is to promote self-determination and ensure less state coercion.  
Habermas focuses on communicative aspect of civil society. The Habermasian public 
sphere is a sphere that is open to all people who are engaged in rational and critical 
debate and agree to collaborate toward a resolution. For Habermas politics can be just 
only when the full range of views and interests are represented publicly. In sum, I 
find that the richness and ambiguity of the meaning of civil society enables the 
concept to serve diverse intellectual and political interests. These theories would help 
me to notice what normative construction is echoed in China, and what role that “civil 
society” is playing in social change associated with the primary social concerns as 
well as the primary intellectual and political goals at that time. 
To study the nature of civil society, an empirical research can help identify 
multiple elements indicative of the existence of civil society. Richness of social 
activities and initiatives outside of the state is one popular indicator used by 
researchers to assert the existence of civil society and its capacity of self-organization; 
the capacity of social groups and non-governmental organizations to circulate 
alternative norms and values and to mobilize people to act in accordance with these 
values is another indicator of civil society and its capacity to reconstitute a new social 
order; last but not the least, the consciousness among individuals and groups about 
the differentiated interests between the society and the state, and the shared identity of 
being part of civil society and being capable to joint together for common interests, is 
increasingly regarded by researchers as an important indicator for a mature and 
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enduring civil society. When I examine private higher education institutions in China, 
these categories will provide theoretical tools to evaluate their actions, initiatives, and 
projects, and to draw connection between these actions and initiatives with the nature 
of civil society.  
These lead to the next issue this study intends to explain: why certain normative 
dimensions and practical elements of civil society are present and others are missing 
in the case of China? The building of civil society is closely connected with the 
conditions provided by socioeconomic contexts. Instead of viewing civil society as 
carrying fixed characteristics, we should take a more constructive view toward the 
elements of civil society. The constituents of civil society, the attributes and roles 
associated with civil society are influenced by institutional contexts, including 
political and social structure and political culture, which is not stable in a country in 
transition. This study will adopt historical institutionalism as the theoretical 
framework that emphasizes the influence of institutional structures, such as political 
structure and political culture, on people’s value and choices. In contrast to the 
rational choice model that presumes people are self-interest seekers, historical 
institutionalism asserts that people are rule-followers with the rules pre-set by 
normative, regulative or even geographic environment. For this study, I hope to 
construct the relationship between institutional contexts and state-society relationship 
in China to add to the richness of civil society literature as well as to enrich the 
discourse for understanding civil society formation and development overall.  
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1.4 Research Methodology 
This study uses case study methodology to examine the politics involved in the 
development of two private higher education institutions, and investigate the 
implication of this dynamic process in the evolvement of state-society relationship 
and the construction of civil society in China. The exploratory nature of this study 
and the emphasis on multifaceted social processes call for a qualitative research 
approach in order to generate data that account for the relative social complexities of 
the research questions. In contrast to quantitative methods that downplay the various 
ways that individuals, institutions, and social environments interact with each other 
and attempt to explain and predict phenomenon by calculating the level of relevance 
to some key factors, qualitative methods focus on the occurrence shaped by the 
context and on the meaning that people have constructed during the interaction with 
the environment. For this study on the development of private higher education 
institutions, the goal is not only to describe this process, but also to find out how the 
process is going on and why it is going on in certain ways in a specific time and place. 
Thus, qualitative inquiry is appropriate to explore this highly contextual occurrence. 
Case study is used for studying complex contemporary phenomenon in its 
natural setting. In case study, as well as in other qualitative traditions, the researcher 
is the primary instrument for collecting data, although other instruments, such as 
questionnaire or interview protocol, can be used to guide the data collection. 
Interviews were the essential source for this study. In this study, I interviewed the 
president and faculty in Xi’an Yuhua private university, founders, faculty and 
volunteers in Dingxian Institute for Peasant Education, and officials in charge of 
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regulating and accrediting private educational institutions. My attempt is to 
understand how the state and institutions interacted with each other as well as how 
institutional contexts influence the interaction. 
There are two cases in this dissertation: one private university and one non-
governmental institute for peasant education. The two cases represent different 
response to the modernization process and give a picture of the complexity of the 
social change in China. And their development illustrates the different pattern of 
state-society interaction in China.  
1.5 Significance of the Study 
First of all, the dissertation will contribute to theoretical understanding of civil 
society. It summarizes and criticizes previous theoretical and empirical account of 
civil society and conceptualizes civil society as complicate interconnected spaces and 
structures (market, legal system, associational network, and pubic sphere) which are 
respectively guided by certain normative principles (autonomy, liability, trust, or 
reason).  
Second, the study is expected to enhance our understanding of the reality and 
the future of democracy in China. Previous studies on Chinese civil society took 
Tocquevillian perspective and articulated the increasing intensity of autonomous 
associations. However, the discussion on the connection between associational forms 
and democracy was absent in these studies. This study pays attention to the interplay 
of structural forces (e.g. the nature of the state, the strength and reach of political 
parties, or prevailing culture traditions) and initiatives of social groups, and explores 
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how the space of nonstate power and its capacity to establish democratic social order 
is shaped by both the structure and human agency.  
Third, the study articulates that the development of civil society is not a linear 
and fixed path. In history, civil society was closely connected to the rise of a market 
economy and “bourgeois society.” In modern world, with the diverse political, 
economic and cultural environment, the evolvement of civil society becomes more 
complicated. When China opened itself to the world in 1980s, Chinese policy-makers, 
intellectuals and practitioners were exposed to different Western streams of 
development thinking as well as to thousands-of-years Chinese traditional cultures. 
By comparing institutions inspired by different missions and working with different 
populations, we have a wide-angle lens to observe the transformation of the Chinese 
society under the working of multiple local and global forces. 
Fourth, among the research on Chinese civil society, many focused on 
environmental movements to demonstrate the emergence of civil society in China, 
while the education field was less discussed. Education institutions are usually sites 
of contestation among the interests of the state, the market, and the society. Thus it 
would be interesting to take educational institutions as cases to observe the dynamics 
of relationship between the state and the civil society. This study is expected to 
address this gap, using education as a site for the study of the development and nature 
of civil society in China. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 In this chapter and the following chapter, I will describe and assess the 
literature that guides this qualitative research. This review encompasses literature in 
three central areas. First, literature containing normative discussion and empirical 
research on civil society is reviewed. Second, the theory of historical institutionalism 
that will guide the connection between systematic characteristics and civil society 
elements is presented.  And some broader political and social contexts that may have 
an influence on the nature of civil society are discussed. Finally, the relationship 
among education, the state and society in China is discussed.  
The literature review is to achieve the following purpose: First, to establish my 
conceptual framework that helps me to evaluate and explain the development of civil 
society and the change of state-society relationship; second, to facilitate me to 
analyze previous empirical studies, find out what factors have been examined and 
what have not, in order to aid my fieldwork as well as to justify the contribution of 
my study to the academic discussion of civil society. 
2.1 Theories of Civil Society 
The concept of civil society prospered during the 17th and 18th century in the 
West in efforts to rethink the social bases of order against the claim of absolutism. 
The theorists in this period argued for the inherent connectivity existing among 
people in a society that otherwise could be atomized by an individualized market. 
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Another main contribution made by theorists in this period is that they established the 
fundamental principles that guide people’s interaction: equality of rights, mutual 
recognition, and reasoning in public sphere, which are repeatedly mentioned in 
contemporary discourse on democracy and democratization. After a lapse of more 
than 100 years in scholarly and political use, in 20th century the concept of civil 
society was revived in the global movement against statism, militarism, imperialism, 
and not least, capitalism, when the connectivity in the society is threatened by the 
overbearing state apparatus and invasive market, and the ideal of equality, reciprocity, 
and reasoning are in reality replaced by oppression, patronage, and imposition.  
However, the civil society movement in 20th century was not just a testimony of 
the concept in its historical meaning. Owing to the work of Marx and Gramsci, the 
Leftists are exploring the institutional settings that produce these oppression, 
patronage and imposition. They called for fundamental reform of the institutional 
settings to create a more participatory and inclusive civil society. In middle and late 
20th century the term of civil society was gradually embraced by mainstream neo-
liberals as a rhetoric and strategy to shove off government intervention and to tout 
self-organization of society. In a word the concept of civil society in 20th century no 
longer refers to a unified ethical existence as theorists in 17th century prescribed, but 
has multiple levels, forms, identities, and antithesis. It has different ways of dealing 
with inclusion and exclusion. In this complicated situation, it is hard to achieve 
consensus on the definition of civil society. On one hand, it is often endowed with 
concrete organizational forms and norms; on the other hand it is an ideology, a utopia, 
a slogan, or a myth motivating people to seek for voice, equality, cooperation, justice, 
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development and democracy. It is no surprise that civil society was a language used 
by both the Left and Right, which take advantage of the rich but ambiguous 
implications of this concept to advertise their own political and social agenda. 
2.1.1 Classic Theories of Civil Society 
The idea of civil society became attractive to 17th and 18th centuries West 
European philosophical and political thinkers, as the result of phenomenal changes in 
ways of production and human interaction in this period, and of the consequent crisis 
of existing social order. As Seligman (1992) described, 
The commercialization of land, labor, and capital, the growth of market 
economies, and continental revolutions, all brought into questions the existing 
social order and of authority. Traditional foundation of social order was seen 
to reside in some entity external to the social world—God, King, or even the 
giveness of traditional norms and behavior itself- those principles or order 
became increasingly questioned by the end of the seventeenth century. (p. 15) 
 
The emergence of capitalism the free flowing of labor and capital promoted an 
awareness of individualism. Philosophical and political thinkers were thus facing the 
task of seeking and justifying principles of human interaction and association, 
integrating the “individual being” and “social being” and reconstructing the 
foundation of social order. The idea of civil society was conceptualized as a model 
for conceiving the workings of society and of social order within this major 
reorientation of European social thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
With an attempt to de-legitimatize the fixed and hierarchical relationship in the 
system of feudalism, theorists in 17th and 18th centuries used the term of civil society 
to referring to a reality of social mutuality. Civil society theories during this time 
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focused on how individuals interact in the society, and how to deal with the 
dichotomy between the individual and the social, morality and reason, and the private 
and the public. The ideas of Locke, Scottish enlightenment theorists, Kant, Hume, 
and Hegel are introduced below to see how they tried to work on and solve these 
dichotomies. As I summarized at the end, these theories are not antithetical, but 
instead complimentary to each other, jointly presenting the structures of civil society 
institutions and the normative values that civil society institutions incorporate. 
 
Locke 
Locke expounds his theory of civil society in his Second Treatise of the 
government (1966). Similar to Hobbes, Locke imagines an original state of nature in 
which individuals rely upon their own strength. Civil society is the format of human 
associations when they leave this state of nature by entering into a social contract 
under which the state provides protective services to its citizens. Seligman (1992) 
says, for Locke, that society is a media for interaction between private individuals, 
“where the inconvenience and insufficiencies of the state of nature are rectified 
through the mutuality of contract and consent” (Seligman, 1992, p.22). The contract 
and consent are embodied in the Law of Nature, under which the freedom, equality 
and rights can be more securely realized than would be possible under the state of 
nature. 
For Locke, then, “civil society speaks to a society that is civil in that it has a 
political formation in which individuals, who have divinely bestowed characteristics 
and powers in the state of Nature, mutually decide to relinquish this power to the 
state for the good of all” (Holst, 2000, p. 93). Authorities derive their power from the 
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transfer of this natural power by contract and consent of those who are governed, 
which may be withdrawn at any time. The structure or form of the government so 
established is a matter of relatively less importance, on Locke's view. What matters is 
that legislative power—the ability to provide for social order and the common good 
by setting standing laws over the acquisition, preservation, and transfer of property—
is provided for in ways to which everyone consents (Locke, 1966, p. 66-71.) For 
Locke, civil society is coterminous with the political realm, and there exists no 
differentiation of civil society from the State which we will find in the thought of 
Hegel, Kant as well as later in twentieth-century writings. 
Locke rooted the tendency of human being to associate not on psychological, 
logical, or historical base but on a religious vision. According to Locke, men united in 
the society by Godly dictate, since  
GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not 
good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, 
convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with 
understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. (Locke, 1966, p. 39) 
 
Scottish Enlightenment Theorists 
While for Locke men are united by Godly dictates, the thinkers during Scottish 
Enlightenment articulate that men are united by instinct, in that “they act in society 
from affections of kindness and friendship.” (Seligman, 1992, p. 27) Francis 
Hutcheson, Adam Smith, John Millar, and Adam Ferguson were several prominent 
theorists in this school. The main question they attempt to address is whether the 
acquisitive ethics of capitalism could be made compatible with traditional virtues of 
sociability, sympathy and justice. The Scottish Enlightenment theorists believed that 
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human beings have natural sympathy and moral affection for each other, which bond 
individuals with rational self-interest together.  
In Adam Smith’s the Theory of Moral Sentiment, he argues that the moral basis 
of individual existence is the need for recognition and consideration on the part of 
others. “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, 
complacency and approbation,” are for Smith the driving force of “all the toil and 
bustle of the world…the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth.” 
(Seligman, 1992, p. 27) Thus, economic activity is rooted in the non-economic needs 
for sympathy and appreciation. In this way the pursuit for self-interest and the need to 
achieve mutual recognition together drive human action in a collectivity. Social space 
of human interaction is conceptualized as a moral sphere, not simply as a neutral 
arena of exchange (Seligman, 1992, p. 31).  
 
Hume and Kant 
Hume rejects this mystified natural sympathy and challenged the unitary 
framework upon which the classic civil society theory had been based. Hume is the 
first person to make clear the distinction between morality and reason, private and 
public, and civil society and juridical society. He distinguishes “what is” from “what 
ought to be,” with the former describing human action driven by moral sentiments, 
and the latter ascertained by reason. According to Hume, men interact with each other 
out of self-interest, and “reason has no place in a psychology of human motivation” 
(Seligman, 1992, p. 38). People establish and follow the laws, not so as to serve some 
universal good, but to maximize their self-interests in an enlightened manner. In his A 
Treatise of Human Nature, Book III OF MORALS, Hume wrote,  
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After men have found by experience, that their selfishness and confined 
generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate them for society; and at 
the same time have observed, that society is necessary to the satisfaction of 
those very passions, they are naturally induced to lay themselves under the 
restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce more safe and 
commodious. (SECT.II Of the origin of justice and property). 
While theorists in Scottish Enlightenment were afraid that mere commerce and 
interest-motivated action would destroy the common ground of civil society and the 
sentiments upon which this ground rests, Hume referred his reader to self-interest as 
the sole guarantee of the social order. As Seligman (1992) articulated for Hume, “The 
universal good was nothing beyond the calculus of individual or particular goods, and 
the public good was supported solely by the workings of private interests” (p. 38). 
The implications of this thought were profound, leading to the notion that people, in 
using their reason to follow their self-interests, eventually achieve the interests of 
society as a whole.  
While Emmanuel Kant echoes Hume in his relegation of ethics and morals to 
the private sphere, he advocates a public arena of rational, critical discourse. For Kant, 
the tendency for individuals to associate in society is not founded on any “natural” 
endowment, but on a universal Reason. Seligman (1992) says for Kant, “As mankind 
come into its own, the autonomy, freedom, and equality of each individual 
themselves engender - through a universal reason - the workings of the moral law.” (p. 
42) Kant saw "Reason" as the fundamental factor for human action. It is in fact this 
"Reason" which differentiates us from other animals. In other words, we are able to 
conform our actions to our ideas of how the world might be or should be. Kant’s 
point of view takes the individual in a different course of actions from what Hume 
prescribes. When using "Reason" to act, in the Kantian view, the person must 
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consider the full effects of his or her actions. For this, the person must ask if a 
specific course of actions can become a universal rule. Immanuel Kant’s main 
principle regarding civil society was that people should treat other people as ends in 
themselves rather than means to the ends of others. In other words, we must consider 
how others would benefit themselves from our actions, rather than how we might use 
them only for our own benefit, and we must ensure that whatever means we use to 
pursue our own self-interests does not interfere with others’ rights to pursue theirs. 
"Reason" serves as a guide for acting in a very altruistic manner, and bridges the 
distinction between private and public.  
Central to the Kantian conception of Reason was the existence of a shared 
public arena where the workings of reason was substantiated. It was within the public 
arena of critical discourse that the individuals as ends was manifested, and that reason 
and equality was validated. In the public arena Rights and justice were ensured 
through the autonomous individuals following the dictates of the universal Reason. 
The public arena was for Kant the sphere of right, of mutual and rational consent to 
the individual and collective will. In Kant, a more rigorous vision of social 
differentiation developed. The state, as the embodiment of political society, is no 
longer viewed as coterminous with civil society, as the publicness of rational debate 
and critique is seen as the province of civil society in its distinction from the State. 
Kant objected to absolutist state by defending the role of autonomous and critical 
citizenry. For Kant, “the very legitimation of constitutional rule rests on the idea that 
its laws would be such that all the citizenry debated them, they would have arrived at 
the same through its very synthesis of Reason with the public realm” (Seligman, 1992, 
21 
p. 43). Thus, the public good is defined by private individual working publicly and 
mutually under the guide of Reason. In this way, the challenge raised by Hume is 
addressed by Kant, that given that people are motivated by self-interest in the private 
realm, how to posit general rules of justice for the juridical society.  
 
Hegel 
It was until Hegel who achieved the real synthesis between particularity and 
universal, self-interest and altruistic, and virtue and justice. For Hegel civil society is 
characterized by particularity of human being. Meanwhile, agreeing with Scottish 
Enlightenment thoughts, Hegel recognizes that people need to achieve mutual 
recognition through which individual as self-conscious is constructed and universal 
will is constructed. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel wrote, 
 In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to him. 
But except in contact with others he cannot attain the whole compass of his ends, 
and therefore these others are means to the end of the particular member. A 
particular end, however, assumes the form of universality through this relation to 
other people, and it is attained in the simultaneous attainment of the welfare of 
others. Since particularity is inevitably conditioned by universality, the whole 
sphere of civil society is the territory of mediation where there is free play for 
every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where 
waves of every passion gush forth, regulated only by reason glinting through 
them. Particularity, restricted by universality, is the only standard whereby each 
particular member promotes his welfare (Hegel, Ethical Life, Civil society, p. 89, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/prcivils.htm).  
An important message imbedded in this paragraph is that the mutually 
conflicting particular interest in civil society cannot be overcome by the society itself. 
The conflicts in private domain can only be resolved in the State for universal value. 
For Hegel, the state is characterized by overarching universal norm, which arbitrates 
disputes and helps to achieve consensus.  
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Classical civil society theorists sought a normal order to replace the old 
hierarchical order characteristics of the feudal regime. According to these theorists, 
civil society as an end has two dimensions: ethical dimension and institutional 
arrangement dimension. The ethical dimension refers to the political and ethical 
values canonized in the social system, and the institutional arrangement refer to the 
political, economic and culture structure established to guard and maintain the 
cultural values. In fact, the civil society brought forward by Locke and theorists of 
Scottish Enlightenment, and what Smith, and Kant present, are not exclusive to each 
other, but constituent parts of a well-functioning civil society. The modern state with 
the legal and executive power has the liability to defend people’s property, liberty and 
rights. And the state is constrained by the law not to abuse its power on the people. 
The market, public sphere, civil associations are formal or informal format of people 
self-organizing their activities under the guide of civil norms and values. The market 
is the format that people organize and coordinate their production and consumption 
activities to satisfy human’s economic needs, and civil association is the format that 
people realize their needs for mutual care and for self-managing their social lives. The 
public sphere is the arena bridging the society and the state where people bring their 
concern toward political issue for discussion and for future action. These formal or 
informal structures are integrative in the establishment and maintenance of the 
imagined new social order, where people are free, equal, self-determining, and have 




2.1.2 Contemporary Revival of Civil Society 
Despite the phenomenal social changes in these two centuries, people are facing 
with the same oppositions that delineate the range of action: egoism and altruism, 
passion and reason, private and public, individual interest and social good. The 
classic idea of civil society still has an important influence on today’s discussion. 
Adam Smith’s well-known characterization of the market as an "invisible hand" 
directing individuals’ selfish interests to the common good, and Hume’s notion of 
public good as aggregation of individual good, were intellectual inspiration to neo-
liberalism in 20th century. But as Seligman (1992) reminds, “the loss of the early, 
eighteenth-century notion of natural sympathy and moral sentiments made it 
increasingly difficult to root this individual in a community and so to present a 
coherent vision of society beyond its individual members” (p. 57). Establishing trust 
and cooperation to compensate the increasing alienation felt in contemporary 
capitalist society become a critical issue in 20th century. And Kant’s notion of Reason 
and a public arena to substantiating this Reason has been re-elaborated by Jürgen 
Habermas in his conception of public sphere. 
 
Neo-Libertarian Civil Society 
Neo-liberal notion of civil society began with a critic of the failure of welfare 
state in 1980s. The intervention of the state was regarded as the source of the problem, 
not the solution. The corruption of government agencies, inefficient investment and 
expenditure, void planning of the market, and the monopoly of the state in some 
public service area was criticized. It is during this time the libertarianism was again 
touted, only devoid of ethical dimension. The government was facing the pressure of 
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decentralization. A market vs. state dichotomy was popularized in both Western 
domestic policy community and international donor agencies. The structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) advocated, or even imposed, by the World Bank on many 
developing countries are the reflection of this way of conceptualization.  
Robert Putnam’s book Making Democracy Work (1994) drew the attention of 
policy community to civic institutions that could affect political outcomes. Putnam 
revived Tocqueville’s thought who in his book Democracy in America (trans. 2004) 
established the importance of autonomous social associations to maintaining 
democracy in a society. According to his observations, Tocqueville inferred that 
associations improve the cohesion and solidarity, and the participation of associations 
in public affair can prevent the unlimited expansion and misuse of state power. 
Putnam adopted the term “social capital”6 to address the problem of an isolate society. 
From a development perspective, Putnam’s theories could be used to argue that 
increasing the stock of social capital would be realized through strengthening civil 
society, and that the increased stock of social capital would bring economic and 
political benefits (Bjorn, 2004, p. 55). Salamon’s (1996, 1997, 1999) global research 
on the “third sector” celebrates the emergence of a vigorous third sector around the 
world, especially in the developing world.  
Partly due to influence by Putnam and Salamon, in the 1990s, the World Bank 
and other development agencies began to value civil society organizations for the 
                                                 
6 The concept of “social capital” was first clearly formulated by Pierre Bourdieu. In The Forms of 
Capital (1986) he distinguishes between three forms of capital: economic capital, cultural capital and 
social capital. He defines social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition."  
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implementation of their antipoverty programs. In “too close for comfort?” Edwards 
and Hulme (1996) note that in recent years the level of official funding for 
nongovernmental organizations in development efforts has increased dramatically. 
This expanded funding forms an integral part of the neo-liberal "New Policy Agenda" 
currently promoted by powerful donor agencies like the World Bank, USAID, and the 
British Overseas Development Administration (ODA). In this agenda civil society 
organizations have become the chosen instrument by donor agencies to provide an 
important complement to the market (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Howell and Pearce, 
2001). 
The neo-liberal discourse of civil society also has its audience in domestic 
policy community. The publication in 1998 of Anthony Giddens’s influential book 
devoted to the elaboration of the “Third Way” reflect the orientation of Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair’s governments to search for an alternative way in-between capitalism 
and socialism, to look to the “third sector,” “non-state arena,” “voluntary sector,” or 
“nonprofit sector” as providers of welfare service. Giddens was defining a so-called 
socially responsible capitalism where “civil society is an intermediary sphere serving 
to complement rather than to replace the state” and “offers a third route to welfare 
provision, which is neither private nor state” (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p 67).   
Howell and Pearce challenge the assumptions of neo-liberal model of civil 
society that civil society and market economies are positively related and that civil 
society and the market operate as separate, autonomous spheres. Howell and Pearce 
argue that the “definition of civil society as the arena of ‘nonprofit’ weakens the 
political functions of civil society as a critical eye on both state and market,” and neo-
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liberals neglect the fact that “market economies can undermine the cohesive and 
integrating dimensions of civil society, creating and reinforcing processes of social 
exclusion” (p. 64) As Marx and Gramsci have earlier pointed out, with the economic 
domination and ideological control continuously in the hand of a small group of 
people, freedom and equality stay in rhetoric. 
 
Habermasian Civil Society 
Habermas's most complete exploration of his notion of the public sphere is 
found in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (1989). In this book, Habermas traced the historical 
emergence of a bourgeois public sphere in the 17th and 18th centuries. The existence 
of public sphere enabled private people to come together as a public and talk about 
common concerns in conditions of freedom, equality and non-violent interaction. 
From the bourgeois public sphere Habermas saw the possibility that differences of 
interests are bracketed and citizens are engaged in rational and critical debate. Public 
sphere helps different groups to find a balance between personal autonomy and the 
demands of the social whole, thus resolving the dilemma that has lain at the heart of 
civil society thinking since the days of the ancient Greeks. Actually Habermas is 
decidedly Kantian in his dedication to reason, ethics, and moral philosophy. However, 
Habermas is worried that mass consumption of culture had been destructive to active 
and participative politics, as a small group of specialists “put their reason to use non-
publicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but 
uncritical” (Habermas, 1992, 175).  
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For Habermas, all modern states face a crisis of legitimacy. To reach a 
legitimate normative consensus around a plurality of interests and positions assuming 
certain conditions are met – equality of voice and access, in particular, and a 
minimum of censorship so that the relevant information is available to all. Politics 
cannot be just unless the full range of views and interests is represented in a process 
in which all the protagonists agree to collaborate towards a resolution (Edwards, 2004, 
p. 60). In Habermasian public sphere, the boundary between civil society and political 
society is blurred. Cohen and Arato (1992) attempted to construct a tripartite 
conceptualization of civil society influenced by Habermasian ideals in which “the 
task is to guarantee the autonomy of the modern state and economy while 
simultaneously protecting civil society from state and economy and its reflexive 
influence over them through the institutions of political and economic society.” (p. 25) 
Critical Theory: Marxist and Neo-Marxist theory of Civil Society 
With a insightful observation of the huge inequity existing in modern capitalist 
society, Marx and Gramsci put an end to the classic concept of civil society and 
started the modern discussion on civil society. Marx rejects the mythical and 
abstracted reading of human nature that the eighteenth century theorists had produced. 
He points out that the network developed in economic production is the key to 
understanding civil society. Marx deems that the structure of economic production in 
capitalism creates an exclusive, patriarchal and repressive society. The civil society 
was a society of the bourgeois, and a large group, the proletariat class was excluded 
from the civil society. Disagreeing with Hegel, Marx regards the particular and 
separate interests that define life in civil society were not resolved in the state. Rather 
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the state, through the sanctity of property and its relations, is subservient to them. He 
regards the state is normally the state of the economically dominant class. Marx 
envisions the politics as some non-state form such like “commune”. When people are 
truly free, he said, they will see themselves as citizens of the whole political 
community, not "decomposed" into different, non-universal roles as a trader, a laborer, 
a Jew, a Protestant. Each person will be "a communal being" united with all other 
citizens, and the state will no longer be seen as an instrument to protect rights so that 
individuals can pursue their selfish ends but as the entity through which everyone 
would achieve "the human essence [which] is the true collectivity of man." (Marx, 
1968, p. 74-76). Marxist theories inspired the worker movement in East Europe in 
early 20th century, which aims at expanding the range of citizenship and the inclusion 
of the working class into polity.  
Antonio Gramsci was the first and most important Marxist to abandon the 
economic reduction of civil society to political economy and to insist on its autonomy 
and distinctiveness from the state. He used the term to describe a particular aspect of 
power-hegemony. According to Gramsci, the reproduction of the existing system 
occurs through a combination of two practices: hegemony and domination, consent 
and coercion. These operate through two different sets of institutional frameworks: 
the cultural and associational forms of civil society, and the legal, bureaucratic, police, 
and military apparatus of the state. Gramsci's distinction of culture was a great 
advance for radical theories; it called attention to the routine structures of everyday 
'common sense', which work to sustain class domination and tyranny. As Gitlin 
comments, “It was Gramsci who, in the late twenties and thirties, with the rise of 
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fascism and the failure of the Western European working-class movements, began to 
consider why the working class was not necessarily revolutionary, why it could, in 
fact, yield to fascism." (Gitlin, 1994: 516). 
Instead of prescribing a normative order of civil society, Marx and Gramsci 
drew our attention to the real working of power in the society, that control of capital, 
resources, voices, languages, and rules lead to domination and subservience, rather 
than equality and justice that is highly valued in the rising of capitalism. Marx and 
Gramsci’ work brought new economic, political and cultural dimension to the concept 
of civil society. With other classic and modern theorists, their work inspired the civil 
society movement in 20th century, which consciously started to explore how the 
designing of modern institutions result in concentration of power and prevent the 
practice of those norms, making it clear that the realization of equality of human 
beings and social justice is not only a constitutional issue or ethical construction. The 
format and meaning of political and civic institutions is related to the process of 
power wrestling among multiple social actors and groups. 
Theorists of the neo-pluralism/ neo-Marxist approach, growing up principally 
on the left in the late 1970s in Western Europe, further design specific economic and 
political structure for equal and inclusive participation. They argue for “power 
sharing” and devolution of decision-making power to grassroots level. This approach 
emphasizes the importance of autonomous powers within society both as a 
counterbalance to the state and corporate power and as spheres in which important 
forms of social action can be carried out (Keane, 1988; Mouffe, 1992). They 
articulate that social conflict can best be addressed at the level of neighborhood, 
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workplace, or community where everybody affected by the decision are included and 
interest can be equally expressed (Cohen and Rogers, 1995).  
In contrast to the neo-liberals mentioned below, these theorists often puzzle 
over just how the sort of political framework most conducive to achieving the 
devolution of public power to society might best be achieved. As Keane (1988) puts it, 
democratization- the “road to socialism” - would mean attempting to redefine the 
boundaries between civil society and the state through two interdependent and 
simultaneous processes: the expansion of social equality and liberty, and the 
restructuring and democratizing of state institutions. Two conditions would be 
necessary for the successful enactment of these processes. First, the power not only of 
private capital and the state, but also of white, heterosexual, male citizens over (what 
remains) civil society would need to be curtailed through social struggles and public 
policy initiatives that enabled citizens, acting together in ‘sociable’ public sphere, to 
strive to equal power, and to maximize their capacity to play an active part in civil 
society; Secondly, state institutions would have to become more accountable to civil 
society by having their functions recast. State institutions must be understood as 
devices for enacting legislation, promulgating new policies, containing inevitable 
conflicts between particular interests within well-defined legal limits, and for 
preventing civil society from falling victim to new forms of inequality and tyranny (p. 
14-15). From this perspective, the state is not excluded from the good function of the 
society, but both a condition and workout of it. 
The contribution of the Marxist and neo-Marxist theories is that they go beyond 
the format of political and social institution to look at the real working of these 
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institutions. The power distribution in the society and the interaction among the 
various power holders and non power holders determines the ways the political and 
social institutions work. And for an authentic civil society to emerge from current 
society, one big characteristic is to be applied into action: redefining power relations 
and developing new structures and inclusion targeting at correcting old rules and 
structures. 
Thus, other than discussing the normative format and value of civil society as 
classic theorists, contemporary scholars are concerned with identifying those 
elements that manifest the transition of society and the incipience of new social 
orders. The following paragraph summarizes the empirical research that describes 
different characteristics of the society when the civil society is in gestation.  
2.2 Civil Society Movement in 20th Century 
In Cohen’s influential book, Civil Society and Political theory (1992), he 
presents four cases of civil society movement in 20th century. In Poland in the 1970s, 
Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik and other activists in the “Solidarity Movement” in 
Poland7 took up the notion of civil society as part of an effort to develop a third way 
after the failure of a potentially total revolution from below (Hungary in 1956) and 
the demise of a process of reform of the Communist system from above, both 
                                                 
7 Solidarity (full name: Independent Self-governing Trade Union "Solidarity") is a Polish trade union 
federation founded in September 1980 at the then Lenin Shipyards, and originally led by Lech Wałęsa. 
It was the first non-communist trade union in a communist country. In the 1980s it launched a broad 
anti-communist social movement. Adam Michnik, life-long dissidents and activist for human rights, 
was an adviser to the Solidarity trade union federation during the 1980s, and a negotiator for the 
Solidarity team during the Round Table negotiations of 1989 between representatives of the 
government, Solidarity and other groups that brought an end to communist rule in Poland. Jacek Kuron, 
as a dissident in the 1970s, led the struggle against Poland’s communist party, and later became a 
government minister after 1989. Kuron was seen as the intellectual driving force behind the founding 
of the “Solidarity”.  
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unlikely given the Brezhnev Doctrine, which posited the right of the Soviet Union to 
intervene anywhere in Eastern Europe in defense of “socialism” (Cohen and Arato 
1992; Foley and Edwards, 1998). Michnik named it “new evolutionism”: 
emphasizing the self-organization of society and the self-limiting character of their 
“revolution”; it would not seize power but force structural reform. Rather than trying 
to change the government, Kuron and Michnik thought opponents of the regime could 
be united to change Polish society - by resisting the party's propensity to control every 
corner of social life. Each independent initiative by citizens, each example of self-
organization by people acting outside of party control, Kuron declared, "challenges 
the monopoly of the state and thereby challenges the basis upon which it exercises 
power." (Ost, 1990, p. 64) The immediate task of opposition intellectuals, as Michnik 
(1985) wrote, was to build "a real, day-to-day community of free people." (p. 148) 
Stressing its break with revolutionary tradition which is undemocratic and 
inconsistent and only leads to dictatorial government which block civil society, the 
Solidarity movement in Poland aims at constructing a highly articulated, organized, 
autonomous, and mobilizable civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.1).  
Paradoxically, the road to political change for Poland began with a dismissal of 
politics. The emphasis was decidedly on a dichotomy between society and the state, 
the Polish nation and the (imposed) Communist state. Independent self-organization 
did not, however, mean relinquishing the goal of reforming the state. Kuron and 
Michnik thought that the regime could be prodded to change. "Organized society is a 
power," Kuron wrote, "and a power every authority must reckon with." (cited by 
Zuzowski, 1992, p. 67-68) Michnik (1985) added, "Nothing instructs the authorities 
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better than pressure from below." (p. 142-144) Democracy and civil liberties were the 
ultimate prizes; activating and organizing the Polish people were necessary first steps.  
In Latin America, the transition from military-bureaucratic authoritarian rule is 
seen as strongly dependent on the resurrection of civil society. Here,  
civil society stands for a network of groups and associations between (in some 
versions, including) families and face-to-face groups on one side and outright 
state organizations on the other, mediating between individual and the state, 
private and public. Different from clan, clique, cabal, and clientele, the 
associations of civil society have themselves a public, civic quality related both 
to a recognized rights to exist” and publicly act in defense of justifiable interest 
(Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 48).  
 
Like the Polish activist intellectuals, the proponents of civil society in Latin 
America often translate “society against the state” into visions of a unitary society 
against the state and above the “dirtiness” of politics. And, like the Eastern Europeans 
who eschewed the party label in building their organizations, many Latin Americans 
nurture hopes for “nonparty parties” grounded in civil society.  
Cohen and Arato (1992) noted parallel developments of the notion of civil 
society in France and Germany in the 1970s, both growing out of critiques of the 
totalitarian trend of the state and capitalism. Participants in the French “Second Left” 
and the German Greens movement observed that all social networks, associations, 
and solidarities disorganized under the administrative and commercial penetration 
into society. This view was expressed in Green Party's 1980 founding manifesto:  
Both the capitalist and state-socialist form of concentration and monopolization 
of economic power yield destructive forms of economic growth which 
contaminate and destroy the very basis of human and natural life. Only by self-
determination at the grassroots, the ecological, social and economic crises can 
be appropriately dealt with. (Jürgen Maier, 1990)  
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Both the French “Second Left” and the German Greens insisted on the need to 
reconstruct “political” society as well as civil society, with “the civil society referring 
to social ties cutting across class relations, and political society conceived in terms of 
movements and organizations directly engaged in defending civil society, articulating 
autonomy and conflict within society, and functioning as mediation between civil 
society and the state” (Cohen, 1992, p. 40). The reorientation to civil and political 
society relocates the locus of democratization from the state to society, with a hope to 
present a third way between social statism and liberalism, which, as Cohen points out, 
“despite their opposition, are seen as resembling each other in their effects on 
solidarity relations” Cohen, 1992, p. 40).  
Civil society movement in this period imbued new meanings and implications to 
the term of civil society. It is no longer an entity consisting of a set of abstract rules, 
but consisting of spaces that can articulate social concerns, generate values and 
collective identities, and carry on social projects to address these concerns, values and 
identities. While at first sight the norms civil society activists upheld were not new, 
such as equality, justice and democracy, actually they went deeper to explore how the 
designing of modern institutions result in concentration of power and prevent the 
practice of these norms, making it clear that the realization of equality of human 
beings and social justice is not only a constitutional issue or ethical construction. 
Other contributions the civil society movement in this period has made include: it 
brought the attention to the agency of human beings in bringing about social changes; 
it testified that civil society could be the site where dominant values can be contested 
and phenomenal political and social change can be initiated; it explored necessities as 
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well as strategies to form alliances in society in order to fight against penetrating state 
apparatus and business corporations. In struggles over equality, justice, and 
democracy, the thinkers and activists sought to reform not only the polity, but also the 
institutions of civil society itself. The civil society movement reveals the paradox of 
the concept of the “civil society.” Civil society is not only an end that people are 
seeking for, it is also a venue of social groups to take collective actions and 
constructively contribute to the “civil society” as an end. Civil society is both the 
reason and the consequence, both “now” and “future.” As a venue, civil society has 
associational, ideological, and cognitive dimensions. 
2.2.1. Associational base of civil society 
Since Tocqueville, the richness of unofficial, autonomous, and self-regulated 
social activities and initiatives undertaken outside governmental structures and 
institutions is widely acknowledged to be essential to maintain civil society. These 
activities can include the publication of independent press, charity events, social 
movements, ecological and pacifist activities, and so forth. They represent what 
Gellner identifies as institutional pluralism, “which prevents the establishment of 
monopoly of power and truth, and counterbalances those central institutions which, 
though necessary, might otherwise acquire such monopoly” (Timaneanu, 1995, p. 4) 
A weak civil society indicates an inordinately large area of opportunities for state 
interventionism and controls. A stronger civil society tempers such statist instincts, 
diminishes authoritarian trends, and imposes a certain social accountability on the 
government. Kelly and He (1992) echo this opinion that a strong civil society implies 
the presence of autonomous, self-organising associations and networks willing and 
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able to dissociate from the policies and values of the state. They regard that this 
socio-diversity is one of the important connotations of civil society. “Without this 
political diversity, all opposing forces tend to be penetrated by or reproduce the state” 
(p. 29).  
In the four cases of social movements in Poland, Latin America, French, and 
Germany, the important move is to call for the establishment of alliance among 
people in all forms- clubs, networks of dissident intellectuals, labor unions, learning 
societies- which serve as effective sources of resistance to oppressive government. By 
associating themselves, people are able to gather resources to collaboratively conduct 
public activities, such as to build libraries and hospitals, advance the culture and art, 
protect the environment, defend the rights of the underprivileged, and meet social 
needs of every kind, not just waiting for politicians and bureaucrats, who were 
distance in both space and spirit, to do it for them. “Amongst the laws which rule 
human nature,” wrote Tocqueville in Democracy in America, “there is none which 
seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized, or 
to become more so, the art of associating together must grow and improve.” 
2.2.2 Ideological Base of Civil Society 
For others, such activities and initiatives outside the state are important but not 
sufficient conditions for the development of civil society. According to Gramsci, the 
oppression exists not only because the state or the dominant class control economic 
and political institutions, but also because they grip the intellectual and moral 
leadership. Concerning this intellectual and moral leadership, Strinati (1995) 
interpreted,  
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Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the 
ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of 
subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated 
construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both 
dominant and dominated groups. (p. 165)  
 
This suggests that in studying non-governmental organizations attention needs 
to be paid to mobilizing potentials of organizations and their activities, that is, the 
capacity of raising and circulating alternative ideologies, norms, and values. If the 
dominated class wants to succeed in change the social order of oppression and 
subordination, it must develop a new ideology.  
The Germany “Green Party” formed its powerful “Green ideology” based on 
environmentalism and sustainable economics and aimed at developing a sustainable 
society. Not only limited to environment concerns, the “Green ideology” also 
advocate participatory democracy wherever feasible. Considered to be an alternative 
to socialism, conservatism, and liberalism, it appeals to left-wing people, 
environmentalist, feminists, and other progressive and moderate groups who are 
dissatisfied with current economic and political system. Alternative ideology presents 
people another possibility beyond the current reality and call for people to act 
together for that different social reality. 
2.2.3 Cognitive Base of Civil Society  
For an emerging civil society to form and function outside the arena of the state-
government, people needs to form a new identity. As Manuel Castells in his book the 
Power of Identity indicates, identity is distinguished from roles (for example, to be a 
worker, a mother, a neighbor, a socialist militant, a union member, a basketball player, 
a churchgoer, and a smoker, at the same time), “which is defined by norms structured 
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by the institutions and organization of society.” Identities “are sources of meaning for 
the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of 
individuation…In simple terms, identities organize the meaning, while roles organize 
the functions” (p. 6-7). Meaning for a person, is self-sustaining across time and space, 
and through which the person as a social actor identifies the purpose of his action. For 
the subordinate group, one problem is that they accept the identity of “the inferior,” 
“the second class of people,” or “the oppressed,” and they may aspire to make efforts 
to change the role to “the oppressor.” Thus to seek the transformation of overall 
social structure, people need to build a new identity that redefines their position in 
society. 
Frentzel-Zagorska (1992), in his study of political transformation in Poland and 
Hungary, found out that in Poland model of transition “Among its unique 
characteristics, the most important was the spontaneous tendency of the emerging 
civil society to coalesce around a sort of powerful “mono-organisation.” This 
tendency stemmed from the logic of confrontation with the centrally organized power 
apparatus and from an awareness that the basic contradiction of the system consisted 
in the opposing interests of the corporate ruling elite and society at large” (p. 46). The 
study suggests that the elaboration and articulation of a collective identity plays a 
crucial role in the transition to a democratic and equal social order. 
 
This chapter describes the classic and contemporary theory of civil society. 
Classic theory puts an emphasis on how to build a social order under the condition of 
social change, and on how to integrate the awareness of individual being emerging 
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out the rise of capitalism and the collectivity. The divide between civil society and 
government sets off civil society as non-governmental: that is, as distinct from the 
official, coercive, political apparatus. And the state was the agent for social justice. 
Marx, Gramsci, and neo-Marx theorists draw our attention to the real work of power 
in their society.  Their work inspired the civil society movement in the 20th century, 
which consciously started and kept exploring its identity, constituencies, structures, 
and values. During the civil society movement, theorists and activists have explored 
the capacity of the old-fashioned theoretical distinction between civil society and 
state institutions to make new and different sense of contemporary social and political 
developments. The most important progress is that the civil society has increasingly 
been a site of bringing the voice of the people to the front. This changes the situation 
that the history of political thought has been mainly a history written from the above. 
Now ordinary people are participating in the generation of values, ideas and norms.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA, AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS STUDY 
 
3.1 Definition of Civil Society for This Research 
Many researchers, following the path beaten by Salamon (1996, 1997, 1999), 
are inclined to characterize civil society in terms of a fundamental trichotomy of 
social sectors as the following:  
1. State/government/public sector  
2. Market/private enterprise/corporate sector  
3. Civil society/non-profit activity/Third Sector' 
This classification represents a way of reductionism. It brought convenience to 
the work of doing research on civil society; however, in the real world the lines 
between the three sectors are often blurred.  
First, as Young (2001) points out, “many non-profit organizations charge for 
their services and / or run sideline commercial operations to support them, and / or 
depend very largely on government grants and subventions.” (p.1) Some 
organizations working on “fair trade” are working in the economic area. Second, we 
tend to expect professional and ethnic values to apply to teachers, doctors, engineers, 
scientists, managers, journalists and many others, whether they are working for a state, 
private sector or non-profit institution. Third, some individuals and companies in the 
business sectors (as well as many researchers and social activists) are increasingly 
concerned with the “social responsibility” and “corporate citizenship” of private 
companies. A growing, if by no means yet decisive, tide of opinion holds that 
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businesses in the global marketplace have duties that go well beyond simply 
maximizing profits for shareholders. Unless it turns out merely to be a short term fad, 
this debate about the corporations of the future may progressively erode the 
distinction between for-profit and non-profit activity. Lastly, but by no means least, 
there is global wave of calling for democratizing the governance. Brazilian cities have 
been the sites of significant experiments in participatory and deliberative governance. 
And gradually this movement will also blur the distinction between the political 
sector and the non-political sector.  
Altogether, therefore, the current 'three sector' taxonomy, rest on rather flimsy 
theoretical foundations even in the West, without considering their extrapolation to 
non-Western societies where both state and market have evolved rather differently. In 
China, there is an increasing quest for clearer demarcation of functions and roles of 
the state, the market, and the non-profit sectors; however, at the same time, all 
political and economic institutions need a structural transformation in order to make 
progress in the path of democratization. And a “civil” society is the result of the 
reciprocal interaction of the state, the market, and the social groups and associations.  
To take account of the complexity of the concept, this paper adopts an 
operational definition that is meant to guide research: 
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from 
those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between 
state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. 
Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional 
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forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are 
often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-
governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, 
professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, 
business associations, coalitions and advocacy group8. 
 
The notion of civil society is exogenous to China. However, it has gained 
scholar attention of domestic and Western scholars doing China research. In this 
chapter, I will describe the scholarly discussing about the applicability of civil society 
to the ongoing social changes in China. I will also review research that uses the 
notion of civil society to study civil associations in historical and contemporary China. 
Finally, I will introduce the development of non-government organizations in recent 
years.  
 This chapter serves two purposes: First, to find out what has been done by 
Chinese intellectuals to develop and theorize the concept of “civil society” and to link 
it to the Chinese reality; second, to provide a general picture of the emerging civil 
society in China in recent years. 
3.2 Normative Discussion of Civil Society in China 
Western Enlightenment celebrated the individuality freed from the bonds of 
feudalism. In the center of Western theories of civil society there is the recognition of 
this individual existence, and the re-exploration of the relationship between 
                                                 
8 This definition is provided and adopted by the London School of Economics and Political Science.  
Available from http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm 
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individuals and the society based on this premise. Individuals are bearer of rights, and 
are morally and politically equal.  
In China, market economy never got full development until recently. China was 
economically self-sufficient and politically isolated from the West before the Opium 
War in 1842. For thousands of years the society was under the control and regulation 
of the patriarchal state. Individuals are bound to their families, masters and lands. 
They cannot move freely or pursue what they want. Social order is maintained by the 
will of the high authority. In this context, the culture emphasized compliance from 
individuals. 
It is still a myth that why feudalism had existed in China for thousands of years 
without being interrupted by capitalism before the Opium War, which strongly shook 
the belief in the superiority of Chinese culture and system held by both the ruler and 
the ruled. However, thousands of years of authoritarian rule and master-servant 
structure have more persistent influence on Chinese society than people can imagine. 
At first sight the “Westernization movement” in late 1890s and then the slogan of “we 
want science and democracy” in the “May Fourth Movement” in 1919 showed the 
preponderance of Western knowledge over Chinese knowledge in the Oriental-
Western interaction during this period. However, a second look will show that 
Chinese tradition did not really recede. In 1898, Zhang Zhidong, an influential 
imperial bureaucrat in earlier economic modernization, publicized his Chapter of 
Advise to Learn (Quan Xue Pian) and advocated his opinion about the quest to learn 
from the West: “Western knowledge as usefulness, Chinese knowledge as essence” 
(Zhong Xue Wei Ti, Xi Xue Wei Yong), which then became the flag of Westernization 
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movement. In this statement, Western knowledge provides the skills and technology, 
but should not be allowed to replace the moral and political base of China in China’s 
quest to become a strong country. Although reformists and revolutionaries criticized 
proponents of Westernization movement for their superficial and uncritical thinking 
about social change, surprisingly this approach was actually embodied in the system 
of all political parties, whether conservatives represented by Kang Youwei, or 
reformists, the Republic Party led by Sun Yat-sen and late Chiang Kai-shek, or the 
Communist party of China (CPC) led by Mao and his successors. Democracy is 
embraced as a tool for mobilization, and an instrument to achieve the goal of building 
an economically strong and militarily powerful China, rather than to contribute to 
individual fulfillment of the Chinese people. Thus the principles of democracy are 
adapted to suit this need, and when other principles are regarded to better serve this 
end, the principle of democracy would be abandoned by political leaders. (Zhao, 2000, 
p. 41) 
CPC that has been the ruling party of China since 1949 adopted Marxist-Lenist-
Maoist thought as its orthodox ideology. Recall that Marx sees the conflicts in civil 
society only to be resolved when each person is "a communal being" united with all 
other citizens, and the state will be the entity through which everyone would achieve 
his individual good which is in harmony with common good. Marx designated a 
popular democracy here, and the politics take some non-state form such like 
commune. For Chairman Mao Zedong and the party he led, then, the Marxist idea of 
democracy is interpreted as collective rule by the Party in the unified interest of the 
people. Theoretically, the party is regarded as having no special interest of its own 
45 
and as acting solely on behalf of the most fundamental, unified, and long-term 
interests of the people (Ding, 2000, p. 112).  
 Ding points out how unity prioritizing over individual interest justifies the 
penetration of the Party into every corner of the society. Mao Zedong expounded on 
the structure of interests in socialist society as a structure of unity among three 
different kinds of interests- those of the state, the collective, and the individual- in 
which state ownership was regarded as the advanced form of public ownership, 
collective ownership as in transition toward state ownership, and private ownership as 
no more than a tolerated remnant of old society. Moreover, contradictions among 
people were considered “questions involving the distinction between right and wrong 
among the people,” indicating negative aspects of life; the positive aspects were 
related to unity (Ding, 2000, p. 112).  
From 1978 to mid 1990s, although the rights of people are written in the 
constitution, the public talk of civil rights was a forbidden zone. For example, while 
the 1992 constitution prescribed freedom of speech and expression, the constitution 
also established an obligation for each citizen to uphold the four “basic principles” of 
party leadership, socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, and Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist thought. If an act of speech is held to constitute counterrevolutionary 
incitement, it is regarded as a crime that may get a penalty of imprisonment of no less 
than five years. Zhao (2000) cites Andrew Nathan’s study of Chinese constitutional 
tradition which indicates, 
The democratic rights of citizens in these constitutions were not derived from 
human personhood but were consistently regarded as a grant given by the 
communist state to the citizens, to enable the citizens to contribute their energies 
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to the needs of the nation. Communist leaders thus were able to add and 
withdraw rights casually. They could also write laws to restrict constitutional 
rights. In this situation, although some democratic rights were written in these 
constitutions, the Chinese people could hardly exercise the democratic rights 
prescribed there (Zhao, 2000, p. 45). 
 Consequently, partly due to the effective monitor and control of the Party 
system, and partly due to the effect of thousands of years of traditional culture which 
inculcate the ideas of compliance, respect for authority, and emphasis on unity and 
social order, there is rare incidence of organized resistance and theoretical challenge 
toward the dominant ideology and political system. 
The market reform launched since late 1970s after the demise of Mao 
rationalized values contradictory to the claim of a unified interest. Under a more 
relaxing political atmosphere at the beginning of the reform, scholars began to reflect 
on the structural reasons that democracy failed to function in China. The “unity of 
interests” was criticized in early 1986 at a conference on political reform organized 
by Chinese Social Science (Zhongguo shuihui Kexue), an influential journal published 
by the Chinese Academy of Social Science. One argument focused on the state-
society relationship and suggested that the difference in interests between the state 
and society provided a basic motivation for democracy: to allow society to protect 
itself from the state. During the late 1980s, emphasis on the difference rather than the 
unity of interests as the foundation of democracy became well-established among 
scholars and gained some official acceptance, as was evidenced by the ensuing voice 
within the regime.  
Ding (2000) in his article “the conceptual evolution of democracy in intellectual 
circles” summarizes academic discussion related to democracy. In early 1986, Zheng 
47 
Shiping, in an article publicized in Political Science Research of (Zhengzhixue 
Yanjiu), suggests that the past measures of decentralization were ineffective because 
they focused only on the allocation of power among different levels of government, 
while the problem of excessive centralization could be solved only by “the return of 
power to society.” Yan Jiaqi, a leading scholar, supports this position and suggests 
that the state should give up its total control of society, allowing individuals and 
social organizations autonomy from the state. Su Shaozhi suggests the existing 
system in China was that of state socialism, under which the party “developed into an 
omnipotent structure in charge of everything.” Under this system social and political 
life became a “unified domain,” suffocating democracy and freedom. Rong Jian, 
using Marxist perspective to argue for the moment when the society regained its 
“self-consciousness,” the society would take back the power of the state. He further 
explains his idea of the two-step-process of returning power to society: economic 
self-determination and democratization in political arena. Another scholar cites 
Marx’s notion of communism as “communities of free people” as evidence that the 
kind of socialism Marx envisioned was built on the basis of a free contractual 
relationship between the government and the people (Ding, 2000, 112-116). 
However, despite the academic discussion about the withdrawal of the state 
from the social sector, the leadership of the CPC over China is not challenged. In fact 
there was a “Neo-authoritarianism” school arising in late 1980s that argues for strong 
leadership from CPC. Sautman, in his article Sirens of the Strongman (1992), 
exhaustively tracks the origin and development of this school. First beginning in 1986 
among some young intellectuals in Shanghai, then embraced by some leading 
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political scientists and policy adviser, such as Wu Jiaxiang, deputy director of the 
Investigative and Research Department of the General Office of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), and Chen Yizi, director of 
the State Council’s Institute for Restructuring the Economic System, the central 
proposition of this school is that in current situations of imperfect market mechanism, 
divergent interests and low culture level,  “it is more feasible and realistic for some 
powerful leaders to push ahead with modernization than to implement democracy all 
at once” (Sautman, 1992, p. 76). In June 1988 the leading intellectual newspaper 
Guangming Daily published an article that used the example of the success of “Four 
Dragons” in East Asia to argue for a leader as capable as the strongmen in those 
countries. Wu Jiaxiang illustrates the reason supporting this proposition, “because the 
decline of traditional authority brings a decentralization whose beneficiaries are not 
ordinary citizens, but the intermediate social structure created by the old authority, i.e. 
the officialdom, which grabs power and plunges society into a state without authority, 
economic freedom or democracy, a liberal, ‘enlightened,’ ‘brilliant’ authoritative 
leader with centralized power is necessary to prevent this situation and remove the 
obstacles to real freedom (Quoted by Sautman, 1992, p. 78). In the neo-authoritarian 
system the political leader rather than the political structure is stressed. Moreover, the 
issue about the foundation of the authority is completely ignored in these discussions. 
In 1980s a parallel discussion was going on which focused on justifying civil 
rights. Shen Yue, a Tianjin scholar, 1986, argued for civil rights through 
reinterpreting Marxist notion of “Burgeliche Gesellshaft.” After scrutiny on Marx’s 
work, she regards that the term of “Burgeliche Gesellshaft” in the work of Marx 
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actually refers to townspeople society (shimin shehui), instead of bourgeois society as 
previously incorrectly translated and misunderstood. Townspeople are transformed 
into citizens by their participation in market and bearing of rights and duties in the 
legal system. Thus civil rights are class-neutral. However, Xi Zhaoyong refuted that 
Burgeliche in Marx’s work mainly referred to bourgeois. Shen Yue used Marx as the 
theoretical reference since Marxist thought was still the orthodox ideology and 
theoretical guide at that time. And bourgeois ideology is seen as threatening to CPC 
rule as well as to national solidarity and social order (Quoted by Ma, 1994). 
Similar to the period of Western Enlightenment, Chinese intellectuals were 
putting efforts on constructing a framework for dealing with the relation between 
individuals and the society on which the social order is based. (Keane, 1988, p. 37) 
Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli (1988), Chinese co-authors of one of the first essays 
published on the mainland to urge the creation of a civil society within a regime that 
had fed hitherto upon a deep-seated culture of “dependency on the state,” in their 
essays deemed individualism as the legitimate basis of “civil awareness.” (Ma, 1994, 
p. 184) Liu and Wang differentiated masses with citizens, with the former 
emphasizing subordination to rulers, while the latter emphasizing individual rights 
and equality. In contrast, another school neo-traditionalism represented by Ju 
Mingzhou, emphasized citizens’ duties in civil societies. This school argued that 
without society there is no citizen. The presence of society enables the creation of 
citizens, and the formation of citizenry represents perfection of individuals. Thus 
citizens should first be conscious of his membership in the society and takes his 
responsibility to the society. 
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Ding (2000) regards that the meaning of civil society as explained by Chinese 
scholars during this period was a rather weak and passive one. Instead of a well-
organized political society confronting the state, it was interpreted as a depoliticized 
sphere of social and economic life, while the state was given the power to dominate 
the political life of society. When intellectuals talk about “returning power to the 
society,” the power in their minds is often limited to economic self-determination. 
The focus then was not on the right of society to participate in the political process, 
but on limiting the state power to the political sphere. The emphasis was on 
separation rather than participation. Also the state rather than civil society is deemed 
as the main actor in as well as the site of democratization.  
This situation got some twist since 1990s. In late 1992, Deng Zhenglai and Jing 
Yuejing published an article on civil society, in which they defined civil society as “a 
private sphere of autonomous economic and social activities based on the principle of 
voluntary contract, and a public sphere of unofficial participation in politics.” (Deng 
and Jing, 1992, p. 61) The inclusion of “a public sphere of unofficial participation” 
marked their difference from Wang Jiaxiang and Rong Jian’s notion of civil society, 
which was economically free but politically passive. Deng and Jing envisaged a two-
stage development of civil society: the first stage aimed at setting up a “dualistic 
structure” in the state-society relationship; the second was characterized by the 
“expansion of civil society from the private to the public sphere” and the 
development of “positive interaction” and democratic politics. In August 1993, more 
than forty scholars attended a conference on civil society in shanghai. At the 
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conference, Guo Dingping argued that the development of civil society had to 
precede the transformation of the authoritarian system (Ding, 2000, p. 127). 
Different with the claim “small government big society” which emphasized a 
reconstruction of economic structure, the discourse of civil society never received 
official recognition. From mid-1990 onward the debate on civil society petered out 
since the Tiananmen Square incident brought tension between the government and 
intellectual groups. Later the debate gradually revived, however, the discussion was 
reoriented toward a “civilized society,” emphasizing the civil behavior of citizens. 
This notion of citizenry is co-opted into official discourse calling for observance of 
law from citizens in order to establish a society based on “rule of law” (Howell and 
Pearce, 2001, p. 125).  
In the international seminar held in Tsinghua University in 2000, Yao Xianguo 
and Yu Jianxin rejected the zero-sum relationship between the society and the state 
inspired by Locke’s and then developed by neoliberalism. They used the concept of 
social capital to emphasize the cooperation between the society and the state. They 
argued that social capital is not something rising and falling out of politics and the 
government. The formation of social capital depends on state building such as 
constitution, legality, juridical review, election, parliament, legislation, multi-party, 
etc. In the meantime, the accumulation of social capital can prevent the arbitrary 
intervention from the state on the society and contribute to the effective working of 
the state. Thus they suggest that two processes should be simultaneously going on: 
strengthen the capability of legislature and enforcement part of the state, and create an 
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environment conductive to the development of civil associations. This view is 
representative of the opinions expressed in other articles in this conference.  
 While advocating individual rights, autonomy, freedom and associational life, 
the Chinese domestic discussants of civil society hardly challenge the legitimacy of 
the state. Civil society in their mind is one that maintains a harmonious relation with 
the state, rather than a hostile rejection of it. Deng Zhenlai and Jing Yuejin (1992) in 
their article point out that the conflict in the society necessitates the intervention of 
the state, echoing the theory of Hegel. The civil society discussants emphasize a 
social life with mutual trust and cooperation. Less attention is paid to the power 
relation between the individual and the state and between different groups in the 
society. Meanwhile, it is noticeable civil society was translated as “shi min she hui” 
(townspeople society) that excludes rural population from their discussion instead of 
“gong min she hui” (civil society) that has broader inclusion. 
3.3 Empirical Research of Civil Society in China 
While Chinese scholars are mainly concerned with establishing a normative and 
prescriptive framework that address the foundation of social order and relationship 
between the society and the state, Western observers are more concerned with 
whether such a civil society ever exists in China and what its nature is. Compared to 
optimism of domestic researchers, Western scholars hold ambiguous view toward the 
prospect of civil society in China. Especially after the tragedy on June 4, 1989, China 
watchers became more skeptical of such a development, emphasizing the fragility and 
weakness of the incipient civil society. Some scholars questioned the applicability of 
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such a concept, to a society and culture so different with the West where the concept 
originates.  
Inspired by the emergence of semi-autonomous associations in the reform years 
and the debate over civil society, scholars such as Rowe (1993), Rankin (1993), 
Huang (1993), and Strand (1990) have explored its historical antecedents in late Qing 
and republican periods. In the late Qing period, the central state was weakened by 
internal crisis and external invasion; Chinese officials, intellectuals and average 
citizens had access to Western political knowledge and social values; and there is an 
embryo commodity economy, all these were believed to be conducive to the 
emergence of civil society in modern sense. Scholars explored the richness of 
associational lives in this period. In his book which studied nineteenth-century 
Hankou, a commercial center in China, Rowe (1993) argued that local merchant 
guilds played an active role in the management of local social and economic affairs. 
Similarly in a case study of Zhejiang province, Rankin (1993) argued that the Taiping 
Rebellion (1851-1864) led to a change in the balance between the state and local 
elites, and the local elites took over responsibility for the provision of welfare 
services, the construction of roads and public buildings, and the supervision of 
irrigation systems, thus assuming public roles.  
Rankin preferred to using Habermasian concept of public sphere over civil 
society because he thought that civil society is more related to Western history of 
political development and democratic ideals, and the term of public sphere is “less 
embedded in Western political theory of historical literature and is more adaptable to 
other parts of the world” (Rankin, 1993, p. 159). Particularly, Rankin finds an overlap 
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of meaning between Western usage of public sphere and the Chinese term, gong or 
public, in parallel to notions of official (guan) and private (si). Rankin found that the 
meaning adhering to the words public are broad and ambiguous: “it may denote the 
state, civic associations and activities outside the state, consensual or broadly held 
opinions and values, publicity to project status or aura, openness and common 
availability, or the existence or pursuit of some general good” (Rankin, 1993, p. 159-
160) Thus he found it is perfect to be used in Chinese context to analyze associations, 
activities, exchanges, facilities, services, and opinions out of state control at that 
period. Rankin used the term public sphere broadly to refer to an intermediate arena 
where officials and the populace engage in open public initiatives. As Rankin noted, 
“such spheres require a state presence, a degree of autonomous or voluntary social 
involvement, some social impact on policy, and legitimizing idea of the common 
good” (Rankin, 1993, p. 160). 
In the previous review of Western theories of civil society, we have known that 
Habermas developed the concept of public sphere to refer to a sphere of critical, 
rational debate that, under the particular historical circumstances of the rise of 
capitalism in France, Germany, and Britain, became the locus for a political challenge 
to public authorities. Comparing with the public sphere in the mind of Habermas, we 
find what’s missing in Chinese context is the “rational and critical communication.” 
Political communication is going on only within a small group of intellectuals. These 
intellectuals are more or less connected to the old political structure, and attached to 
traditional values, so their discussion could hardly be described as critical. The 
participation in reform is limited to the elite. The elite is consisting of liberal officials 
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and old gentry with open mind, whose role are different with that of bourgeois in the 
Western transformation. In fact, Rankin suggested, “the late imperial public sphere 
was local rather than national, linked to the rise of commerce and commoditization 
rather than capitalism, consensual rather than confrontational, and characterized by 
management of local affairs rather than public discussion.” (Howell and Pearce, 2001, 
p. 127) This public sphere served for the goal of maintaining social solidarity, social 
order and security more than for promoting justice and democracy.  
This role of civil society was reiterated and confirmed by Brook’s study. 
Through a survey of local sources, Brook (1997) demonstrated the richness of civic 
culture in Shanghai over the past four centuries, where voluntary organizations have 
formed around the principles of locality, occupation, fellowship, and common cause.  
Brook links the expansion of autonomous group formation to state crisis, arguing that 
such voluntary organizational activity not only compensates for the weakness of the 
state but serves to stabilize state-society relations (Howell, 2001, p. 127). 
In his critical review of Rowe’s and Rankin’s accounts of local elite activism, 
Wakeman (1993) remained skeptical of the degree of local autonomy, arguing that 
such activity was officially sponsored and patronized from above and embedded in 
the complex interlinkages between the bureaucracy and local guilds and associations. 
Civil society in modern China has a long distance from Western definition of civil 
society and Habermasian’s public sphere. Wakeman cites Habermas’ definition, 
By “public sphere” we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which 
such a thing as public sphere is open in principle to all citizens… Citizens act as 
a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to 
coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and unite freely, and 
express and publicize their opinions freely (p. 111).  
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And then Wakeman cites Philip Huang’s notes, 
In the context of Western European history, Habermas’ study of the rise of the 
public sphere is tantamount to a study of the roots of democracy… From the 
standpoint of the roots of democracy, it was not merely the expansion of the 
public realm of life that was crucial, but rather its expansion in the context of 
the assertion of civic power against state power (p. 111).  
 
While this broad participation of citizens in public affair, civil society for 
democracy, and assertion of civic power against state power are all lacking in 
findings of studies on Chinese civil society. Wakeman criticizes that Rowe’s 
conclusion of the similarity between Chinese urban society and Western capitalist 
society is not supported by convincing evidence. Wakeman also comments on the 
student protest in Tiananmen Square in 1989, thinking “the incipient elements of civil 
society failed to come together in a sustained and organized way” (p. 112) 
Strand (1990) echoes Rankin in the existence of a civil society in the republican 
period. He noted that restaurants, bathhouses, markets, temples, and brothels in the 
republican period served a similar role with salons and coffee shops during the 
emergence of Western capitalism, in these places discussions occurred and a public 
space was created; the spread of new media such as newspapers and telephones 
helped to circulate ideas and opinions; the formation of professional associations such 
as lawyer’s guilds and chambers of commerce from 1903 onward pointed to the 
emergence of a limited public sphere. For Strand this sphere was limited because such 
associations reflected a mixture of dependence and autonomy, representing social 
interests, yet at the same time imprinted with state power (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p. 
127). Chamberlain (1993) defines civil society in a way that makes it roughly 
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equivalent to what might be called incipient democracy (p. 223). He concentrates his 
attention on Chinese phenomenon with the wished-for civil society. 
Huang (1993) provides a positive interpretation of this difference between 
Chinese and Western path of civil society development. Huang used the term “third 
realm” to refer to a sphere between state and society, with both participating. He 
stated “The twin processes of modern societal integration and modern statemaking in 
late Qing and Republican China, limited though they might have been in contrast to 
the West, led to greater interpenetration of the two and expanded third-realm 
activities” (p. 229). Huang mentioned that the democracy in early-modern and 
modern Europe “was born of a high degree of both modern societal integration and 
modern statemaking” (p. 230). He pointed out that the example of the new chambers 
of commerce illustrated well the simultaneous involvement of state and society in the 
new institutions of the third realm, a process making for statemaking and societal 
integration.  
In agreement with Huang, Culp in his studies of the elite-managed educational 
institutions in Republican period when a weakened and delegitimized bureaucracy 
caused the devolution of power into the hands of local elites groups, find “it may 
more productive to see state and social forces interacting in an institutionalized third 
realm that was a product of merging processes of state building and proliferation of 
elite voluntary associations” (Culp, 1994, p. 473). 
The compromised autonomy of many of these associations and their complex 
ties with the state inhibited the emergence of a civil society that offered an alternative 
locus of power challenging state authority. Other characteristics of civil society such 
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as citizen rights, legal protections, and an effective constitution limiting state power 
were relatively weak. However, the research of these scholars challenged the 
assertion of Max Weber that China’s failure to develop capitalism was owing to the 
absence of urban political autonomy and to the dominance of particularistic 
attachments to native-place kith and kin, and also challenged the famous assertion of 
“clash of culture” by Huntington who regards that Chinese culture is inimical to 
Western idea of democracy and civil society can’t develop in Chinese context. The 
presumption of a uniquely unchanging “traditional” China, which so dominated 
scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s, was still a powerful influence in the field. Rowe 
and Rankin’s argument was framed in this context (Huang, 1993, p. 221).  
3.4 Civil Society Development in Contemporary China 
In one-party system, the transition of leaders can imply the possibility of 
transformation in economy and politics. This is what happened in 1970s’ China. With 
the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his pragmatic approach, the emphasis of the state 
shifted from ideological control to economic development. However, conditions 
disadvantageous to the development of civil society still exist: the Communist Party 
doesn’t want its legitimacy to be weakened or its authority to be threatened by new 
powers; Chinese political leaders is unwilling to make change to the fundamental 
political structure, which is reflected in such political slogans as “constructing 
socialism path with Chinese characteristics” and “constructing market economy with 
Chinese characteristics.” Chinese intellectuals and the middle class, with their 
intricate connection with the old system and the ruling party, play an ambiguous role 
in pushing for democracy. Meanwhile the creation of a political and social 
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environment advantageous for the development of civil society is hopeful under three 
changes: 1) with the withdrawal of the state from the social sphere, the third sector is 
encouraged to fill the blank; 2) with the economic decentralization and marketization, 
the pervasiveness of party apparatus is reducing, and the control of the Party is 
declining, thus many social initiatives are tolerated; 3) with the openness to the 
international environment and China’s integration into world affairs, the third realm 
got support both financially and theoretically.  
 A focus of academic debate is if there is a middle class or a bourgeois class in 
China. Howell and Pearce (2001) posit that as a result of restructuring of the social 
fabric, grater social differentiation, and increased mobility, there is a process of class 
reformation. A new domestic bourgeoisie is in the making, composed of an 
expanding group of private traders, private entrepreneurs, and Chinese managers in 
foreign companies as well as Chinese owners of overseas businesses (p. 131). 
However, different from the middle class emerging in 17th and 18th century in 
Western societies, this group has closer connection with the state; it is difficult to find 
a common identity for this group; they are not spiritual or moral leader of other 
classes; the members in this group usually do not directly confront with the authority 
of the state, nor do they have political agenda of democracy issue; they are rational 
and pragmatic, not risking their careers. (Pearson, 1997) 
NGOs come from three sources in China: First, they are transformations from 
mass organization, such as All China Women’s Federation, All China Youth 
Federation China Association for Science and Technology, and China Disabled 
Person’s Federation. They were established in Leninist-Maoist era to oversee and 
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mobilize particular constituencies and served as “transmission belt” of government 
policy. In 1980s, they were transformed into parastatal non-profit sector (also called 
GONGO) to advance charitable, research, information and polity objectives. The 
second category is traditional membership associations, such as culture centers, sports 
and recreation clubs, student societies, professional association, and etc. The third are 
organizations established by intellectuals or activists who saw the emerging social 
crisis and the need for non-governmental intervention. Despite of their great 
contribution to maintaining social stability and vitality, their roles are not officially 
and socially recognized until the publication of Civil Society in the Making: 250 
NGOs by the Chinese Development Brief in 2001 (Young, 2001).  
The rules governing the formation and activities of social groups were enacted 
in the wake of the Tiananmen incident of 1989. The State Council Order No. 43, 
promulgated in October 1989, was entitled The Regulations on the Registration and 
Management of Social Organizations, to replace the “provisional measures” of 1950. 
It required that no social organizations might carry out their activities before approval 
for registration has been granted. The timing of its formulation indicated the 
government’s concern at that time about the emergence of social groups outside 
government control. During the weeks of political storm leading to the Tiananmen 
Square incident, quite a few unregistered organizations, e.g., the Beijing Workers’ 
Autonomous Federation and the Beijing Students’ Autonomous Federation, had been 
engaged in agitating activities that challenged the Communist Party’s authority. The 
regulations have been implemented effectively. In 1991, a nationwide investigation 
was conducted. Some social organizations are disbanded. According to the 
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pronouncement of the state, these organizations had deviated from the correct 
political line, used unlawful means to make profit, or avoided government 
management, causing elements that threatened social stability (Zhang, 1995). 
Even in the golden time of forming association between late 1970s to 1980s, 
when there is no law governing the formation and activities of social organizations, 
free associationism was far from being really achieved. Although there was no system 
of national regulation until 1989, they tended to be regulated in an ad hoc manner at 
sectoral or local levels and were often established under the umbrella of a state 
department. The unit system, the party network, the nomenklatura system did not 
change much since Maoist era9. As Nathan (1997) said, “The unit system tied both 
rural and urban residents to a work or residential unit that controlled virtually all 
functions of their lives. This include jobs, education, marriage, housing, medical care, 
recreation, and political education.” (p. 55). Thus, people actually do not have much 
privacy in their lives. Nomenklatura personnel system enabled the party to control the 
appointment and promotion of officials. Thus if officials failed in identifying 
“dissidents” and repressed their action timely, their political career will fail. Using 
social mechanism of control including control of media and party network, the state 
can guide the thinking of people. As a result, even during 1980s, those unregistered 
association cannot reach a broad population. Their activities are only limited to a 
small group of core members.  
                                                 
9 The nomenklatura were a small, élite subset of the general population in the Communist countries 
who held various key administrative positions throughout the governmental system, as well as 
throughout the party's own hierarchy. The Communist party has the authority to make appointments to 
these key positions. 
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Autonomy of semi-governmental and non-governmental organizations is a 
major focus of research in this period. The mass organizations is observed to have 
transformed from “transmission belt” in Maoist era to service-oriented, working style, 
activities and structures, adopting new ideas and openness to global norm and trend. 
For example the All-China Federation of Trade Unions has set up legal departments 
to assist worker with contractual issues and to deal with labor disputes. The All-China 
Federation of Women has conducted research into discrimination against women in 
the workplace, has pressed for legislation to protect women’s interests, and has 
expanded international networks (Howell, 1996).  
Though the tight regulatory framework makes the process of registration more 
complicated, people continue to organize in ways that bypass the regulations or 
require less formalities such as affiliating with another association or forming 
networks (Saich, 2000). Merle Goldman (1991), Andrew Nathan (1990), Michel 
Bonnin and Yves Chevrier (1991) have discerned a nascent Chinese civil society in 
the successful creation of networks of independent organizations “outside state 
control” by such intellectuals as Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming in the period 
preceding the spring of 1989. Gu (2000) studies four intellectual groups, The 
Development Group led by Chen Yizi, the Beijing Social and Economic Science 
Institution (BSESI) founded by Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, The Cultural 
Academy founded by young scholars in Beijing University, and the editorial 
committee of the Toward the Future series led by Jin Guantao and his wife Liu 
Qingfeng. These four groups represent different scholarly schools and have distinct 
mission. Gu illustrates that these intellectual organizations either avoid this restraint 
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by registering as for-profit corporations or minban institute, or possessing great level 
of decision-making autonomy by gaining support of high-rank reformist bureaucrats, 
and argues for the emergence of independent intellectual public sphere. However, 
Chamberlain (1993) criticizes that these organizations are missing the thesis of 
“popular consciousness.” He cautions that “The constituent elements of a nascent 
civil society are relatively limited in number, largely urban based, mainly centered in 
the intellectual-student community.” 
Echoing the global civil society movement, popular resistance in China is 
another focus of research as symptom of civil society. Evidence showed that 
resistance and protest against authority arose during the economic reform (Perry, 
2001; Saich, 2000). As victims of reform and government corruption, urban workers 
who were laid off and farmers who are further marginalized by economic liberation, 
spontaneously organized protests and complaint activities, seeking compensation and 
fair treatment from the government. Due to the strong state control and lack of legal 
organization for coordination and collective bargaining, these protests are just 
ephemeral phenomena. They are easily oppressed or pacified, with leaders being 
imprisoned or under supervision for very long time. And in these protests, people 
aggregated without long-term goal. (Wakeman, 1993) 
Following the Eastern European model of civil society vs. dictatorial state 
model, writers such as Gold (1990), Ostergaard (1989) and Strand (1990) saw the 
“Tiananmen Square incident” as indicative of an emerging civil society. Chamberlain 
(1993) reports that this temptation comes from 
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the manifestly high level of political awareness and sophistication among 
student involved in the demonstrations; the insistent student demands for 
autonomy; the warm support given to students not only by “white-collar” 
professionals but also by the bulk of ordinary citizens; the seeming ability of the 
demonstrator to police and govern themselves in the midst of chaotic conditions; 
the aura of goodwill and “civility” pervading the streets of Beijing (p. 199).  
 
For Sullivan (1990) the hallmark of civil society is the capacity of once alienated 
groups within society to overcome their differences and present a solid front in the 
face of an intransigent regime. Chamberlain is skeptical of the “emergence of a 
cohesive popular consciousness” and pointes out the fragility of such united front and 
lack of enduring change. Compared to old tradition of protesting the state, 
Chamberlain recognizes that there is increasing request and practice of open 
discussion in the process, and the goal is compatible with the global democratic 
project; for openness, less corruption, democracy. However, he observes no shared 
identity among the participants that ties them together. Discussion and decision-
making is still limited to a small group.  
In Chinese history, there are not many records of collaboration across classes. 
Peasants’ strikes happened a lot of times in history, and occasionally there are 
intellectual protests against the authority. But only in times of national crisis, there is 
formation of alliance among different classes. The Communist Party of China (CPC) 
was once very successful in utilizing national crisis to mobilize workers, peasant, 
students, intellectuals, and even capitalists to work together for the same goal. But in 
most of the time, the line between different groups is clear. In contemporary China, 
urban citizens are blaming village migrant workers as the source of chaos and crimes, 
and similarly, “white collars” do not believe that they have similar interest with 
workers in factories. Due to the lack of communication among different groups, there 
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is absence of consensus. This further reduced the motivation to challenge the state’s 
transgression, because with the possibility of acquiesce of other groups to state’s 
transgression, there is greater chance for the challenge to fail (Weingast, 1997). 
3.5 Historical Institutionalism 
While the theories and empirical research on civil society provide a framework 
to evaluate the feature of civil society, historical institutionalism provides a 
framework to analyze the process of the formation of civil society. The transition of 
society involves the restructuring of the power system and the struggle between these 
power holders. Historical institutionalism “represents an attempt to illuminate how 
political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take 
place.” (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992, p.2) Among a variety of theories that 
explain how preferences are formed among individuals and groups or why one 
alternative is preferred over another, there are two kinds of explanations especially 
competing with each other: rational choice institutionalism, and historical 
institutionalism. Both theories acknowledge the impact of institutional circumstances 
on shaping individual choices. However, rational choices model views actors as self-
interest seekers, that during collective decisions each actor attempts to maximize his 
own interest. Institutions set down the rules of game, such as whether it is a zero-sum 
game or win-win game, and how much to win or to lose, and players try to maximize 
their benefits within the rules (North 1990, and Bates 1989). Historical 
institutionalists agree with rational institutionalists on the constraining effect of 
institutions, but they want to go further and argue that institutions plays a much 
greater role in shaping politics than that suggested by a narrow rational choice model. 
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According to historical institutionalism, individuals are not so much as all-knowing, 
rational maximizers, but more as rule-following “satisficers” (Hall 1986, and 
Skocopol, 1985). This is largely due to the limited reasoning capacity of human 
beings and lack of information and knowledge about alternative. As Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992) convincingly address, people don’t stop at every choice they make in 
their lives and think to themselves, “now what will maximize my self-interest?” 
Instead, most of us, most of the time, follow societally defined rules, even when so 
doing may not be directly in our self-interest. 
Rational choice and historical institutionalism also diverges on the issue of 
preference formation. Rational choice institutionalists have a difficulty to 
operationalize self-interest, that in many cases they just make assumptions about what 
that self-interest is, such as certain benefits or certain positions, and in many cases 
they avoid this difficulty by focusing on strategies players adopt. And institutions 
primary provide a context imposing constraint on strategies. This is quite different 
from historical institutionalists, who argue that not just the strategies but also the 
goals actors pursue are shaped by institutional context. Thus, historical 
institutionalism is especially helpful in analyzing that how the change of institutional 
contexts impacts the shift of interests and values, which is essential in the transition 
of society.  
Historical institutionalists work with a definition of institutions that includes 
both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct 
(Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 2). Key to their analyses was the notion that institutional 
factors can shape both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power 
67 
among them in a given policy (p. 6). One feature typifying this new institutional 
perspective is its emphasis on what Hall (1986) refers to as the “relational character” 
of institutions. More important than the formal characteristics of either state or 
societal institutions per se is how a given institutional configuration shapes political 
interactions. 
Historical institutionalists often disagree on what is counted as institution. Some 
are more focused on formal structures and legislature system. For example, 
Immergut’s (1992) comparative analysis of health care policy in France, Switzerland 
and Sweden illustrates how a nation’s electoral rules and constitution provide the 
institutional rules of the game in which political battles are fought. Weir’s (1992) 
study of evolution of employment policy from 1920s to the 1980s summarizes the 
organization of political institutions such as parties, legislative and legal processes are 
instrumental in determining how groups define their policy interests. Their studies 
ignore the importance of social structures and informal social norms to forming 
preferences and choices. Steinmo and Thelen (1992), in their book Structuring 
Politics, offer their view of how broadly the institutional net should be cast, 
emphasizing that social structures and norms are accountable as institutional contexts 
for behaviors and choices. 
Thus the term “institution” can encompass a wide range of meanings. For 
example, Peter Hall’s (1986) definition includes “the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy.” John Ikenberry (1988) breaks 
down his definition into three distinct levels that “range from specific characteristics 
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of government institutions, to the more overarching structures of state, to the nation’s 
normative social order.” Another widely used definition is provided by Scott (1995) 
who distinguishes three institutional pillars: “Institutions consist of cognitive, 
normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning 
to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers- cultures, structures, 
and routines- and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.” As Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992) comment, historical institutionalists lack the kind of universal tool kit 
and universally applicable concepts on which other more deductive theories are based. 
Rather than deducting hypotheses on the basis of global assumptions and prior to the 
analysis, historical institutionists generally develop their hypotheses more inductively, 
in the course of interpreting the empirical material itself. Each researcher would get a 
different set of institutions and interactions among institutions that accounts for 
decisions, policies and organizational changes. And this kind of exploration would 
also be a task in my study. I would use both the previous literature and my own 
fieldwork to construct the framework of institutions that are relevant to the 
development of civil society. 
3.5.1 Political Regime and Regulative Structure 
Researchers recognize the most determinant context is political regime and 
party structure, which decides how far the reach of the state could be achieved. The 
common sense is that civil society is relatively weak in authoritarian state and one-
party state compared to democratic state and multiple-party state. Structures of 
political and civic participation are essential for the constitution of a public space 
(Hahn, 1995). Variations within the political regime include the difference of 
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constitutional rule, electoral rule, and importantly, the level of centralization and 
decentralization, which influence the legitimacy of social activities and the range of 
these activities.  
The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the party in power in China. The CPC 
has both central and local organizations. At the top is the Central Committee and, 
when it is not in session, the Political Bureau (Politburo) and its Standing Committee 
exercise the power of the Central Committee. Both the Political Bureau and its 
Standing Committee are elected by the plenary session of the Central Committee. In 
reality, the Politburo oversaw the operations of the government and made all major 
policy decisions. The state administrative organs of the People's Republic of China 
include the central and local administrative organs. The central administrative organ 
is the Central People's Government, better known as the State Council. Local 
administrative organs are local people's governments at four levels: the provinces 
(autonomous regions and centrally administered municipalities), cities and 
prefectures, counties and townships. The administrative organs are under the 
leadership of the CPC, with the Sectary of the Party Committee as the highest 
authority in each level of government. In China all the government officials are 
appointed by the CPC Organization Department. People can elect for the deputies of 
local People’s Congresses. Each local People's Congress then conducts an election for 
the next higher level of People's Congress, culminating in elections for the national 
legislature body: the National People's Congress (NPC). NPC is the nominal highest 
organ of state power, with the rights of legislation, decision, supervision, election and 
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removal. However, the nomination of the candidates the NPC is still largely 
determined by CPC. 
Researchers find that economic reform of China results in increasing 
decentralization which changes the relation between the central government and local 
government. Dittermer & Hurst (2002) are concerned with the change of power 
balance between central and local politics. They observed that during early the reform 
era, the state apparatus devolve greater decision making authority to local levels, in 
part because of uncertainty or opposition to reforms and in part because the central 
state itself was quite weak in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. This shift of 
decision-making power results in variety of political control model depending on 
local political and social climate, and consequently variety of possible spaces allowed 
for civil society development.  
Researchers find that economic reform also impacted the use of monitoring and 
control mechanism. Walder (1994), a leading political scientist in Harvard University, 
in his theoretical discussions on institutional change in communist regime, argues 
convincingly that economic liberation has created alternative channel for officials to 
obtain material benefit and thus officials are less motivated to obey the command 
from their superiors. And while economic liberation also increase the cost for monitor 
and control, such inspective and control actions declined. Minxin Pei (1994) in his 
study on the transition of Communism in China and Soviet Union has argued that 
“reform in the communist systems tends to generate and accelerate the decay of the 
key institutions it seeks to preserve and revitalize” (p. 49).  
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3.5.2 Political culture 
Political culture constructs the persistence of certain mental forms that tend to 
direct, inspire, and orient individual responses to significant and often divisive issues, 
including the attitudes toward the state, bureaucracy, change, minorities, and so forth 
(Timaneanu, 1995, p.7). Thus there is no doubt that political culture has a strong 
influence on civil society development. Jeffrey Hahn (1995) points out that even the 
most committed activists would fail in their democratic actions in the absence of a 
supportive political culture. Timaneanu articulates that creating an open society out of 
authoritarian traditions and habits are indeed the most daunting political and social 
tasks. According to Timaneanu, a psychological readiness for change is essential for 
civil society to emerge, survive and sustain.  
Kelly and He (1992) point out that the communist hegemony over mainland 
China radically reinforced the age-old tradition of unitary, non-competitive politics, 
and has created a highly centralized, state-dependent society. Civil society in China 
has lacked ideological validation and legitimacy. An example is that rather than 
choosing to support democratization based on the renewal of civil society, the post-
Marxist trajectory of the intellectuals is from the party-state democracy towards the 
“new authoritarianism.” (Kelly and He, 1992, p. 33; Sautman, 1992). 
Feng Chen (referred by Dittermer 2002, p. 21) echoes this view and points out 
that despite its far more elastic contours and attendant loss of popular credibility, 
Marxist ideology continues to legitimizes the absolute control of Communist party 
and rationalize regime maintenance of control over the masses and perhaps to 
encourage a more long-term perspective on elite political theorizing and collective 
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agenda setting for the future. In the contrast, Dittermer observed that orthodox 
ideology is increasingly subsumed by local political culture.  
In the society, Confucianism has dominated China for thousands of years. 
About the role of Confucianism in Chinese politics, scholars have different judgment. 
Some thought the “min ben” thought in Confucianism shows respect to public will. 
“Min ben” means treating the welfare of the common people as the basis of the 
wealth and power of the polity. It is reflected in the classic Chinese statement min wei 
bang ben (people alone are the basis of the state). Such a conception, however, 
presupposes a distinction between the ruler and the ruled, and exhorts the ruler to 
pacify the common people in order to achieve the stability of their ruling. Guang 
(1996) comments that “Minben is very much a paternalistic idea. It seeks to ensure 
the welfare of the common people in order to keep the rulers in power, not to extend 
to the people autonomy and power of participation in government” (p. 423). Other 
scholars including famous political scientist Samuel Huntington argues that 
Confucianism is inimical to democracy. “Confucianism's insistence on the importance 
of equality over freedom, sympathy over rationality, civility over law, duty over 
rights, and human-relatedness over individualism seems opposite to the value-
orientation of the modern West” (Tu, 2001, p. 13).  
Sen argues in his discussion on global roots of democracy, that diversity is 
feature of most cultures in the world, and culture is not resistant to change. There is 
evidence that political attitudes and political behavior of people change recently. Shi 
Tianjin (1999) finds that economic growth makes people to have more confidence in 
asserting their own interest and more efficacy in political participation. And Chinese 
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intellectuals, inspired by civil society discussion in the West and global civil society 
movement, and encouraged by loosened ideological control by the state, began to 
criticize “unity of interests,” attempted to justify civil rights, and argued for 
“returning power to the society” (Ma, 1994).  
What is worthy of noticing is that in an authoritarian regime where the political 
and social institutions are in the control of the ruler, the political culture is primarily 
shaped by the need of the ruler, and the existing political and social institutions, such 
as the administrative structure and the education system, keep reinforcing the political 
culture to solidify the power of the ruler. Thus, in ancient China, even though 
Confucian thought mentioned the importance of the people’s welfare, the political 
institutions reinforced the ruler’s interpretation of Confucius theory that emphasizes 
the compliance of the people to the emperor and his officials. In Chinese history, 
political culture shifts when there is phenomenal change in political contexts or when 
the state is relatively weak, such as in the late Qing Dynasty and in late 1970s.  
3.5.3 Social Structure 
Fewsmith (1999) identifies and distinguishes two political models in analyzing 
the relationship between social and political change. The model of elite politics sees 
politics as limited to a small group within the state agencies and thus politics are 
relatively autonomous from society and hence resistant to change. The other model 
emphasizes mutual penetration and interaction between the state and society, and thus 
the structural change within the society would influence the power balances and 
change of policy orientation. Scholars who study contemporary China have 
discovered changes in social structure after the economic reform has created potential 
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to change the political scenery. There emerged a “middle class” comprising business 
elites, professionals, and intellectuals in China (Dittmer & Hurst, 2002). Although the 
members in this group usually do not directly confront with the authority of the state, 
or have political agenda of democracy, due to their possession of valuable resources, 
expertise, and knowledge, they nevertheless have more negotiation power with the 
state. 
Institutions shape people’s attitudes and preferences, and reversely people’s 
preference shape the institutional design. It is especially compelling to look at the 
moments of institutional change. Conflicts over institutions and their outcomes reflect 
the change of interests and power relations in the society. To the relevance of my 
research, neo-institutional theories adopting a historical perspective do not assume an 
essential relation between the state and society. The degree and strength of autonomy 
and capacity of multiple political actors, including the state, to act are constrained by 
historical context and current forces. And the actions the state and the society take 
affect subsequent rounds of political choices. Humans both make and are made by 
their own history. Thus, rather than viewing human choice as bound by static 
institutional constraints, historical institutionalists see choice bound by history itself. 
Discussion of the nature of civil society and the state-society relationship relies on the 
understandings of the interactions between human and institutions in a real world. 
Thus, in the following chapters, besides examining the contextual factors 
enabling the emergence of the public space and the increasing activities conducted by 
social groups, the researcher will pay attention to the following aspects: 
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1) The interactions between the society and the state. Past research has 
focused on the organizational structure of social associations or forms of social 
actions, but does not pay enough attention to how the state and social groups interact 
with each other. The respective power of the state and the social groups, and the way 
they interact using their power directly impact the results of the social groups’ efforts 
and the feature of the civil society.  
2) The outcome of social actions and state-society interaction, especially 
the institutional change in political, social and cultural aspects. We not only pay 
attention to the actions taken by social groups , but what consequence that their 
actions lead to, which should be an essential part in our observation and description 
of transition to civil society. 
3.6 Implication for My Study 
I intend to study the nature of civil society and the change of state-society 
relationship in China. The literature review in this and the previous chapter provides 
me certain conceptual lens to observe such a civil society, for example, if it focuses 
on self-determination, or political rights, or participative structure of policy-making. 
And the literature also provides theoretical tools to describe the associational, 
symbolic (if the civil society groups have capacity to generate alternative values) and 
cognitive (if there is such consciousness of civil society differentiated from the state) 
dimensions of civil society. Educational institutions, with the state, market, society all 
involved, are good examples to observe how the society interacts with the market and 
the state. 
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Historical institutionalism provides a framework to explain the nature of civil 
society and change of state-society relationship. In this study, I will study two cases: 
one is a private university in urban city whose programs are more market-oriented, 
and another is a non-governmental open university in rural village that focuses on 
educating peasants with both development skills and critical thinking. By studying the 
similarity and difference of the two institutions in academic missions, educational 
values, strategies to survive and expand, connection with other social groups and 
organizations, and ways of interaction with the government, it expects to understand 
how institutional contexts, such as regulative structure, local political culture, and 
social networks, that impact on the nature of civil society in China.   
Many previous studies of Chinese civil society emphasize the initiatives of the 
society, and the interaction between the state and society is rarely discussed. However, 
both the state and society changes in response to contextual transition, and they are 
mutually molding each other in their interactions. I hope to explore civil society 
development in China while viewing civil society both as arenas responsive to 
institutional transformation as well as arenas that construct values and carry out 





This study uses case study methodology to examine the establishment and 
development of two non-governmental higher education institutions and their 
interactions with the government, and thus contribute to the broader theory about the 
evolvement of state-society relationship. Moreover, the exploratory nature of this 
study and the emphasis on multifaceted social processes calls for a qualitative method 
in order to: 1) generate data that accounts for the relative social complexities of the 
research questions; 2) render conclusions regarding the theoretical relevance of this 
study.  
In this chapter I will first offer a justification for using a qualitative case study 
approach to answer the research questions, and I will describe what my case is. Next, 
I will describe the data sources that will be utilized in the study. Finally, I will talk 
about some validity issues in conducting the research. 
4.1 Qualitative Methods and Case Study Justification 
Many analysts of political culture pursued their projects through statistical 
interpretations of large-scale attitude surveys. These surveys provide information 
about people’s attitude toward democratic concepts and practices. For example, to 
study the political culture in rural Botswana, Parson (1977) surveyed 1,060 
households in rural Botswana to get information about: 1) the knowledge of the actors 
in, and the processes and activities, of the political system; 2) the participation in 
voting; 3) the evaluation of the services and policies of the government. In another 
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study, Shi Tianjian conducted a survey to study the political attitudes of people in 
Beijing, China after the economic reform. Shi Tianjin (1999) finds that economic 
growth made people to have more confidence in asserting their own interest. 
However, survey has its limitation. First, people’s knowledge of the political system 
is a potential source that directs people’s behavior, but not a good indicator of their 
real behavior in the reality, just like a people familiar with Kantian thought probably 
not behave in a way guided by the thought. Often there is gap between what people 
believe and what people do, either because he is constrained by the surrounding 
condition, or he chose the way that benefit him most instead the way he though most 
correct. Second, survey shows a snapshot of the society, but not a live picture of how 
actors interact with each other to make the society function or make the society 
transform. 
There is another method often used to study civil society, the historical method: 
many well-known studies on civil society are conducted by historians, such as the 
study of the public life in Zhejiang province after the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) 
conducted by Rankin (1993), and the study of the nineteenth-century Hankou by 
Rowe (1993), and the study of rise of the bourgeois public sphere since the 18th 
century by Jürgen Habermas (1989). Data resources include documents, sound 
recording, pictures, artifacts, and other original work that was created at or near the 
time being studied, narrative accounts by people who experiences the time being 
studies, and secondary historical records. 
Compared to survey or historical study, qualitative research enables the 
researcher to develop a level of detail about the individual or place and to be highly 
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involved in actual experiences of the participants (Creswell, 2003). Qualitative 
research expands the range of knowledge and understanding of the world beyond the 
researchers themselves. It often helps us see why and how something is the way it is, 
rather than just presenting a phenomenon. For this study about the development of 
non-governmental educational institutions, the goal is not only to observe this 
phenomenon, but to find out how this phenomenon happens and why it happens in 
specific time and place. Miles (1983) asserts that qualitative methods are a bona fida 
area of scholarly research because they attempt to gather comprehensive and “rich” 
data from multiple sources. A qualitative study, then, might investigate a problem that 
is otherwise difficult to depict through numbers or survey data.  
Compared to historical method, case study focuses on contemporary 
phenomenon within real-life contexts (Yin, 2003). It provides a systematic way of 
looking at the phenomenon, and as a result the researcher may gain a sharpened 
understanding of why the instance happened as it did, and what might become 
important to look at more extensively in future research. It does not aim at obtaining a 
big picture of the history, but an in-depth understanding of specific issues bounded by 
time and space. 
Prior research documents the validity of using the case study method in 
analyzing similar civil society organizations or activities. Morgan and Bergerson 
(2000) used case study methodology to study the process of introducing and 
implementing lay boards at a number of higher educational institutions. This study 
revealed how internal and external forces influenced the process, and how multiple 
actors, values, structures, and interactions were involved. Gu (2000) studies four 
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cases of the development of intellectual groups and argues for the emergence of 
intellectual public sphere in China. The four cases illustrate different relationships 
that intellectuals have developed with the state in 1980s and 1990s. Culp (1994) used 
case study methodology to investigate educational associations and institutions in two 
counties: Jianshan and Lanqi, in order to understand local politics in Republican 
China. Case study can explore complex occurrence to achieve a holistic 
understanding of the occurrence. 
In addition, the case study technique is appropriate for exploring a topic on 
which little empirical research exists. Often qualitative studies are undertaken 
because there is a lack of theory, or existing theory fails to adequately explain a 
phenomenon. There are thus no hypotheses to be deducted from theory to guide the 
investigation. Qualitative investigators build toward theory from observations and 
intuitive understandings gained in the field (Merriam, 1998). Since the politics of 
non-governmental education institutions has rarely been studied before, case study 
technique will contribute to theory development for this phenomenon.  
In deciding which cases to study, probabilistic sampling is not necessary or even 
justifiable since statistical generalization is not a goal of qualitative research 
(Merriam, 1998). On the contrary, it is what we can learn from the case, not whether 
it is representative or not, that determines the case selection (Stake, 1995). In my 
study, I chose two cases: one is a private university in Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi 
province; another is a non-governmental open university in Ding xian, a rural county 
in HeBei Province. These two institutions are chosen for study because first, they 
illustrate the social efforts to break the monopoly of the government in managing the 
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formal and informal education. Each is a pioneer institution in their respective area, 
the area of private higher education and the area of peasant adult education, and their 
experiences tell a comparatively complete story of state-society interaction in these 
two areas; second, despite all kinds of difficulties, both institutions sustain to today; 
third, both institutions have complex social networks with the government, traditional 
educational institutions, and other non-governmental organizations, which would be 
valuable to the study of state-society relationship; fourth, both institutions have 
certain influence in their respective area as well as in policy-making. Thus, through 
the case we can gain an understanding of how they expand their influences. In this 
study, the cases are bounded both by location (two provinces) and by the time period 
beginning from the establishment of the universities through the time of my fieldwork. 
Personal familiarity with the two institutions and the consequent trust between 
the researcher and the people in the two institutions are additional reasons for 
choosing the two cases. Since 2002, the researcher has been involved in a project on 
“Improving the quality of private higher education in China through policy advocacy 
and accreditation system,” led by Professor Jing Lin and Fengqiao Yan and sponsored 
by the Ford Foundation. By participating in this project, I have had chances to talk 
with people of the private university on phone, and visited the campus in 2005. So, I 
am not a complete stranger to them. For another Institute for peasant adult education, 
I knew one of the founders before the institute was established, and became a 
volunteer of the Institute since its existence. The trust between the two institutions 
and the researcher help me gain entry into the two organizations and obtain access to 
necessary information.  
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These two institutions are working respectively in an urban and a rural area; 
they have different ownership structure and administrative structure; they have 
different academic missions, and have developed different systems of recruiting 
professors and admitting students. They have different visions about the social order 
and thus choose to focus on different groups and adopt different education methods to 
approach the vision. The differences reflect the multiple and parallel processes of 
“development models” that are experimented in contemporary China. In the 
implementation of the government’s “open door” policy, China since the early 1980s 
has been exposed to diverse ideas, institutions, practices, and models from the world, 
which are different or even contradicting, and individuals and social groups got their 
inspirations from different sources. People are pursuing the modernization path and 
simultaneously contemplating on the problems of modernization. In contrast to the 
common sense that “civil society” is one unitary field, civil society is the aggregate of 
multiple and overlapping spaces which have different structures and develops in 
different paces. Simultaneously, the revelation of any similarity of politics of these 
two institutions may demonstrate the influence of a more overarching institutional 
context such as political culture on state-society relationship. 
4.2 Data Sources and Data Collection Strategy 
I used interviews and documents as primary sources for data collection in my 
study. Yin (2003) identified interview as “essential sources of case study 
information” (p. 89), because interview can focuses directly on case study topic and 
can provide perceived casual inferences. In addition, Murphy contends that interviews 
are the best qualitative data source when “you are interested in examining issues of a 
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process—how decisions were made” (p. 77). According to Murphy, interview data 
may be used to determine how complex events occurred, who was involved, and what 
the program or policy means to key participants and influentials. For example, 
Pearson (1997) used interviews to investigate the attitude and involvement of 
business elites in politics.  
Yin (2003) mentioned that “Interviews will appear to be guided conversations 
rather than structured queries…Your actual stream of questions in a case study 
interview is likely to be fluid rather than rigid” (p. 89). Thus, I used open-ended 
questions in interviews to ask respondents about factual data as well as their opinions 
about events. The interview protocol is derived from the overarching research 
question and subquestions (See Annex 1-4). The interview helped me to get 
information about who are involved, how they are involved, what factors impact their 
preferences, what, how and why certain actions are taken, what the interaction among 
different actors are like, and how they perceive the relationships between the state and 
social groups. 
Document analysis provides critical information about historical events and the 
institution’s development. The case related documents include website of both 
organizations, meetings notes, project proposals, government regulations, brochure of 
workshops, evaluation reports, and the organizations’ newsletters, yearbooks and 
research journals. Documents are primary data sources in some research on 
organizational change in China (Saich, 2000). Documents can cover a broad range of 
information, such as names, times, events, decisions, and outcomes, even though they 
may not be always accurate and may even carry some biases. Document is also useful 
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“to corroborate an augment evidenced from other sources” (Yin, 2003, p. 87). To 
ensure validity, the analysis has considered the source of documentation, the 
authorship of the documents and the intended use of the documents.  
4.2.1 Interview Pool Selection 
I used purposeful sampling to construct my interview pool. Merriam (1998) 
explains, “purposeful sampling is based on the assumption the investigator wants to 
discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which 
the most can be learned” (p 61). The aim of the fieldwork was to describe and analyze 
the evolvement of state-society relationship from the stories of two educational 
institutions. Key informants with special knowledge of the development of the two 
educational institutions were consulted. For the purpose of my study, I interviewed 1), 
Founders and administrators in the private university in Xi’an; 2), Founders and 
administrators in the Institute for Rural Reconstruction in Ding Xian; 3), Officials in 
local and central government who are in charge of approving and accrediting private 
higher education institutions. The founders and administrators in both educational 
institutions helped me to know the stories behind their survival and development, and 
to understand the how institutions interact with the government. The interview with 
the president and faculty in both educational institutions also helped me learn about 
their educational values and their perception toward the role of education in a 
changing society and in politics. The interview with officials helped to obtain an 
understanding toward the relationship between the state and educational institutions 
from the perspective of the government.  
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4.2.2 Fieldwork  
Yuhua University 
The fieldwork of Yuhua University was primarily conducted between May and 
June in 2005. In May 25, 2005, with other researchers of the Ford project, the 
researcher went to Yuhua University. The Ford project had provided certain research 
grant to teachers in the project’s two participating private universities in order to 
improve the quality of teaching and management at the universities. A conference 
was held for the private university faculty to present their papers. The researchers 
listened to the presentation of teachers about their research design and findings. In 
addition, as a part of the Ford Project which was to evaluate the quality of Yuhua 
University, the researchers conducted group interviews with teachers, staff and 
students in each educational institute. This focus group was not a representative 
sample of teachers and students in each university. It consisted of people who were 
willing to participate in the focus group and talk with the researchers. 12 teachers and 
17 students participated in the group interview. In this group interview, the 
researchers mainly asked about why they chose to work in the university and their 
feelings about the university. Although this is not in the fieldwork plan of the 
researcher, the group interview helped the researcher understand if the teachers and 
students feel the same way about the university as the administrators told us. 
After other researchers of the Ford project left, the researcher of this dissertation 
stayed for another two weeks and conducted interviews with the key informants. The 
founder was not in Yuhua University at that time, but was pursuing his doctoral 
degree in Britain. And the researcher interviewed him through phone before and after 
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the visit to the private university. During the two-week stay in Yuhua University, the 
researcher interviewed the deputy president, and then through the introduction of the 
deputy president, interviewed the other six administrators, among them, two co-
founders of Yuhua University who are also in the Board of trustees, one Vice 
President, the Dean for academic programs, one administrator for student affair, and 
one editor in the research center. These people were selected for their knowledge in 
each of the important transformation stage of Yuhua University.  
The researcher also interviewed two municipal government officials in Xi’an 
city where the private university is located. The government officials were the 
Director and Assistant Director of the Office of Education Run by Non-governmental 
Sectors (OERNGS). They were selected because the Office was the direct supervising 
government branch of the private university.  
For the private university, secondary data are also collected from the following 
1) Website of the university which provides background information about the 
university, such as organizational structure, academic programs, personnel, 
and etc. 
2) Yearbook, which provides key events of the university over the years 
3)  Government regulations, including regulation issued by the provincial and 
central government.  
4) Articles about how the regulation is drafted, written by the Office of 
Education Run by Non-governmental Sectors.  
5)  Research publications of the research center in Yuhua University, which 
show the research capacity of the university, as well as the research focus of 
the University. 
6) Newspaper reports about the university. 
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Dingxian Institute of Peasant Education 
From the end of June to the end of July, 2005, the researcher visited the 
Dingxian Institute of Peasant Education (DIPE). The researcher interviewed the 
president, and interviewed the other seven administrators, among them, two founders 
of the Institute and also the members in the board of trustees, the assistant of the 
President, the Director of Office, the Chief of Staff who was in DIPE from the very 
beginning, one for the research, one responsible for ecological agriculture and one 
responsible for the ecological architecture, altogether eight people. The interviewees 
were selected according to their involvement in and knowledge about each of the 
important working area of DIPE.  
The researcher interviewed two municipal government officials in Ding Zhou 
city where the institution is located, one is in OERNGS, the direct supervising 
government branch of the Institute, and another is in the Bureau of Agriculture which 
has cooperative relationship with the Institute. 
For DIPE, the case related documents were collected from the following  
1) Website of organizations, which provides background information about the 
university, such as organizational structure, academic programs, personnel, 
discussion topics, key events, and etc. 
2) Notes of meetings and workshops, which provide detailed records of each 
workshop and meetings.  
3) Journals written by volunteers, which provide information about the 
experiences of the volunteers in the Institute. 
4) Newsletters regularly published by the Institute. 
5) Newspapers co-edited by the Institute and the villagers. 
6) Evaluation reports written by scholars and volunteers students. 
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7) Media report of the Institute. 
8) Publication of the Institute. 
9) Government regulations about peasant cooperative and non-poisonous 
farming. 
 
When the researcher was on site, there was a workshop on peasant economic 
cooperative, and a workshop for ecological architecture. The researchers observed 
how the workshop was conducted, how students participated in the discussion, and 
how students responded to the content of the workshop. The observation provides the 
researcher a chance to obtain close-up examination of the Institute’s practice, and also 
triangulates the information obtained through notes of meetings and workshops taken 
by volunteers and the Institute’s staff before. In DIPE, the researcher also talked with 
villagers and participants of the workshop in an informal way. Although this is not in 
the fieldwork plan of the researcher and is not included in the data analysis, the 
informal conversation with the participants helped the researcher understand the 
views of villagers toward the Institute.  
 
Issues of Entry, and Ethics  
Compared to the limited access to information and the relatively tight control 
over Chinese society during 1950s and 1960s, a condition that severely handicapped 
many areas of American research on contemporary China, China’s political 
liberalization in the post-Mao era has opened up the availability of data source for 
research. Harding (1993) writes, “Chinese officials began to make themselves 
available for interviews…and limited opportunities opened up for fieldwork in 
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China,” particularly for those who had institutional and personal contacts in the 
country (p. 26). However, afraid to be involved in any kinds of trouble, or not seeing 
the necessity of being studied, many organizational leaders, and government officials 
and staff may refuse to be interviewed or to provide documents for research projects. 
In Xi’an city, with the Ford Project and the connection of the primary 
investigators of the Ford project with the government, two government officials in 
OERNGS accepted my interview. When I called the other government officials, they 
were unwilling to undergo the interview in the excuse of either being too busy or they 
are not the right person to talk with. 
In Dingzhou city, due to the tension between DIPE and OERNGS10, and due to 
the sensitivity of the local government toward visitors from abroad11, the government 
officials explicitly stated they do not welcome me or any reporters or researchers. But 
some local government officials visited DIPE during the workshops, and the 
researchers took the opportunity to talk with two officials.   
The lack of primary source from the government about the attitude and opinion 
is partly compensated by talking to other people inside as well as outside the two 
educational institutions to know about how government interact with Yuhua 
University   and deal with issues such as land, tax, program registration, and 
accreditation, as well with DIPE to deal with issues such as land, registration, grant 
application, and etc.  
                                                 
10 The Institute is organizing workshop on peasant cooperative, which is regarded by the municipal 
government to be beyond the range of operation stipulated on the Institute’s license. The detail of the 
government-Institute tension will be described in Chapter Eight.  
11 There is a conflict between the local government and the villager on the use of land, which led to 
fight between the two sides. The government is wary of visitors from outside the city, especially from 
abroad, who may expose the issue to the media. 
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Before the interviewing, the researcher disclosed the purpose of the research to 
interviewees, and obtained the consent of the interviewee in sharing the information 
for research purpose. For ethical concerns, the researcher will protect the anonymity 
of the informants. In the dissertation, for clarity reasons, only the function of the 
interviewee has been displayed, i.e., the president, head of village, chief of staff, etc.   
Data Collection Procedures  
The interviews made use of three recording methods: audiotaping (using digital 
voice-recorders), photography, and taking written notes. 12   The researcher took 
written notes in all interviews regardless of whether or not the interviews were 
audiotaped. If allowed by the interviewees, the interviews were recorded on digital 
voice-recorder with high storing capacities.  This enabled the possibility to check 
accuracy of the written notes after the interview was conducted. However, when the 
interviewees explicitly expressed that they do not want their words to be audiotaped 
or they felt uncomfortable when there was voice-recorder around, the researcher 
would only take notes of the conversation. The two institutions were photographed, to 
facilitate description and analysis of the setting.   
Self-reflective notes were recorded in a field journal, which was consulted 
throughout the drafting of the dissertation.  Also, notes and recordings were subject to 
in-the-field analysis, and enabled consequent fine-tuning of interview questions. 
 
                                                 
12  Most case study researchers recommend using written notes, because of the time-consuming 
transcription of audiotaping (Stake, 1995).   
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4.3 Data Analysis Procedures 
4.3.1 Case Analysis Strategies  
After the field work, the field notes and recordings were transcribed.  All 
interviews were fully transcribed. Every interview is stored as a file labeled with time 
and name of interviewee. The other information was stored by the source of 
information. Simultaneously, reading through all collected information, including 
written notes of interviews, documents, observational fieldnotes, and etc, is necessary 
for obtaining a sense of the overall data (Tesch, 1990; Creswell, 1998). During the 
general review of all information, reflective notes and preliminary findings in the 
form of memos were written down.  
After the transcription of fieldnotes and interviews, the multiple sources of data 
from both cases are organized in a chorological order to unfold the evolution of state-
society relationship over time. The state-society relationship is not a static state and 
the development of civil society is in a dynamic changing process in the transitional 
period of China’s economic and political changes. Events are labeled, such as 
“getting registered”, “getting approval for land use right”, “planning workshop”, etc, 
that identified a move of the organization for practicing its missions or interacting 
with other groups. For interactions, key actors involved are highlighted, such as “with 
the government”, “with other social organizations”, “with the media.” The researcher 
keeps reviewing each event, writing summaries and memos, and drawing meaning 
from it.  
In order to discuss the state-society relationship, government-organization 
interaction is the focus in the data analysis. The responses of the government toward 
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the move of the organizations are summarized into short statements, and the 
researcher looks for correspondence between these statements and establishes 
patterns. The strategies that the educational institutions adopted in interacting with the 
government are also analyzed in this way. Finally, based on the patterns of 
government-organization interaction, the chorological description of events is 
packaged into several development stages, each stage representing a characteristic of 
government-organization interaction. Although in some situations the government 
attitudes shift from time to time, and the organization strategies are not so clear-cut 
and overlapped in different stages, the development stage still presents a picture of 
evolution along the time. 
The literature of civil society provides categories for analyzing the nature of 
civil society. As discussed in the chapter of literature review, civil society as an end 
has two dimensions: the ethical dimension and the institutional arrangement 
dimension. Civil society as a venue has three dimensions: ideological, cognitive, and 
associational dimension. These are categories abstracted from the literature review 
and will be the analytical tool in the data analysis. What these categories fail to do is 
to describe how the civil society utilizes these ideological, cognitive, and 
associational resources and turns them into negotiation power during their interaction 
with other political actors. There is a tie missing between the civil society as a venue 
and civil society as an end. This is the goal of the data analysis in this research, which 




4.3.2 Comparison of Cases 
The contexts of the two cases are compared to examine what changes in the 
environment relate to the emergence and development of the organization. However, 
it is not the researcher’s attempt to disclose the causal relationship between the 
contextual elements and the civil society development. In the field of comparative 
politics, John Stuart Mill described two approaches for doing comparison: “Method 
of Agreement” and “Method of Difference.” These two methods present a logic way 
to reveal the causation. However, the identification of independent variable and 
dependent variables in civil society development and the discussion of the causal 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables is not the purpose of 
this research. Instead, the research is to identify meaningful events that mark the 
evolution of state-society relationship and draw a picture of civil society in China 
from the consequential events and networks of actors involved in the events. Thus, 
the description and comparison of contextual elements is to present the direction of 
change rather than a static cause-effect connection. 
The “ideological,” “cognitive,” “associational,” and “strategic” dimension of 
civil society in both cases are compared. From the comparison, patterns across cases 
will emerge. The aggregate analysis of the two cases is a pattern-searching process 
that displays convergence as well as divergence of the characteristics in multiple units 
of the society. And the researcher will interpret the patterns in a meaningful way that 
people can learn from the cases about how Chinese society evolves in a rapidly 
shifting domestic and global environment. 
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4.4 Internal and External Validity 
The data collection and data analysis described above demonstrate that the 
researcher is a key instrument in these processes. Given the limitations of human’s 
understanding and the consequent distorted description or interpretation of data from 
interviews or documents, and the possible bias that the researcher could bring into the 
data collection and analysis, the researcher must employ certain measures to ensure 
the validity of what is reported. The following section will talk about some control 
strategies for the validity of the case study. 
Internal validity deals with the question of how research findings match reality 
(Merriam, 1998). Triangulation, the process whereby multiple data sources are used 
to develop converging lines of inquiry, recommended by Yin, Merriam and Stake, 
will be used to avoid bias and distortion, and thus to increase the internal validity. I 
triangulated some background data from the document and from the interview on the 
validity of time, location, participants, and decisions. However, when there is a 
conflict between different interviewees, triangulation is not a useful strategy and may 
reduce the rich information and implication imbedded in this conflict. Under this 
conflict, I used a more constructive method, exploring data relevant to the 
interviewees, such as their respective position in the network, their relationship with 
others, and their ideologies to fully understand why there is such conflict.  
Member checks, also recommended by the three authors, can enhance internal 
validity. This process requires that the researcher verify data content and 
interpretations with the source, particularly if the data are derived from interviews or 
observations. This verification builds in another filter for catching missed or 
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misconstructed perspectives by both the researcher and data sources throughout the 
duration of the study. If the interviewee agreed to check and help, I brought the 
transcript back for their review. 
Yin recommended investigators think about rival models and make sure their 
models are more relevant to understand or explain the phenomenon. Basically, a case 
study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly observed. An 
investigator will “infer” that a particular event resulted from some earlier occurrence, 
based on interview and documentary evidence collected as part of the case study. 
However, if the researcher sticks on one model of explanation, he might ignore 
intentionally or unintentionally those evidence that do not fit in this model. Having all 
the rival explanations and possibilities considered would prevent this “theory bias.” 
For this case, literature review has helped lay out multiple possible factors that may 
address the institutional change, and I kept open to other possibilities of factors 
emerging during the fieldwork, and ultimately to approach the reality in possible 
maximum level.  
External validity is “establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalized” (Yin, 2003, p. 34). Because it is impossible for a case study to follow the 
same procedures in sampling as experiments and surveys do, and because of the small 
number of cases to be studied, generalizing from the cases to the whole population is 
problematic at best. Case study has a different argument for generalization, called an 
analytic generalization (Yin, 2003; Becker, 1990). In analytic generalization, the 
investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory 
rather than to the whole population. As suggested by Yin, a previously developed 
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theory can be used as a template to compare the empirical results of the case study to 
the previous findings. And the findings of case study can help to extend and refine 
theories by specifying the conditions under which a theory holds. 
4.5 Limitation of the Study 
There are three limitations in this study. First, because of the difficulty to get 
access to some important informants, especially government officials, the study risks 
missing key perspectives from government officials and their narration about 
experiences of involvement in this process. 
Second, the study focuses on the perspectives and narratives of the founders and 
administrators when studying the development of the institutions, and sees them as 
the new actor who entered into the public space and interacted with the state, thus 
ignoring the experiences of students in the institution whose attitudes and ways of 
participation may also reflect the social change and state-society relationship in the 
transitional period. Hopefully, future studies will pay attention to students’ experience 
in the educational institutions.  
Third, this study aims primarily at contributing to the theory of civil society 
development, and thus it has limited implication for policy advocacy. However, it 
may help facilitate mutual understanding between the state and the society and 
facilitate future interactions. Despite these limitations, this topic is still worthy of 
studying, because little is known about the nature of civil society development in 
China, especially in the area of education. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN CHINA:  
A HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Pusser (2003) reminded that historically when centers of power began to 
consolidate the administrative, symbolic, and coercive bases of their power, they took 
an interest in the educational system. He wrote, 
The historical patterns have varied considerably, but there is one clear 
relationship: As the state has emerged and consolidated its administrative base 
of power through the creation and expansion of bureaucracy, it has begun to 
exert control over education and to use education to sustain not only the 
administrative bureaucracy but also the symbolic and coercive bases of power 
(p. 122).  
 
This statement could well explain the relationship between the political system 
and education in China. For thousands of years the need of political system has a deep 
influence on education system. Seeing through the difference of educational systems 
in different countries and regimes, observers would find surprising similarities in the 
use of education for political goals. The transformation in a system or society requires 
reformers to work against the prevailing force of the time and change the structure of 
education. Thus, before we go into the specific cases to explore the working of non-
governmental education organizations, the researcher perceives a need to review the 
cultural and education system in Chinese history to catch a glimpse of the force that 
sustains social continuity or propels changes. After this, the researcher describes the 
history of private higher education and adult education which has great relevance to 
today’s private higher education and adult education. 
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5.1 Culture and Education Systems in Chinese History 
5.1.1 The Establishment of an Orthodox Moral System and “Rule by Virtue” 
In their book “China: A New History,” Fairbank and Goldman (1998) covered 
the breath of the country’s history, from the earliest archaeological records to the 
present.  With thousands of archaeological finds in the Yellow River, dubbed the 
“cradle of Chinese civilization,” the Chinese writing system was developed in the 
Shang ( ) dynasty (1700-1027 B.C.), as revealed in archaic Chinese inscriptions 
found on tortoise shells and flat cattle bones. Following the Shang dynasty is the 
Zhou (周) dynasty which lasted from 1027 to 221 B.C. It was philosophers of this 
period who first enunciated the notion that the ruler, as the "son of heaven" governed 
by divine right, rule the country by the "mandate of heaven.” The early decentralized 
rule of Zhou dynasty invites comparison with medieval feudal system in Europe, but 
the effective control of Zhou dynasty depended more on familial ties than on feudal 
legal bonds. The Zhou amalgam of city-states became progressively centralized and 
established increasingly impersonal political and economic institutions. These 
developments, which probably occurred in the latter Zhou period, were manifested in 
greater central control over local governments and a more routinized agricultural 
taxation. 
One important event in this period is the invention of the “li” (礼) system, a 
complicated ritual system. The system infiltrated to all aspects of social life, 
prescribing the style of clothes, buildings, music, equipment, and etc., for each class 
of people in different kinds of situations. This system ensures the hierarchical order in 
the regime. The system was at crisis at late Zhou when the authority of the king was 
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challenged by the increasing power of vassal states. Living in the disorganized period 
of the feudal Zhou dynasty, Confucius called for the revival of the “li” system, taking 
it as a model of ideal politics. In his view, the breach of this system is because of the 
swelling of personal desires. Thus he created moral principles that both the ruler and 
the ruled need to follow, with the essence being the continence of one’s desires that 
do not conform to the “li,” and to cultivate a true love for others. According to 
Confucius, good politics can only result from the rulers’ sincere love for his people 
and the latter’s sincere respect for the ruler reciprocally. The so-called political 
principles which he proposed are primarily ethical in nature. Compared with Greek 
political thought, the Confucian doctrine did not touch upon the institutional 
arrangement for maintaining the ethical ideal. However, Confucius ideas have 
influenced Chinese political and cultural values for more than two thousand years. 
Till today Confucianism did not lose its relevance and we heard the appeal for “rule 
by virtue” from both politicians and scholars constantly.  
5.1.2 The Establishment of the Imperial Examination (Keju) System and 
Unification of Learning 
During constant wars among the vassal states, one state, the Qin (秦) state, got 
stronger by relying heavily on Legalist13 scholar-advisers. In 221 B.C. the king of Qin  
dynasty subjugated the six other vassal states and imposed Qin's centralized, 
nonhereditary bureaucratic system on his new empire. Centralization of power is 
                                                 
13 In Chinese history, Legalism was one of the four main philosophic schools in the Spring and 
Autumn Period and the Warring States Period (Near the end of the Zhou dynasty from about the sixth 
century B.C. to about the third century B.C.). It is actually rather a pragmatic political philosophy, with 
maxims like "when the epoch changed, legalism is the act of following all laws", and its essential 
principle is one of jurisprudence. "Legalism" here can bear the meaning of "political philosophy that 
upholds the rule of law", and is thus distinguished from the word's Western sense. 
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accompanied and consolidated by standardizing legal codes and bureaucratic 
procedures, the forms of writing and coinage, and the pattern of thought and 
scholarship. The imperial system initiated during the Qin dynasty set a pattern that 
was developed over the next two millennia. 
The Qin Dynasty abolished the feudal system of landholding and established the 
unified “county” administrative system to strengthen the control of the central 
government in the whole country. The local officials are directly appointed by the 
central government. Since then the power of the central government reached the 
county and even village level. The Han (汉) Dynasty (202 B.C. -220 AD) further 
established the “review and recommendation” system, and government officials in 
every level can recommend talents with moral virtue or academic excellence or 
technical creativity to the central government. Following that, the Sui (隋) Dynasty 
(581-618) initiated the most influential education system in China, the Imperial 
Examination, or Keju (科举 ) in Chinese. The Keju system enjoyed a long and 
dominant position in the history of ancient Chinese education, and it lasted more than 
1,300 years until the last examination during the Qing（清）Dynasty (1636-1912) in 
1905. 
In the Keju system, talents were recognized and selected for future positions in 
civil service through a series of national examinations. It interwove closely the three 
essentials for state officials, those of learning, examination and administration. In 
order to pass the examination, people need to learn Confucian classics required by the 
government. Some scholars regard Keju as a great invention of ancient China and a 
fairer system, because it enabled children from poor families to have opportunities to 
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attend the government examinations and to participate in governing the country. Thus 
regardless of parental social or economic status all males were eligible to take part in 
the exams and therefore realize their potentials if placed in important government 
positions. Actually, the invention of the Keju system is not simply a mechanism of 
education reform, but mainly a political reform. Between Han and Sui dynasties, 
there was a lengthy period when the nation was again separated into several small 
kingdoms. It was during the Sui Dynasty that the many separate states were again 
unified into a whole. To enforce the centralization of power, and to reduce the 
influence of powerful aristocratic family clans that prospered between Han and Sui 
Dynasty, the emperor realized the need for a strong, well educated civil service 
system, one that employed the most qualified talents directly from the whole of the 
society. Thus Keju was a system which mainly served for the political need of the 
state.  
The Keju system was perfected in Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), when the 
content and format of examination were well established. The examination system 
became the organizer of social classes, when the social status of the scholar class who 
got “degrees” from passing different levels of examination was higher than the class 
of merchants, farmers, soldiers, or handicraftsmen. Passing the national examination 
was the only way for the non-royal members to gain high social status. And the 
national examination system in turn promoted the establishment of official schools 
and private schools. While the education institutes established by the central 
government mainly enrolled children of government officials, the schools opened by 
local government enrolled students from all social classes in local areas, and there 
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were also many private schools owned by families or instructors who had officially 
recognized “degrees.” Despite of their difference in ownership and source of students, 
the curriculum of these schools were centered on the subjects and classics listed by 
the national examination. Thus the state controlled the minds of people through 
unifying the examination system and maintaining exclusive control of the “degree” 
issuing system. 
5.1.3 Modern Education System and Strengthening of the Nation 
In the eighteenth century, European countries, beginning from Portuguese, then 
Spanish, then British and French, began to trade with China, importing textile to 
China while exporting tea and silk and porcelain from China back to Europe. By the 
early nineteenth century, British merchants imported opium into China, in spite of the 
fact that opium was prohibited entry by imperial decree. In 1839 the Qing 
government, after a decade of unsuccessful anti-opium campaigns, adopted drastic 
prohibitory laws against the opium trade. This touched off “The Opium War,” as the 
British retaliated. The Chinese were disastrously defeated, and their image of their 
own imperial power and the cultural superiority of Chinese civilization was tarnished 
beyond repair.  
The rude realities of the Opium War, the unequal treaties, and the mid-century 
mass uprisings caused Qing courtiers and officials to recognize the need to strengthen 
China. Chinese scholars and officials had been examining and translating books 
introducing "Western learning" into the country since the 1840s. Under the direction 
of modern-thinking scholars and reform-minded officials, Western science and 
languages were studied, special schools were opened in the larger cities, and arsenals, 
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factories, and shipyards were established according to Western models. Students were 
sent abroad by the government and on individual or community initiative in the hope 
that national regeneration could be achieved through the study and application of 
Western science and technology. It is from that time that Western science and 
technologies, theories of political institution, social institutions and economic models 
were systematically introduced to the Chinese intellectual communities, and scholars 
and social activists began to think about and seek for the path of China to prosper. 
And failure of reform from the top convinced many Chinese that the only real 
solution lay in military revolution, by which to sweep away the old order and erecting 
a new one.  
The Republican Revolution broke out on October 10, 1911, and on January 1, 
1912, the Republic of China was established. Influenced by the incessant war, the 
input of the government in education was not stable, but the Republican government 
followed Western models, especially American university models, to establish one 
national comprehensive university in each province. However, instead of focusing on 
the goal of “individual development” and “citizenship awareness” in liberal arts 
education that was embraced by American universities in the nineteenth century, the 
universities under the regulation of the Republican government focused on “practical” 
curriculum that aimed to train talents that advance the country’s economic, military, 




5.1.4 The Consolidation of Public Education System and the Unification of 
Learning 
When socialist China was founded in 1949, the CCP government adopted the 
Soviet model of education, taking all private schools and universities back to the 
government. Same as other state owned organizations during this period, the 
university was a “work-unit” in a multi-tiered hierarchy linking each individual with 
the central Party to implement the Party policy. The first higher education conference 
held in June 1950 set the main task of the country’s higher education system, which 
was to “serve the country’s economic construction, which is the foundation for all the 
other constructions” (Hayhoe, 1996, p. 75). In accordance with the centralized 
economy and control by the rigid political system, higher education planning was 
centralized in the hands of the state. With the state government taking care of running 
and administrating colleges and universities, and with excessive uniformity and a 
rigid system of management, Chinese colleges and universities had no autonomy in 
their own development. Institutions responsible for the same field of study and 
training specialized personnel for the same profession had the same course outlines 
and unified textbooks fixed by the central government. The enrollment quotas for 
each specialty were set by the government and had to be filled every year. Moreover, 
the government arranged the national unified placement for college graduates, and 
graduates had no choice but to go to the job assigned to them by the government. The 
allocation of resources and personnel was under central planning. More than 80% of 
the funding came from central and local government. Academic freedom was greatly 
restricted. More seriously, many distinguished intellectuals were exiled in the anti-
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rightist movement of 1957, creating immeasurable loss to the nation and nearly 
destroying the higher education system, which took decades to recover. 
5.2 History of Private Higher Education in China 
Modern higher educational institutions were introduced into China at the 
beginning of 20th century. In Ruth Hayhoe’s book: China’s Universities 1895-1995: 
A Century of Cultural Conflict (1996), she describes the influence of a range of 
foreign countries on Chinese higher education system in one hundred years. 
Economically self-sufficient and politically isolated from the outside world, 
traditional Chinese education system was very different from Western systems. It was 
until the Opium War that the door of China was open to the outside. Facing the 
national humiliation caused by the defeat in the war, facing also challenges of 
economic expansion from Western countries and future military threat, the Qing 
government had to make the choice to adapt itself to the new developments of the 
world. As a result, the Self-Strengthening Movement and the Westernization 
Movement, led by comprador bureaucrats in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
were waged which aimed at introducing Western systems and technologies to build a 
strong Chinese state that could survive and prosper in a hostile international 
environment. As a by-product of this movement, Western ideas and institutions were 
also introduced by a group of Chinese intellectuals who had the chance to observe the 
emergence of Western democratic systems in the nineteenth century (Zhao, 2000).  
In the early 1900s, institutions supported by the government were in small 
number, and they were high-level training institutes “to provide education in specific 
areas (especially practical knowledge such as engineering and military) needed to 
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deal with the Western incursion,” hence they were not universities in the Western 
sense (Hayhoe, 1996, p. 36-37). Western churches were main supporters of these 
institutions. Other supporters of higher education were provincial gentry, scholar-
bureaucrats, and industrialists, who hoped to contribute to strengthening and 
development of China. Some of the best and most famous of these became the basis 
for modern universities, such as Beiyang Gongxue, set up in Tianjin in 1895, and 
Nanyang Gongxue, established in Shanghai in 1896 with the support of industrialist 
Sheng Xuan-huai. The last few years before the collapse of the Qing dynasty 
(1909~1911) witnessed a rapid proliferation of modern schools, mostly private or 
gentry-run schools. As Hayhoe mentioned, the gentry in this period hoped to see 
revolutionary changes rather than the stability espoused by conservative officials.  
Privately-supported higher education institutions reached their peak under the 
Republican Party in 1912-1927, when the absence of a strong central government led 
to possibilities of vigorous experimentation at all levels. Although most institutions 
were of low quality, some prominent institutions emerged, among them include 
Nankai University by Zhang Boling, Nantong University by Zhang Qian, Jimei 
Specialized School and Xiamen University by Chen Jiageng, Fudan University, and 
some others. In 1930, China had thirty-nine universities and seventeen colleges, 
among them fifteen were national-level institutions, eighteen were provincial level, 
and twenty-three were private. These institutions depended on the contributions of the 
founders or donations collected from the society. Student fee covered part of the cost 
(Hayhoe, 1996).  
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This period, as Hayhoe mentioned, saw the first real effort to establish a 
“university,” in the sense of the defining and establishing values of autonomy and 
academic freedom. Cai Yuanpei was a leading role in pushing for autonomy and 
academic freedom in a university 14 . When Cai became Chancellor of Beijing 
University, he remarked in a letter about the policy of Beijing University on academic 
freedom: 
1. With respect to academic theories, the example of universities all over the 
world will be followed, that is, all ideas and opinions will be tolerated and 
accommodated in accordance with the principle of ‘freedom of thought’. [...] 
Inasmuch as different schools of thought can uphold their views and have not 
fallen into disuses in the process of natural selection, they will be allowed to 
develop freely in spite of their conflicting natures. 
2. With respect to the teaching staff, scholarship will be the main criterion for 
their appointment. Their work of teaching will also be guided by the principle of 
freedom of thought (Gao, 1984, vol. 3, p. 271). 
 
Cai thought that the enterprise of schooling should be entirely given over to 
independent educators, uninfluenced by any political party or church (Gao, 1984, Vol. 
4, p. 177). So he promoted professor committees directing the university and 
students’ committees for their self-regulation. He even recommended that the Chinese 
Government establish university districts in various regions of the land, with each 
district having a university to supervise all levels of district schooling. Control of the 
university and district educational affairs would rest with an education committee, 
organized by university professors. 
However, when the Nationalist Government was established in 1927, the goal of 
democracy was conceding to the national need for economic construction and 
                                                 
14  Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940) was known for being the Republic’s first Minister of Education, 
Chancellor of Beijing University, and the founder and first president of the Academia Sinica, China’s 
highest national research institute.  
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political stability. Hayhoe mentioned that “university autonomy and academic 
freedom on European lines were neither easily acceptable in terms of their 
epistemological connotations, nor practically possible, given the series of political 
and economic crisis the nation was passing through” (Hayhoe, 1996, p. 59). For 
example, in legislation passed in April of 1928, the aims of higher education were 
expressed as follows: “Universities and professional schools must emphasize the 
applied sciences, enrich the scientific content of their courses, nurture people with 
specialized knowledge and skills, and mould healthy character for the service of 
nation and society.” An important consideration in these regulations was the 
registration and control of private institutions to ensure they served the Nationalist 
Party’s ends. 
After 1949, under communist leadership and with new political and 
administrative structures, private universities met difficulty in student enrollment and 
their funding and their scale were shrinking. From 1951 to mid 1950s, the 
government adopted the Soviet Model and began the process of readjustment of 
higher education system, and all private higher education institutions were joined 
with or changed into public owned universities.  
Since the 11th National Party Congress15 in 1977, China embarked onto the path 
of modernization. As a strategy for human resources development, education has 
increasingly become a priority in the government development policy. In April 1978, 
                                                 
15
 The central leading organ of the Chinese Communist Party is the National Party Congress and the 
Central Committee it elects. The Party's Constitution stipulates that the National Party Congress is held 
once every five years. The Central Committee is accountable to and reports its work to the National 
Congress.  
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a major national education conference was held that abandoned the Cultural 
Revolution goals of class struggle and adopted modernization as the main goal for 
educational development. The unified national College and University Entrance 
Exam for higher education was restored in 1977. From 1978 to mid 1980s, higher 
learning institutions expanded their enrollments and diversified their programs. 
During this period public universities were still predominantly dependent on 
government funding. However, since late 1980s there were “within-plan” students 
and “out-of-plan students,” the former paying no tuition or only a small sum of tuition 
by those students from high income families, and the latter paying a larger sum of 
fees for their enrollment in the university. This strategy was adopted for expanding 
student enrollment without placing greater financial burden on the government.  
Due to financial constraint, the state gradually adopted a decentralization policy 
and a large share of financial responsibility for funding a university was passed from 
the central government to local government and to the education institutions 
themselves. To further mobilize social resources, the state began to encourage non-
state groups and organizations to establish and manage educational institutes. As 
early as 1982 the revised Constitution wrote, “The state encourages the collective 
economic organizations, state enterprises and institutions and other sectors of society 
to establish educational institutions of various types in accordance with law.” This 
provides a legal basis for the operation of private higher education. The same policy 
was specified in the document entitled Resolution on Reform of the Educational 
System, issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) 
on May 27, 1985, which stipulated that “local authorities should encourage and give 
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guidance to the establishment of schools by state enterprises, social organizations, 
and individuals.” Private educational organizations run by multi-property ownership 
system were growing and evolving due to the new spaces created by these policies. 
The majority of all kinds of private educational organizations, which appeared 
at this time, were “exam-assisting” organizations to help those students who intended 
to pass the national examinations to obtain higher education certification through self-
study. The National College-Level Self-Study Examination system was established in 
1981 by the government for individuals, mainly in urban areas, who could not get into 
the formal higher education system but who wanted to achieve higher learning 
credentials through studying on their own. The examination is written with the same 
standards as a regular university would adopt. While the exam is beneficial for the 
learners, it is also a reflection of government’s policy to train more talented people 
for the country's modernization drive. To implement the exam, the government has 
established national, provincial, municipal, and minority nationality regional 
committees, called the Higher Education Self-Study Examination Guidance 
Committee (HESEGC). The committee designates full-time regular higher education 
institutions as testing universities, which under the supervision of the committee, 
develop the study materials, conduct the examinations, and award certificates to 
students who pass subject tests. Those who have completed and passed the tests for a 
series of required courses for undergraduate or professional study in a certain 
discipline, receive college or sub-college diploma from the state examination 
organization and the testing university. 
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In the 1980s and early 1990s, most of these self-study-assisting private 
institutions were small, had limited capacity of enrollment, and were not qualified to 
give graduate certificates and diplomas on their own (Yan, 2003). But the private 
higher education sector had been undergoing rapid growth because of the high social 
demand for higher education. China is a nation that attaches great importance to 
education, and people perceive receiving good education as the way to a decent life 
and high social status.  Parents have high expectations toward their children in 
education. However, only a very small group of people could receive higher 
education because of the small number of public higher education institutions. In the 
third national census in 1982, of the one billion people in the country, only four 
million held bachelor degrees, comprising only 0.4% of the whole population. In 
1982, the formal higher education institutions enrolled 315,000 students and adult 
higher education institutions enrolled 291,000 students, a number far from meeting 
the social demand for higher education (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1982, 
1983). And private universities filled the gap between demand and supply. As one 
administrator put it,  
It is the state that provided the soil so we can sow the seed, but it is the 
market that provides sunshine, water and fertilizer for the university to grow 
healthily. The biggest patron of private universities in China is neither the state, nor 
enterprises, but the market. It is the market that welcomes it (the private university). 
And it is completely because of the identification of market need that we succeed” 
(Personal conversation, June 16 2005). 
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After more than two decades of development, China now has 1,230 private 
universities. In China, among 10 university students, one is studying in a private 
university. In March 2005, the Ministry of Education (MOE) held a press conference 
and Hanjin, the head of department of education planning and development in MOE, 
announced that by 2004, 1.4 million students were attending private universities, 
accounting for 10.47% of the national total, an increase of 3.16% from the previous 
year. 
5.3 History of Adult Education in China 
It is since the late Qing Dynasty that adult education originated and prospered in 
China. With China facing crisis of external invasion and civil strife, in 1920s and 
1930s, prestigious scholars such as Tao Xingzhi, Liang Shuming, Yen Yangchu 
(James Yen as his English name), and other famous scholars promoted adult 
education to train manpower for national self-strengthening and development. They 
collectively initiated the famous Chinese Rural Reconstruction Movement. Similar 
with those entrepreneurs and social activists who founded private universities during 
the same period, leaders of the Chinese Rural Reconstruction Movement hoped to 
carry on social reform through educating and training the common people. The series 
of direct social-reform activities focused on the curriculum. For example, Yen 
Yangchu designed the content of rural reconstruction as “art and literary education,” 
“livelihood education,” “health education,” and “citizenship education.” It was 
regarded highly crucial that the education of those who bear the direct responsibility 
of the present society coincide with their real life situations. The goal is to eliminate 
illiteracy and to improve livelihood, and more importantly, to motivate rural citizens 
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to run their own schools and thus actively participate in their communities. As Pu-
hsia (1944) phrased, direct social reform and education are but two phases of the 
same thing. Yen Yangchu said,  
What is most gratifying is this, that after people had learned to run their own 
people’s schools, their modern farms, their cooperatives, their health clinics, 
they demanded that they should run their own government. Is there anything 
more natural and more inevitable? […] To me self-government is the inevitable 
result of a people who are educated and capable of carrying on their own social 
and economic welfare. (Buck, 1945) 
 
For Yen, self-government was a natural extension of people taking 
responsibility for their own development as a content of citizenship education.  
Yen, Liang and Tao all believed that the fundamental path of reforming China is 
reforming the rural society, since China has the majority of its population residing in 
the rural area. Liang’s theory is that the disperse peasants can organize themselves 
with the help of intellectuals. The ultimate goal is to construct a self-sustaining and 
self-governing rural society. Yen and Tao gave mass education a grand political cause: 
to build the country into a democratic country.  
Among these people, Tao founded the Xiaozhuang Normal School to train 
teachers for mass education, and later organized the “Work and Study League” in 
many regions; Liang established the “Rural Reconstruction Research Institute” and 
later established around 70 experimental zones in Shandong province to carry out 
educational activities and reform policies; and Yen founded the Mass Education 
Advancement Society and chose Dingxian village in Hebei as the experimental site 
for carrying on social reform and educational activities. Besides these highly 
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acclaimed leaders in adult education, there were also groups of social activists who 
conducted adult education in multiple forms. 
However, the most influential and large scale adult education was initiated by 
the Communist party that used adult education to awaken the consciousness of the 
peasants and urge them to rise up to fight for their own sake. During 1930s and 
19040s, many labor union schools, peasant schools, peasant movement workshops 
were established in cities and villages. In a time when the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) was struggling to survive and lacked strong public support, adult education 
became a powerful instrument to promulgate its Marxist ideology and mobilize the 
masses to form worker-peasant alliance and to join in CPC. The guiding principle of 
the adult education campaign by CPC was the "mass line," which required that adult 
education be seen as a mass social movement, to be duly carried out by the people but 
vigorously directed and controlled at all levels by CPC. Indeed, adult education was a 
powerful weapon for CPC to carry on the revolution. 
During the period of People's Republic of China, adult education continues to be 
adopted by CPC as the key instrument for the country’s transition from feudalism and 
capitalism to communism, and an instrument for consolidating the proletarian 
dictatorship and training personnel for national economic development. In early 
1950s, a Literacy Committee was set up at each government level. As the situation 
changed, and in order to meet the demands of literacy and post-literacy education, in 
1983, Adult Education Authorities (AEA) was set up to replace the Literacy 
Committees at all government levels. This is a national organization which bears the 
management responsibilities for literacy education, and for primary, secondary and 
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higher education for adult cadres, workers, peasants, and out-of-school children and 
adolescents. Since peasant illiterates constitute the major proportion of China’s 
illiterate population, within each AEA there is a unit specially designed for peasant 
education. For example, a Peasant Education Division (PED) has been set up in the 
Department of Adult Education (DAE) of the State Education Commission (SEC) and 
in all education commissions of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions 
directly under the leadership of the Central Government. Within the peasant 
education department of a prefecture or a city or county, there is an education office 
(or section), while in townships there are usually professional personnel in charge of 
peasant education. And there is a leading group in charge of literacy and post-literacy 
programs in each village. The above peasant education bodies are responsible, in rural 
areas, for literacy and post-literacy programs and for primary, secondary, cultural and 
technical education as well as for various short-term training courses. In literacy and 
post-literacy education, SEC is in charge of the strategies, policies, overall planning, 
establishment of goals and arrangement of meetings to exchange experiences and 
appoint high-level personnel and units, while the authorities of provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government, as 
well as the prefectures are charged with the drafting and implementation of concrete 
policies and detailed plans, while also compiling textbooks, training management 
personnel and summarizing experiences gained.  
The literacy campaign and vocational education served three functions - 
eradicating illiteracy, creating a new type of citizenry who championed the leadership 
of CPC and its policies, and developing a new intelligentsia from the working classes. 
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Adult education in all has been a state-managed campaign which succeeded in 
effecting mass behavioral changes (Lin, 1963). Effectively, there were no social 
groups outside of the government carrying out adult education between the year of 
1949 and 1976. 
Adult education took a big shift after the economic reform was launched in 
China. The Decisions of the State Education Commission Concerning the Reform and 
Development of Adult Education, approved by the State Council in June 1987, 
clarified priorities and major tasks of adult education in the 1990s. It identified post-
secondary training, or in-service training, as the top priority on the national adult 
education agenda. A new development in literacy education in China, is that literacy 
is integrated with teaching of skills to promote a commodity economy in rural areas. 
Adult education covered higher learning, and secondary and primary education. 
Forms of learning included full-time classroom teaching, self-learning with audio-
visual materials, full-time, part-time or spare-time learning. Certified education for 
adults includes one year university courses, short-term special college courses, 
specialized secondary schools and general secondary schools. Non-certified education 
for adults includes literacy education, the training of applied technologies in the rural 
areas and continuing education. Funding for adult literacy work comes from funds 
raised by village and township governments, urban communities, and other 
organizations. Funding also comes from budget for staff training and education in 
enterprises and state organizations. In addition, social forces and individuals are 
encouraged to give financially on a voluntary basis (Lofstedt, 1990).  
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However, because of the decline of government subsidies in adult education in 
rural areas, the agriculture sector has suffered severe setback since 1980s and is 
lagging far behind in the provision of adult education. Primary education and literacy 
classes for adults disappeared, and there is no training institute for adults in rural sites. 
In most rural areas the only way for adults to get access to education is to register for 
agricultural schools of radio and television 
Summary 
The history of the establishment of education system in China well reflects the 
instrumental use of education by the government, and the advance and retreat of the 
power of the government and the social forces in the field of education. From 
reviewing the history, we find that the development of education is closely related to 
the economic needs of the country. Before the Qing dynasty, China has a strong state-
government, and education strongly serves the political need of selecting talented 
people to help the emperor govern the country. In the late Qing dynasty, facing a 
weak state-government, social forces took up the task of education and promoting it 
as a force of social reform. In socialist China education was used as a powerful 
political tool for mass mobilization and literacy campaign. Now in the drive for 
modernization and facing economic competition from other countries, the 
government calls for the participation of the social forces in the provision of adult 
education. It is the first time in the history that the government actively sought for the 
cooperation of the society, and it is the first time in the history that a strong 
government meets with a sprouting society.   
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CHAPTER 6  
EDUCATION FOR MODERNIZATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
PRIVATE UNIVERSITY 
 
I chose one private university as the case in this study because the emergence of 
private universities breaks the monopoly of the government in the formal education 
area. China is still a one-party system, and in the policy level, there is rarely any 
chance for the common people to provide their input about what kind of education 
should be provided by educational institutions, what standard to be enforced, and 
what teaching method to be adopted. And private universities provide an opportunity 
for social groups to provide alternatives in educational ideas and practices, and 
influence the society through educational activities.
The establishment and development of private higher education institutions in 
China have made contributions to providing higher education to the masses in China 
(Lin, 1999). More importantly, private higher education institutions have made 
innovations in curriculum and program design, administrative structure, student 
management and campus culture, which have been gradually recognized in the 
academic circle. However, looking back on the path that private universities have 
traveled through, it is not a smooth development. For example, private universities 
have suffered from the ambiguity and lack of support from the government, for at the 
beginning, there were no government administrative units assigned to manage and 
take responsibility for the establishment and development of private universities, no 
specific laws to stipulate the rules of running and managing the private universities, 
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and no institutional management to ensure that private universities enjoy similar 
benefits as public universities. Today, private higher education institutions have been 
incorporated into the government administrative system and are overseen by MOE as 
well as local government educational offices. And in 2002, the Law of Promoting 
Private Education was enacted. However, during the two decades in between, private 
higher education institutions have struggled hard for their status, for autonomy in 
management and for their rights.  
This chapter describes the development of one private university, Yuhua 
University, and its interaction with the state-government, which reflects the process 
of social groups in the education field to strive to provide public good while 
negotiating room for survival and development.  
6.1 Xi’an City: History and Today 
As Yuhua University is located in Xi’an City, Shaanxi province, it would be 
helpful to provide the context in which the university has developed. Located in 
central China and landlocked, Shaanxi province is adjacent to seven other provinces: 
Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Gansu Provinces and Ningxia and Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Regions. Shaanxi serves as the vital industrial, transportation, and 
communication juncture to link the central parts of China with the southwestern and 
northwestern parts of the country. Xi'an, the capital of Shaanxi, is one of the oldest 
cities in the world with a vivid and rich history and culture. It is not only the 
birthplace of the Chinese Nation, but also the birthplace of human civilization in Asia 
and the cultural center of prehistoric civilization. Over a period of more than 2000 
years, Xi'an had been capital for thirteen dynasties. Along with Rome and 
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Constantinople, this city was a world leader in culture and trade and played a vital 
role in bridging the gap between the East and the West. As such, Xi'an has a wealth of 
historical and cultural resources. 
According to China Statistical Yearbook 2006, Shaanxi province ranks third in 
terms of overall research and development strength after Beijing and Shanghai (the 
China Statistical Bureau, 2006). The province boasts more than 2,000 science and 
technology research institutes, of which 50 are recognized as conducting research 
recognized as first rate in the country. The province’s largest number of R&D 
institutes and personnel are concentrated in Xi’an city (Shaanxi Statistical Bureau 
2005). 
Since the 1980s, especially in 1990s, the number of private higher education 
institutions increased rapidly in Xi’an. In 1984, there was only one private higher 
education institution in Xi’an with only 300 students, and in 2000, there were 66 
private higher education institutions with more than 107,491 students in total, 
accounting for more than 20% of all the students in higher education institutions in 
Xi’an. In 2005, of the 18 higher education institutions nationwide that had more than 
ten thousand students, six were located in Xi’an. Thus Xi’an has been known as the 
“silicon valley” of China’s private higher education (The Shaanxi Education Office, 
1984, 2000, 2005). 
The fast development of private higher education in Shaanxi can be attributed to 
its rich educational and research resource of the area, which provides a big pool of 
part-time and full-time faculty for private universities. And Xi’an’s adjacency to 
seven provinces and regions which has a large pool of potential students but few 
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higher learning institutions gives the private universities the needed student sources. 
In addition, Shannxi is a big province, however, the GDP of the whole province is 
less than the GDP of Suzhou, a middle-sized city in Jiangsu province in eastern China. 
With the rise of private education in Shaanxi, the Shaanxi government has come to 
see private universities as a source of revenue and an engine to stimulate other service 
areas in Shaanxi. It is believed that the professional training or vocation training 
programs offered in the private universities of the province could cultivate more 
talents needed by the province’s modernization process. Thus, while other provincial 
governments still held an ambiguous attitude toward private education, Shaanxi 
government has showed tolerance toward its development. Private universities in 
Shannxi province, because of the government’s attitude, have found it easier to obtain 
land than those in Beijing city or Guangdong province to build their campuses.  
The university studied here is called Yuhua University. Yuhua University was 
established in 1992 and registered with the Ministry of Education (MOE). It was a 
small institution with only a few hundred students and no campus in 1992. Now 
located in Xi’an High-tech Development Zone, this university has a land of 333 acres 
and buildings with total space of 685,000 square meters. It has developed into a 
comprehensive university with a student population of about 40,000, and a full-time 
faculty and staff of 1,728, and is one of the largest private universities in China. The 
university has 7 colleges, 17 departments and 79 programs in foreign languages, 
Chinese, law, business administration, humanities, social sciences, science, 
engineering, information technology and medicine. The administrative structure of 
Yuhua University is that the president is in charge of daily affairs under the 
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leadership of the Board of Trustees. In March, 2005, Yuhua University was 
accredited by MOE as an undergraduate degree granting university that would confer 
bachelor’s degrees independently, which is a status only two other dozen private 
universities enjoys in the country. 
6.2 The Founding of the Private University as a Process of Examining Life and 
Society 
The development of private higher education in Shaanxi, most of all, benefit 
from having a group of entrepreneurial scholars who devote their talents and energy 
to higher education. In the complex and disadvantageous environment of private 
universities, these individuals have played many roles: as educators to establish 
education goals and set up academic as well as administrative structures in their 
universities; as entrepreneurs to mobilize and manage resources; as public relation 
professionals to coordinate the relationship with other economic and academic parties; 
and as politicians to negotiate with and win the trust and support of the government.  
Dr. Wang16, the founder and president of Yuhua University, is one in this group. 
Born in 1958, he went to college after the state government restored the national 
college entrance examination system in 1977 which was disrupted during the Cultural 
Revolution period (1966-1976). After he earned his bachelor degree in law in 1985, 
he worked in the Higher Education Research Center in a public University, and did 
research on vocational higher education. At that time the government just restored the 
vocational higher education systems of other countries, and the research center 
received a lot of research work to study how to establish a vocational higher 
                                                 
16 All the names of people mentioned in this dissertation are pseudonyms. 
123 
education system in China to satisfy the practical need of the country’s economic 
development at that time. In 1992, he founded Yuhua University, and developed the 
institution from having less than one hundred students to one with more than 30,000 
students in one decade.  
At the initial stage, Wang was not completely dedicated to the school, but went 
abroad to expand his own business in other areas. Before he founded the private 
university, he founded the Xi’an Studying Abroad Center that provided consulting 
service to those people who wanted to go and study abroad, and from 1992 to 1994, 
he went to Singapore to manage a business there. Wang said that from late 1980s to 
early 1990s he was primarily concerned about earning money. In the early 1990s, a 
university teacher earned around RMB 800 yuan (100 U.S. dollar) per month, while 
at that time the price of a color TV and a refrigerator cost thousands of yuan. Thus 
this level of salary could not afford him a decent life. To earn money and live a better 
life was a big incentive for Wang to establish the university. The second incentive 
was to put his many ideas toward education and society into practice, for which the 
university he worked for did not provide such opportunities. Wang, in his late 20s and 
early 30s, had attended the retirement party of many professors; he was depressed to 
see those professors spending their whole life in the same university teaching the 
same courses year after year. And he decided that he would not want to live that kind 
of life.  
 The two-year experience of doing business abroad changed Wang’s thought 
and life, and he came to the conclusion  that although making money is important, 
money is not everything. “Survival is like a doorsill, once you cross it, money is no 
124 
longer significant.” After having made more than what he could spend in his whole 
life in early 1990s, he began to think about the position of human being in the society 
and in the world. At that point he felt further wealth accumulation was not what he 
wanted, and he hoped to explore the deeper meaning in life and accomplish goals that 
benefit not only himself but other people. So he refused the offer of two million yuan 
to sell his school. Based on his observation of the gap between China and other 
developed countries in providing decent and humane life for people, he decided he 
would devote his remaining life in developing the training institute into a famous 
University, with which to influence China’s educational system. After he came back 
from South Asia, he went to Peking University to audit classes on education and other 
social science areas. While devoting the majority of his time to running his university, 
he often visited other countries to learn about different education systems. In 2003, he 
went to Britain to pursue doctoral degree in education administration.  
Wang’s vision of Yuhua University was greatly influenced by the Western 
system of private university as well as well as the practices of other private 
universities in China. He regards that the development of private higher education 
relies on the construction of the external environment and internal system of the 
university. External environment should be based on the society upholding principals 
of fair competition, policy protection, and freedom of development. Fairness is the 
principal that should be applied to all social activities including education in the 
society. He criticized that the government neither understood nor supported private 
universities; instead the government held doubts or was indifferent to the 
development of private education. On the side of government policy, he thought that 
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the government needs to recognize the role and contribution of private institutions to 
education, and draft policies to provide private universities authentic support in tax, 
land use, and finance; the government should loosen its regulation in student 
enrollment and clarify its definition of the status of private education. Wang 
articulated that diversity should be valued, that is, higher education institution could 
have different ownership forms and different structures, and the government should 
recognize their respective advantages and strongpoints, and evaluate them according 
to their distinctive situations, instead of holding biases toward the “private” 
institutions while favoring the “public” ones (Huang, 2003; interview with Wang, 
September 2006).  
Internally, Wang insisted that the private education system should be 
established on the principal of serving the mass, upholding the people-centered 
principle, and providing holistic education. He notes many Chinese students are 
excluded from public universities because they failed in the fierce competition to pass 
the national entrance examination for colleges; they and many people are in 
disadvantaged positions in the country’s economic, political and cultural system, for 
they can only be engaged in doing simple manual labor. Private higher education 
institutions can fill in the space left by the elite-oriented public higher education, and 
extend access to the higher education to a broad population. Wang regards that among 
all the qualities that a person have, “personality” is the fundamental indicator of one 
person. It is a combination of inborn attribute and acquired characteristics that 
determines the direction of development of one person. The role of education is to 
help the students to understand themselves and construct their own knowledge and 
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skills structure based on that understanding. Wang envisions that the current “degree-
oriented” education will gradually lose its place and “capability-oriented” education 
will be given priority in the making of a knowledge society. The “people-centered” 
education will lay a foundation for the life-long education for a person. Wang regards 
the trend of education will be integrative education and interdisciplinary education. 
“One specialty and multiple skills” is a good model for current private higher 
education (Huang, 2003; interview with Wang, September 2006).  
Wang is influenced by educational ideas of other countries with regard to the 
role of the government in private education development as well as the goal of 
education set by other private universities. And local pioneers in private universities 
also provided inspirations for Wang. The president of Peihua Women University, one 
of the oldest private higher education institution in Shaanxi province founded in 1984, 
was involved in the Xi’an Peihua Women’s Vocational School in the late 1940s. 
Peihua’s founder explored the model of “supporting education through enterprises, 
and combining enterprise with education” (以产养学，产教结合). Wang adopted 
this idea and found his own business enterprises to support the teaching and learning 
endeavor of Yuhua University. Wang also learned from the president of Xi’an 
Translation University, Deng Zuyi, who made a breakthrough in the development of 
his private university by loaning money from banks and buying huge acres of land for 
rapid expansion, turning the university from a no-name school into a major player in 
a short time. Deng also inspired Wang in other areas. For years, Deng has been 
making efforts to fight against government discriminations against private education 
institutions and has called for public awareness on the issue. Deng has formulated the 
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concept of building a “harmonious” Xi'an Translation University. The nature of being 
harmonious means that a private university should not be money-oriented. It has to be 
public-spirited and spend all tuition fees collected from students on benefiting the 
students themselves. Deng proposed the model of “English (as a language tool) + 
major knowledge+ modern skills.” He caused a debate by claiming to open a subject 
area that the students would study for five years but will not rely on the government 
giving them degrees to find jobs. Deng explained, “the goal is to challenge the 
traditional idea of ‘education for degree’ and to authentically provide high quality 
education to students. To avoid degree-oriented education means to step out of the 
outmoded framework and design the curriculum and textbooks according to the needs 
of the society.” Deng’s model has inspired other private universities, including 
Yuhuan University led by Wang. 
Integrating global and local experiences and ideas, Wang crystallized his 
educational philosophy which is that the higher education system should “include big 
and small universities, should evaluate a university’s teaching according to their 
specific missions and goals, should encourage learning for both the old and young 
people, and should promote education without limitation of the national boundary”  
(In Chinese: 校无大小、教无高下、学无长幼、育无国界). Wang explained his 
ideas in the following: First, China does not only need comprehensive universities 
such as Beijing University and Qinghua University, but also needs small-scale and 
flexible universities such as private universities. Each has its own advantages. The 
society and government should assess a university according to the needs of the 
society and the effectiveness of the university in meeting those needs. Second, the 
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state accreditation agency should evaluate a university’s educational effectiveness 
and quality of education according to its educational goals and types of education 
offered. That students who study in a vocational training program of a private 
university, who gets his graduation certificate and finds a good job, and that graduate 
students enrolling in an elite public university who obtain his doctoral degree, should 
both be seen as the success of their respective programs. The vocational education 
programs of a private university, and the doctoral education programs of a public 
research university, have different focuses and thus should be measured by different 
evaluation standards. The government or the society should not evaluate a 
university’s quality of education using the same academic requirements for elite 
public universities and private universities. Third, higher education system should 
make efforts to achieve the goal of life-long learning. It should break the limitation on 
the age of students, and implement flexible instructional methods to make learning a 
process not restricted by age and occupation. Wang regards that private universities 
have the advantages in facilitating life-long learning due to its flexibility and 
autonomy. Lastly, universities should reinforce their collaboration with universities in 
other countries. And Huang states that private university can respond more quickly to 
the trend of higher education in the global environment. 
6.3 Groping the Way in Wildness: the Initial Development of Yuhua University 
between 1992 and 1994 
6.3.1 Search for Physical Space 
As a researcher in a public university since 1985, Wang observed there existed a 
big gap between the current education system and the needs of the society, and he 
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proposed to reform to the existing curriculum and programs. At that time, Wang was 
often invited by private and public education institutes to do consulting work, 
providing assistance in designing vocational education curriculum and programs. He 
found out that the bureaucracy of a public university makes it reluctant to change. It 
took almost four to five years to see any obvious changes in public educational 
institutions, while in contrast private university was more responsive to the 
suggestions from research findings and more willing to adopt recommended solutions 
to current problems.  
In 1988 Wang and his colleague Wu, while still working as researchers in the 
public university, were invited by the provincial Economy and Trade Commission 
(ETC) of Shaanxi province17  to take charge of its subordinate school providing 
training for the trade business. According to the memory of Wang,  
The establishment of the school is not the product of government plan but of the 
society’s needs. One vice president of ETC applied for a license in the MOE, 
but he was unable to enroll one single student. So they invited us to take over 
the school. I reimbursed him (the vice president) RMB 800 yuan for the 
registration fee and I got the license. I saw the gap between the need of foreign 
companies and current curriculum offering in public universities and so I 
applied my ideas into the design of the school and its programs. At that time, 
individual persons were not allowed to establish and own school. So the training 
school still belonged to the ETC” (Interview with Wang, September 23 2005).  
 
At the beginning, the institute possessed neither teaching building, nor 
dormitory, nor laboratory facility, and had no teachers. Its assets include one school 
title, one seal, and 600 yuan of debt. According to Wang and Wu’s observation of the 
needs of the society, the training school should be focusing on training people who 
intended to work in foreign-China collaboration companies. Wang went to Beijing to 
                                                 
17 the Economy and Trade Commission of Shaanxi province is a government branch. 
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collect teaching materials and edited textbooks by himself. They used their own 
money to do advertisement for the school, and visited all the public higher education 
institutions in Xi’an in order to recruit foreign teachers when the employment of 
foreign teachers was strictly controlled. They used their social network in Xi’an and 
persuaded entrepreneurs to invest in the training school. Through establishing and 
working in this training school, Wang not only found an opportunity to earn money, 
but also an opportunity to apply his theory gained from research into practice. In 1992, 
the number of full-time students in the school reached 500, and capital based on the 
fixed asset reached hundreds of thousands yuan. However, at this time, due to the 
change of the administrative structure in the Shaanxi province, the school’s parenting 
organization transformed from ETC to the Bureau of Security, which wanted to claim 
back the school. But the success of the training school inspired Wang to establish his 
own university.  
In 1992, Wang, Wu, and another colleague, Cao, began to establish and run 
their own training institute. Similar with many other private universities established 
during that period, they began with establishing short-term rental relationship with 
other organizations for offices and classrooms. In the first year, Wang, Wu and Cao, 
the three co-founders of the Institute, rented spaces in one middle vocational school 
specializing on leather manufacturing as offices and classrooms and enrolled 800 full-
time students, who mainly took classes for the preparation of the national self-study 
higher learning examinations for academic diplomas and degrees. The Institute also 
held short-term training classes and night school in the rented classrooms of a 
vocational school of architecture. In 1993, the number of full-time students doubled, 
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and the Institute moved all the classrooms and offices to the vocational school of 
architecture, and rented two floors in a hotel for students’ dormitory, while also 
renting a building of a public university for teachers’ dormitory. The founders 
realized the current space they had would limit the expansion of the Institute. 
To explore the idea of a new campus, Wang made contact with Lian, the former 
Dean for Teaching and Learning in Xi’an Translation University who later founded 
his own school. Lian’s school was in the courtyard of the Training Division of Xi’an 
military district. The school had a large space but a small number of students. In 
December 1993, Lian’s school and Wang’s Institute merged into one institute, and 
Lian became the administrative vice president of the Institute. The school by now had 
two teaching facilities in two districts, respectively in the architecture middle school 
and the Training Division of Xi’an military district.  
6.3.2 Curriculum Structure 
In this initial stage the curriculum structure was similar to that Wang and Wu 
established in the training institute of ETC, that is, they mainly focused on training 
students for employment in the business and trade field. Programs included 
accounting, business administration, hotel management, and public relations. The 
Institute provided professional skill training to high school graduates and college 
graduates and recommended them to companies after the training. With the increasing 
reputation of the Institute, many companies asked the Institute to train talents for 
them. In September 1992, the Institute signed contracts with the Xi’an Paging Center 
in training staff in paging service; in October 1992, again the institute provided 
training to personnel in the international business service and office automation 
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system. In March 1993, it signed a contract with the Lanzhou military district in 
training service personnel; also in March 1993, the foreign business investment 
consulting service center in Xi’an commissioned the Institute to hold training 
workshop in international business, international accounting, office automation 
system, international finance and investment. In May 1993, the Institute cooperated 
with Xi’an Jewelry Corporation to establish new programs and courses in the field of 
jewelry.  
The institute gradually shifted from a part-time training institute into a full-time 
vocational training sub-college. Since the Institute was not permitted to issue its own 
diplomas and degrees, its students needed to take the national higher learning self-
study examinations for academic diplomas and degrees. Not designed for the purpose 
of providing higher vocational education, the national self-study system focused on 
basic theories and concepts in each field. Besides the knowledge required in the 
national self-study system, the institute added a large amount of skill training courses, 
such as public relation, language, photography, calligraphy, cosmetology, truck 
driving, and etc, in order for the students to have both the academic diploma and the 
specific skills, and to be more competitive in the job market.  
6.3.3 Administrative Structure 
In the initial stage, the Institute did not establish a formal administrative 
structure. The highest administrative leaders were primarily the founders of the 
Institute. And as founders, they took charge of everything from the institute’s macro 
planning strategies to the most trivial housekeeping, including fundraising, public 
relations, supervising of the construction of campus buildings, advertisement, teacher 
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recruitment, student enrollment, textbook editing, etc. One administrator commented 
that to be successful the founders of private universities in 1990s need to play several 
roles simultaneously: politicians, educators, entrepreneurs, and social activists. They 
need to be politicians to be good at dealing with all kinds of people, groups, and build 
networks both outside and inside the Institute; they need to be skillful in coordinating 
the economic and political relationships among them; they need to be educators to 
understand the principles for offering good quality education, and to apply all kinds 
of strategies to improve teaching and learning; they need to be entrepreneurs to be 
familiar with school management, cost calculation, and resources flow; they need to 
be creative and risk-taking, to have vision in the future, and most importantly, to be 
able to salvage the school out of all kinds of difficult situations. They need to be 
social activists to be engaged in numerous social activities to express their views, 
increase their influence, and win sympathy and support (Interview with one vice 
president for student management, June 16, 2005).  
6.3.4 University- Government Interaction: Keeping Low Profile by the University vs. 
Indifference of the Government  
When asked why the private higher education institutions can grow in such a 
rapid speed in Xi’an province, President Wang gave an unexpected answer: because 
the government did not pay attention to private education and neglected its 
development. Thus private education could have certain space to develop. According 
to Dr. Wang, “the neglect of the government is the government’s biggest support to 
the private universities.”  
134 
At the beginning stage, despite the tone of encouragement on the government 
document, “private” is a dangerous word in the mind of many government officials. 
The repeated and often swift-shifting of political policies during the years between 
1949 and 1976 made the government officials uncertain of the real intention of the 
central government about private education. Due to the ambiguity in the government 
policy and lack of law on private education, at the local level, attitudes of local 
governments varied. Afraid of being held responsible for any problems, the 
government officials in some regions discouraged the establishment of private 
education institutions. Thus, for the private education institutions in Xi’an Province, 
the neglect of the government was really a blessing to them. 
However, President Wang also pointed out that the neglect of the government 
made it very difficult for Yuhua University to gain necessary support and official 
recognition. From early 1980s to early 1990s, there was no organizational 
arrangement in the government structure for dealing with private institutions. No 
specific government administration office was designated to manage the registration 
of a private university. In some provinces the government designated the Adult 
Education Authorities to supervise private universities. It took two years for Wang to 
succeed in getting Yuhua University officially registered, since the relevant 
government offices shifted the workload and responsibility to each other.  
Chen Baoyu’s description of the administrative system during this period 
echoes the experience of Wang. He illustrates: 
The state education administration departments from the top level to provinces 
and cities assigned very few people to oversee private education, unequal to 
their task. For example, the State Education Commission is a state organization 
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with 700 employees; the office directly administering private schools is a low 
level office with only three staff. From the position of the office to the number 
of people, it is hard to imagine how they can shoulder the task of planning and 
managing nearly 70,000 private universities, secondary schools, primary 
schools and kindergartens (cited by Lin, 1999, p. 148). 
 
For a long time, there was no law or regulation concerning the status of private 
universities in the education system and their operations. Thus, whether to approve 
their entry into the system, their program structure, their personnel recruitment, or 
their student enrollment is up to the judgment of individual government officials. In 
Shaanxi government, except for the difficulty in registration, in this initial stage the 
government did not intervene much in the program structure, personnel recruitment 
and student enrollment, which was appreciated by founders of private universities. 
However, people in private universities felt unfairness in the government’s 
differential treatment toward public universities and private universities. The 
government did not collect tax from public educational organizations. However, the 
government collected taxes from private universities whether they are registered in 
the Department of Education or in Bureau of Industry and Commerce, except for a 
very few schools that can issue their own diplomas and degrees. In addition, private 
universities cannot get any government grant or research funding, or preferential price 
in land acquisition. And teachers and students in private universities are not permitted 
to enjoy benefits as those in public schools, such as obtaining student loans, getting 
discount price in train tickets, having subsidies in health insurance, etc. 
During this time of period, Yuhua University kept a low profile as a strategy for 
survival. It did not make large-scale advertisement, nor make public complaints, nor 
call for policy change. Instead, the founders primarily used whatever personal 
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connections and resources they had to ensure the continual existence of the university. 
They appointed professors mainly through personal relationships and 
recommendations of acquaintances, and enrolled students through sending 
recruitment staff to the high schools nearby. They tried not to get too much attention 
for themselves. At this point, what they did was not to produce an impact on the 
education system or on the society, but to build up their own strength to survive. 
6.4 Establishing an Order: Stable Development between 1994 and 2000 
6.4.1 Construction of a University Campus 
Before 1994, Yuhua University had not entertained the thought of establishing 
its own campus. In 1994, Wang came back from abroad and dedicated himself to the 
goal of building the institution into a comprehensive university that could rival with 
public universities. To reach this goal it obviously did not make sense to rely on 
renting spaces for classrooms. They were at the mercy of the landlord, for if the 
landlord wanted to stop the rental contract, the university could not be sustained. For 
the founders, it was very important to maintain the stability of the university. Thus in 
1994 the private university signed a long-term (ten years) land rental contract 1) with 
a spinning factory and invested 600,000 yuan to construct a teaching building; 2) with 
a thread-making factory to construct a residence building; and 3) with an architecture 
vocational school to use its classrooms, dormitories, dinning halls, and playgrounds. 
Although many people doubted the worth of the investment, soon Wang proved that 
his decision was right. Since there was no official or unofficial accreditation system 
set up for private universities at that time, students evaluated the quality of private 
universities based on their observations of the infrastructures of the schools. Thus the 
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investment on the infrastructure attracted a large number of students for Yuhua 
University. In the following semester, 2,400 new students enrolled in the university.  
In 1995, Wang took another big step in campus building. That year, Wang met 
Gu, the Chair of Yuhua Corporation. Yuhua Corporation was a village-owned 
Corporation located in Yuhua village. The village managed agricultural products, 
commercial businesses, restaurants, a travel agency, and real estates businesses. To 
develop the travel business, the Corporation applied for a loan of RMB 40 million 
yuan to construct a theme park. Due to the failure of management, the park could not 
make a profit, and the Corporation needed to pay millions yuan of interest to the bank 
every year. Wang persuaded the Corporation to invest the land in the development of 
the university as a form of cooperation. According to the agreement, the Corporation 
contributed its land, buildings, and lake in the park to the University, and the Institute 
helped the Corporation by paying half of the interest of the bank loan. The 
Corporation sent representatives to join in the University Board of Trustees and 
participated in the decision-making of the university development. Through the 
cooperation, the Institute saved money in building their own campus. The chair of the 
Corporation, Gu, also had a wish: to establish a high-quality university and middle 
school in the Yuhua district, he thus consequently supported the idea of Wang. Wang 
said of their collaboraton: “We can only cooperate with those who have authentic 
concern in education and wish to make contributions to education. It won’t work out 
if the cooperation is based on obsession for personal benefit.” Wang regards that the 
cooperation with Yuhua was based on their common understanding of education 
which would really benefit the development of the university. The cooperation with 
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Yuhua Corporation enabled the university to have a campus with a land of 190 acres. 
On the campus the university constructed buildings with total space of 180,000 
square meters, which could accommodate more than 10,000 students. After the 
development of campus buildings in 1994 and 1995, the number of students enrolling 
in the university increased from 800 to 6,000. The success of the Institute set a model 
for other private universities in Shaanxi province that began to give priority to 
infrastructure buildings since the middle 1990s. 
6.4.2 Academic Construction: toward a Comprehensive University 
Wang frankly recognized that the initial stage of the university was the stage of 
“original capital accumulation.” The key to its survival is the expansion of the 
enrollment by a large scale, as they received no government funding to help with 
school building constructions and other instructional needs. Since 1996, Wang 
decided that the focus of the college should shift to maintaining and improving the 
quality of teaching by maintaining a restraint on the number of students enrolled. 
Wang intended to limit the number of student enrollment to be around 4500 per year 
from the year 1996 to 2000. 
With the possession of its own campus, though it continued to look for more 
spaces, Yuhua University gradually shifted its focus to constructing teaching facilities, 
such as libraries that now have 1.2 million books, internet connecting to classrooms 
and dormitories, a satellite digital transmission system, computer centers, an 
audiovisual teaching center, and a considerable number of science laboratories. The 
University focused on funding for the teaching needs, while contracting the logistics 
work to the market, hiring companies to manage logistics in places such as dormitory 
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buildings, dinning halls, and bathhouses, which was an innovative strategy at that 
time. They asked companies to bid for constructing the dinning halls, and after the 
construction was completed, the contractors could run it for 15 years, and the college 
would not collect administrative fees, but it would require the contractor to control 
the profit range to be around 15%~20%, while the profit range in the society is 
generally 35%~40%. The current student apartments were also constructed by real 
estate companies. But concerning the discipline of students, the university assigned 
supervisors for the management of dormitories. This way, the University could use its 
limited financial resources in the construction of libraries and other infrastructures of 
the campus.  
Initially most of the academic programs offered by the university were majors 
in humanities and businesses, such as language, management, law, advertisement, etc. 
This was due to the fact that the university did not have enough funding to support 
engineering majors which require substantial financial investment in laboratories and 
equipments. With the upgrading of the university and improvement of its financial 
capability, the university began to establish majors in science and engineering and 
became a comprehensive university. In 1998, it merged with Xi’an Institute of 
Science and Technology, which greatly strengthened its capacity in the field of 
science and engineering. Now the university has seven colleges and seventeen 
departments, covering arts, business, social science, engineering, agriculture science 
and medical science. However, English, computer technology, and business 
administration are still its brand programs. 
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Despite its expansion of programs, the University continued its emphasis on 
training students with practical operational skills. Forty percent of the classroom 
instruction time is given to lab experiments or practical projects. Internship in 
factories, companies or corporations is encouraged and for some programs is required. 
In addition, the University asked companies to be involved in the design of 
curriculum, or invited company managers, engineers, and designers with rich 
practical experiences to give instructions. For example, the Financial Director of one 
famous corporation was appointed as the instructor of the accounting class and he 
designed the curriculum based on his knowledge and the accounting system of that 
corporation. But one teacher also pointed out that such teaching method is outdated in 
some programs. Because students of these programs eventually need to go through 
the national unified higher learning self-study examination to get their graduate 
certification, so the teachers still have to arrange their instruction according to the 
required knowledge of the national examination. 
Besides emphasizing practical operational skills, the University also emphasizes 
the cultivation of four core abilities in students: critical thinking, learning ability, 
communicating skill, and collaboration skills. According to a vice president, how to 
employ pedagogies to cultivate these abilities is in the discretion of the professors and 
teachers who design and teach the curriculum.  
Most of the faculty were part-time teachers who are either retired teachers or 
currently employed teachers in public universities. The recruitment of part-time 
teachers saved cost for the private university since there is no need to provide the 
faculty with housing, health insurance, and retirement pension. Also the recruitment 
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of part-time teachers provided more flexibility since the private universities need to 
frequently adjust the program structures according to the needs of the market. 
However, there are also problems. For example, part-time teachers lack a strong 
commitment to teaching in private universities, and as they have high mobility, 
retention is a serious issue. In order to improve the quality of education, a stable team 
of full-time teachers are necessary. From 1993 on, the university began to recruit 
university graduates and provide training opportunities for them. Beginning 1997, it 
began to employ its own graduates to take positions in the administrative offices, and 
provide them opportunities to take courses for Master’s degree. 
In 1996, the University established a research center called “Higher Education 
Research Center.” The research center is focused on doing research on educational 
theory, educational systems and models in other countries and in China, and 
educational practices in history and in contemporary times. It is the first research 
center established by a private university, and it published a quarterly journal called 
Research on Higher Education”, which has gradually gained reputation in the 
academic circle.   
6.4.3 Administrative Structure 
During this period the University established a formal administrative structure. 
The public universities are under the leadership of the Communist Party Committee, 
and the Party Secretary of the Committee is the highest authority in the university. 
The private university is, by legal requirement, a system with the president in charge 
under the leadership of the Board of Trustees. According to government regulations, 
private universities should also have a Communist Party Committee and establish the 
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position of Party Secretary, but the Party Secretary is not necessarily the highest 
authority in the University. In the University, the Board of Trustees consists of 
founders, investors, and the Party Secretary. The Board of Trustees is responsible for 
making decisions about the direction of the university, fund raising, the university’s 
development plan, appointments in the University Affairs Committee and the 
appointment of main academic leaders in each program.  
The executive responsibility is taken by the University Affairs Committee under 
the leadership of the president. The University Affairs Committee establishes an 
administrative system and implements the education goals of the university. The 
Committee invites celebrities in all fields to constitute an advisory board to advise the 
university’s development plan. The academic leaders are primarily retired famous 
professors in public universities who are known for their deep knowledge and rich 
research experiences in their field. The academic leaders are responsible for designing 
teaching plans, selecting teaching materials, formulating policies about academic 
development, and directing their programs’ teaching activities.  
The colleges and departments in the University have great autonomy. They have 
power to appoint faculty, determine the use of budget, establish new programs, and 
design curriculum. Although the University Affairs Committee has the ultimate 
power to approve the budget and program establishment, it seldom intervenes with 
the concrete operations of the colleges and departments.  
Compared to public universities, the organizational structure and management 
procedures in the University are simpler, and the decision-making power is more 
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decentralized. President Wang compared private universities with public universities 
in this way:  
Public universities and private universities have differences in their focus of 
work. Private universities emphasize more on efficiency and effectiveness, and 
the administration is to serve the goal of enhancing students’ academic 
performance. But the public universities have to maintain complicated routines 
and its administration structure is often overstaffed. Oftentimes, the 
maintenance of routine work takes more energy than the efforts put into 
improving students’ academic performance. In addition, the complicated 
administrative procedures impose limits on the autonomy of academic 
professionals in the university. 
6.4.4 Property Right and the Finance System 
In 1995, the co-founder of the Institute, Wu, parted way with Wang and 
founded his own University. To appreciate his contribution to the Institute, Wu was 
allowed to claim part of the Institute’s assets as the start fund for his new organization. 
According to Wang, the property right of the Institute was not clarified from the 
beginning. And under that situation, he had to show support to his partners. This 
incident forced Wang to deal with the issue of property right. To prevent the same 
kind of situation y or potential dispute in the future disposal of assets, he persuaded 
all members in the Board of Trustees to give up their stock of the Institute. To 
recognize the contribution of those founders, Wang kept the position of Lifetime 
Trustee for them, which means they have lifetime benefits such as having an 
apartment for free, a monthly salary and health care, and perks such as having the use 
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of the university’s cars after retirement. In this way, no one “owns” the University, 
and when the founders or trustees leave the university, the existence and the survival 
of the University will not be affected.  Wang explains, “it is important to build the 
consensus that we are not making money from this (running the university), but 
making contributions to the society.”  For those education institutes that merged into 
the University, Wang also required that the original founders give up their stocks. 
Wang said he would not merge with any education institute whose president was not 
willing to give up his stock. 
For Wang, the boundary between “private” and “public” is not that clear. “From 
the very beginning, I have never thought that the university is my own university. 
University of social forces means that the university is supported by all of the social 
members18. Everyone contribute a little to the university, whether it is land, money, or 
knowledge. People come together to build the university, and the university is of the 
people.” Wang notes that when people realize that the school is not a “private” school, 
they tend not to fight over personal gains, but are more willing to take responsibility 
dong things from the perspective of “public good” and the common interest.  
The finance management of private universities is a sensitive issue. After 
exploration in the initial stage, the Institute established a strict finance system. It 
implemented a two-level financial auditing system consisting of the Board of 
Trustees and the University Affairs Committee：the Board of Trustees is responsible 
to back-check the financial accounting of the University Affairs Committee as well as 
of each college and department monthly and annually.  It also regulated that all the 
                                                 
18 In Chinese, “minban universities” are used to name universities such as Yuhua, and literally minban 
means “run by social forces” 
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accountant cannot be the relatives of the members in the Board of Trustees and the 
University Affairs Committee. Wang emphasized the point that the goal of the school 
is not for profit-making, but for public common good, and he hopes that this idea is 
embraced by all the members of the university.  
Students in private universities could hardly apply for student loans, as banks in 
China would provide this service only to public university students. In 1997, a vice 
president of the University helped the University to get a grant of three million yuan 
from the Cihui Buddhism Foundation as a source of scholarship to students from low 
income families. In 1999, the University established its own student aid fund. 
Members in the Board of Trustees each donated fifty thousand yuan and every 
teacher donated ten percent of their annual salary to the fund on a voluntary basis. 
Thus every year around 200 to 300 students from low income families can obtain 
financial aid from the fund. One board member said the next step is to establish an 
alumni association of the University and call for donations from the alumnus to help 
with the development of the University.  
 
6.4.5 University - Government Interaction: Expanding Influence by the University 
vs. Imposing Stringent Regulations by the Government  
Capital Requirement and Land Use Right 
During the development stage between 1994 and 2000, Yuhua University made 
many aggressive moves to improve the facility and quality of education of the 
organization as well to expand its influence, including signing long-term contract 
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with corporations for expanding its campus, adjusting its program structure and 
establishing new programs, increasing the number of teachers, and establishing an 
education research center to influence the theories and practices of higher education. 
The expansion of the private universities in Xi’an city during this period elicited the 
attention of the government, which began to implement measures to place private 
higher education under its regular administrative control. In 1996, the People’s 
Congress of Shaanxi province passed the Regulation on Schools Run by Social 
Forces in Shaanxi province. This is the first provincial-level regulation on private 
education. The Regulation stipulates the requirements for running a private university 
or school, procedures of establishing new programs, the right to school assets, and the 
mechanisms of internal management. This change in government attitude reflects that 
the government has attached certain importance to the development of private 
schools/universities and the rights they should have. For example, Article 35 of the 
Regulation articulates that private universities should get the same treatment as public 
universities in raising fund and purchasing of teaching facilities. And if private 
universities have the need to use land, the government can give it certain priority in 
the allocation of land. And Article 37 says that teachers in private universities have 
equal status with teachers in public universities. However, the government also 
placed a lot of restrictions on private universities. For example, Article 9 states that in 
order to apply for the license of running a university, the founders need to have 
ownership of fixed and stable teaching sites and teaching facilities, have a stable 
source of funding, and have qualified full-time and part-time teachers, accountants, 
and administrative staff. While in reality, many private universities are unable to meet 
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such requirements. Many began with nothing and depended on taking out loans and 
renting classrooms for their initial survival and development. They solved the 
problem of campus building and teacher recruitment with only a small amount of 
capital investment. The Regulation hence on the one hand gives private universities 
some protection as they now have laws to refer to and rules to observe, which is a 
good thing, but also it means the space for private universities to survive is narrower, 
and individuals and social groups need to have much stronger financial capacity at the 
beginning in order to establish and run a private higher learning institution.  
Wang, as well as administrators in other private universities, complained that 
without measures taken by the government to provide practical support, the new 
government regulations imposed constraints on them and discourage the efforts of the 
private universities. The regulation on land transfer and land use is one example. In 
China, the government owns the land. People do not have the ownership of the land, 
but only the right to use it. When people want to transfer their use right, they need to 
get the approval from the government. Wang’s university, as well as many other 
private universities did not want to buy the use right of the land for three reasons: 
First, it costs a huge amount of money to buy the land’s use right and the university 
cannot afford the expenditure and the transaction tax; second, if the university applies 
for loan, the procedures of applying for bank loan is very complicated and the bank 
would quite possibly not approve the application; third, even if the bank approves, the 
interest of the loan is higher than annual rental fee of the land. Thus, many private 
universities signed long-term rental contract with other organizations to use their land, 
or in the case of Wang, they cooperated with villagers in running Yuhua University. 
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However, these forms of cooperation were regarded as inappropriate by the 
government. In 1997, the central government enacted a regulation to forbid any 
organizations to use agriculture land for commercial or industrial use. However, it 
does not mention the land used by private universities. According to this regulation, 
private universities need to buy the land first and change it to “non-agriculture” land 
later. However, many private universities neither can afford the cost of commercial 
land nor can get support from the government to do so.  
In the collaboration of the private university and Yu Hua Corporation, the use 
right of the land is not transferred and still belongs to the peasants in Yu Hua village, 
and the Corporation applied and got the approval to use the land for educational 
purpose. However, this kind of cooperation did not have precedent in Shaanxi 
province, and the provincial government insisted on dealing with the issue on its own 
logic: the University must have the land license to build the university, and to have 
the license, it must purchase the use right of land and to pay the tax for transferring 
the use right. If the University does not get the license, then it is illegal for it to 
construct buildings and run the university on the land. With a strong determination to 
have their own campus, Wang ignored the warning of the government and decided to 
build the university campus in Yu Hua district. In the national land investigation in 
1997, the national Department of Land Management found out that Wang violated the 
land policy, and Wang might be subjected to several years of prison. But at the end, 
the government decided to give him a milder penalty: a fine of one million yuan, 
since the private university is being run for public good. Wang joked about this 
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penalty: “I will not cry for the losing of money. The university is the nation’s 
university, and the penalty is also given to the nation.” 
Characteristics of Private universities: For Profit or For Not For Profit 
In the years of 1994 to 1996, the university was in a status of losing money. It 
was until 1997 when the Bureau of Commodity Price (BCP) permitted the increase of 
tuition by 1/3 that the Institute was able to pay off its debt and began to make a profit. 
In the Regulation on Schools Run by Social Forces, Article 6 stipulates that social 
groups can not run educational organizations for the goal of profit-making. This is a 
tricky regulation. All private universities have no funding from the government and 
their operation depends on tuition. In some private universities, extra profits are 
distributed to owners or shareholders, and in other universities, extra profit is made in 
order to expand their scale and improve the quality of education. But the Regulation 
does not consider possilble modes private universities may use to redistribute the 
profit, and what fundamentally distinguishes non profit making activities and 
commercial activities. In a word Article 6 in the Regulation does not clearly define 
what operational model is considered as nonprofit. In many regions BCP standardized 
the tuition for private universities as a way to constrain the profit-making of these 
institutions. Administrators of private universities complained that the government 
ignores the difference of private universities which differ in their conditions, 
investment in infrastructures, and cost of operation. One administrator said, “Private 
education, especially private higher vocational education, needs more investment in 
experiments, internships, and practices, and different majors vary in their education 
cost. The government standardizing the tuition led to deficiency of many schools.” 
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And he suggested that the government should give the decision making power on 
tuition to the school, and the schools only need to put on records in the BCP and 
government education offices. And the government offices can assess if the price is 
reasonable according the university’s investment in infrastructure, operation cost, and 
the education quality provided by the school. (Interview with an administrator on 
teaching and research, June 19 2005)  
Academic Status of Private Universities 
Private universities enjoy relatively more autonomy than public universities in 
program establishment, admission, funding and other matters. However, they are still 
under highly centralized control from the government, as the central government 
continues to dominate the approval of degrees and diplomas, and set strict quotas for 
enrollment of students in certain subject areas. On October 1, 1997, Regulation on 
Schools Run by Social Forces issued by MOE was implemented. It is the first 
national level regulatory and administrative law on private education. The issuance of 
this regulation marked a new development era, in which the government intended to 
indirectly rule private education by law and guide private education into the 
government-administered developmental track. According to the regulation, MOE is 
responsible for making overall plans for education run by non-governmental sectors, 
and set the establishment standard of private universities.  
Following the regulation, private universities need to apply to MOE to get the 
qualification to issue diploma and academic degrees. But when asked why private 
universities have such difficulty to get the approval to issue bachelor degrees, one 
government official mentioned that private universities lagged behind public 
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universities in terms of the qualification of their faculty and the condition of teaching 
facilities. He added, “private higher education institutions should focus on vocational 
training, that is what our country currently most needed” (Interview with a 
government official in OERNGS, Shaanxi, June 20 2005). The regulations serve to 
strengthen the control of the state government in the private sector. 
The discriminatory treatment they receive in the national unified degree system 
is always the bottleneck for private higher education institutions. MOE is the only 
agent that has the power to accredit the country’s educational institutions, and ranked 
them into first-class, second-class and third-class bachelor’s degree universities. 
Below that there are the associate degree vocational and technical colleges which the 
MOE classifies private universities to be. This classification limited what kind of 
students private universities can enroll.  
Since 1991, MOE gave some provinces the qualification to examine and 
approve private universities to enroll students who would get graduation certification 
through the means of applying a “Certificate Examination.” In the Certificate 
Examination system, the university has the authority to organize tests for 30% of the 
courses, and for the other 70% courses, students fulfilled them by taking the national 
higher learning examination for self-study. This policy enabled private universities to 
attract some students. However, in 2004, MOE declared to cancel the “Certificate 
Examination” and forbad private universities to enroll students under this category. 
The reason is that as an executive branch, it is beyond the MOE’s power to initiate 
such system. Therefore the “Certificate examination” system was terminated as 
demanded by the State Council. The abrupt policy change pushed many private 
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universities to the edge of bankruptcy since they could not adjust programs timely to 
avoid the loss of students. 
What has been a threatening factor for private universities is that public 
universities have established the so-called “second tier colleges” or “independent 
colleges” since the middle 1990s. These are institutions that capitalize on the teaching 
resources of public universities and operate like pseudo private universities. They 
offer very similar programs as private universities. The government has given them 
beneficial policy by accepting whole sale that they are undergraduate degree granting 
institutions, thus edging out the advantage of private universities from the very 
beginning, as most of them were still allowed only to provide tertiary degrees. The 
expansion of the second tier colleges rake in huge profit for public universities, while 
driving many private universities out of business. In order to keep their enrollment 
scale, many private universities find themselves having to lower their admission 
scores substantially. By doing this, their academic quality was jeopardized and their 
reputation was affected, leading to the creation of a vicious circle. 
Compared with public universities, private universities have to meet rigorous 
requirement and go through much more difficult application and examination 
procedures to get the qualification to issue their own degrees. This restriction not only 
influences their recruitment of high-quality faculty, but also their recruitment of 
students. For a long time, private universities have been allowed to admit students 
only after all public universities have admitted theirs since they are at the lowest 
echelon of higher education institutions. In this situation, whatever efforts they make, 
the room for quality improvement is limited. But for the “independent colleges” 
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owned by the public universities, they can enroll good students due to the fact they 
can grant bachelor degrees from the beginning and bank on the reputation of the 
public universities they affiliate with. And the procedures for “independent colleges” 
to apply for the establishment of new programs or adjustment of old program 
structure are much easier than private universities, since the administrators in the 
public universities are the “insiders” of the government system. A sense of crisis has 
been looming large for many private universities, which have grown from scratch 
since 1980s to find their market niche. Now the public universities and local 
governments joining force in setting up independent colleges has instantly taken away 
their advantages – that as private institutions they maintain a closer tie with the needs 
of the economy and have highly flexible administrations and programs. 
Voices from the Private University 
With its increasing influence, Wang was elected to be the executive trustee in 
the higher education society in Shaanxi province, Director of Vocational Education 
Society in Shaanxi province, as well as the Vice Chair of Intellectuals’ Society in 
Shaanxi province. Wang was able to express his opinions in more occasions. And 
these professional associations provided chances for people to exchange ideas with 
each other. But Wang said, “when people get together, they complain a lot about 
current situations. But we rarely take collective action. We don’t want to provoke the 
anger of the government.” 
Wang said, with the increasing number as well as expanding scale of private 
universities, the government has taken private universities more seriously and would 
more frequently have conversations with people in private universities for their 
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opinions. So now administrators of private universities have more opportunities to let 
their opinions be heard by government officials either through informal or formal 
channels. And Wang found out sometimes the informal conversation is more useful 
than formal conversations in advancing understanding between the government 
officials and private universities.   
Wang mentioned that one important strategy for private universities is to 
improve their quality of education and also take efforts in other affairs to establish a 
good reputation and gain the trust of the government. In 2001, several provinces 
nearby Shaanxi suffered from big flood. In cooperation with the local government, 
Yuhua University decided to enroll around four hundred students from disaster areas 
and exempt their tuition. This initiative got praise from local government and also got 
broad media coverage. Starting in early 2000s, the private university called for 
improving the credibility of private universities. With more and more private 
universities coming into the higher education scene and the consequent heated 
competition, private universities were criticized for making dishonest advertisement 
to students and parents. Some private universities boasted that their employment rate 
of graduates could reach 98% which was not true. Wang and his university initiated a 
collective manifesto and called for other private higher education institutions to join 
in. The manifesto declared that private universities would not do misleading 
advertisement, and publish their phone numbers so that they can receive feedback and 
evaluation from parents, the public and the media. The manifesto received good 
comments from the media, including the China Central Television (CCTV), as well as 
the government.  
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6.5 Rising above the Water between 2000 and Now 
6.5.1 Marching toward a New Stage in the Development of the University 
Besides continuing his strategies of cooperating with business enterprises to 
mobilize funding and resources, such as cooperating with one real state company and 
one medical company in order to obtain RMB 20 million yuan in investments in the 
university every year and to have sites for internship for its students, Wang even 
considers cooperating or merging with public universities. 
My goal is not a small-scale professional school, but a comprehensive 
University. If a University cannot make distinctive contributions in knowledge 
creation, it can hardly be recognized by the society. In the international arena, 
everyone knows Peking University because of its accomplishments in 
knowledge and values creation. However, under current condition, a private 
university can not accomplish high-level academic achievement. The advantage 
of a private university is its capacity to mobilize resources. If we can cooperate 
with a public university, taking charge of the undergraduate / industrial 
education, and leaving the graduate education to the public university, the 
university may undertake fundamental change. (Interview with Wang, 
September 20, 2005) 
 
When asked if he would worry that the cooperation with public university may 
lead to the loss of power and control of the university, Wang said he would not worry 
about that. He explained it is because he didn’t view Yuhua University as his own 
university. What he cares about is the development of the university, not personal 
power or personal control of the university. He articulated that the key is to establish 
a mechanism to guarantee the prosperity of the university. When the mechanism is 
established, it will not matter whether the university belongs to the government or 
non-governmental social groups, because the leaders of the university must follow the 
rules and laws set in the mechanism. And if the head violate the rules, other people 
will be against him.  
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After 2000, Wang further emphasized the research role of the university. From 
2001, the research center was renamed as “Qi Fang Education Research Center”19, 
and its goal is to widely absorb ideas from all around the world, and to become the 
think tank for private universities. Besides Xi’an, the research center established 
branches in Beijing and Shanghai, and invites many famous scholars from outside the 
university as the advisors and part-time researchers of the research center. Convening 
scholars in East China Normal University and Beijing Normal University in 2001, the 
research center planed and accomplished the editing and publishing of the “Qi Fang 
Private Education” series, consisting of six books on “exploration of private 
education,” “introduction to private education,” “history of Chinese private 
education,” “policy analysis of Chinese private education,” “the report on the 
development of Chinese private education,” and “overseas private education.” In 
2003 and 2004, the research center called for public application to the research grants 
provided by the center, and it was the first time that private research centers in the 
country set up such grants. More than 100 researchers from 50 educational 
institutions applied and 19 scholars got the grant. From 2002 to now, the center has 
held domestic and international conferences and forums independently or 
collaboratively with other academic institutions. In 2002, the center started 
publication of the journal “Research on Private Education”, focusing mainly on the 
theory and practice of private education in China and other countries. In 2003, as a 
primary drafter, the research center participated in the drafting, discussion and 
finalizing the version of the Law of Promoting Private Education of Shaanxi province. 
                                                 
19 Qi fang in Chinese traditional medicine means using different prescriptions for different kinds of 
illness. 
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And during the enacting of the national Law of Promoting Private Education, it 
participated in the investigation organized by the National People’s Congress (NPC), 
the Ministry of Education (MOE), and Shaanxi government, providing advice for the 
eventual passing of the Law. 
The Dean for academic programs in Yuhua University explained the research 
role of the university is not only to improve its status and influence, but also to 
facilitate the teaching and learning in the university. Collaborating with the Ford 
Project mentioned previously, Yuhua University in 2004 offered a research grant that 
faculty could apply for. And the teachers chose a diverse range of topics for their 
research: new model of student management that cultivation of personality; teacher 
training; the development of multiple-intelligence of students; and multi-dimensional 
system of student evaluation. From these topics we could observe the administrators’ 
and teachers’ efforts and creativity in developing the talents of students. The campus 
culture of Yuhua University is metaphorically dubbed as “transforming fish into 
dragon” (yu hua long), since the university is located in Yu (fish) Hua (transformation) 
district. Wang said the university believes that every student could excel in the 
society. Although they are not the “top students” in the traditional definition, in fact 
they have great potentials that are not explored in the traditional system of education. 
One staff in the student management office said similar words: “Although our 
students are not good at traditional school examination, many of them are talented. If 
we give them opportunities, they could make great achievement.” Yuhua University 
encourages the development of students’ interests and personality. Students are able 
to obtain support from the university faculty and staff when they participate in 
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science competition or art contest. One researcher in the research center, Yun Gong, 
once a student in Yuhua University, said he likes the university very much because of 
its free environment and its emphasis on personal development. He was given great 
autonomy to work on the university newspaper. Later he participated in the national 
“Challenge Cup” contest of extra-curricular scientific work; for this he acquired 
technical support from the university and was given flexibility in allocating his time. 
There are several other students who got support when they participated in regional or 
national talent shows. This is not common in public universities. One staff in the 
Administration Office of Student Management said that “the university attached great 
importance to the development of students’ abilities. The university leaders regard 
that the university’s strength is represented by the performance of its students.” 
Along the years one big change in Yuhua University is that the students 
gradually get involved in the operation of the university. Students are encouraged to 
provide suggestions about the university’s management. For example, one student 
told the researcher, “whenever we called the Vice President responsible for student 
management to tell him our thoughts about the university, he listened to us patiently 
and gave us timely response.” In the construction of the dinning room, study room, 
and the new library, the university collected feedback from the students and made 
adjustments to the original plan. And the Student Union and the Student Newspaper is 




6.5.2 Yuhua University-Government Relation: Independence Required by the 
Private University vs. Inclusion of the Social Groups by the Government 
With the increasing number of private universities and their expanding scale, 
the presidents of some private universities became famous and were elected as 
representatives in People’s Congress, or Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Committee (CPPCC). Wang is a representative in Xi’an Municipal People’s Congress 
and Shaanxi Provincial People’s Congress in 1998, and then the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) in 2003 and 2007. His nomination and being elected is connected to 
his increasing reputation in the field of private university. There are three other 
presidents of private universities (in the whole country) who are in NPC and more are 
in the provincial or municipal People’s Congress or CPPCC. As representatives, they 
have opportunities to formally participate in political decision-making. They can 
propose a bill directly to the Congress or participate in the discussion of the 
establishment of new laws. Wang told us that in the informal meetings with 
government officials, the administrators of private universities often express their 
opinions about current policies. However the impact of such informal advocacy is 
unknown. 
In Shaanxi province, private universities have developed into a sizable scale and 
gained high social reputation, which attracted the attention of the government. 
Shaanxi provincial government began to realize that the development of private 
universities is an opportunity to make it a famous brand of Shaanxi province and a 
way to showcase the achievement of the provincial government under economic 
reform in these years. In 2004, the Shaanxi provincial government provided a lot of 
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support to the four private universities in Xi’an that applied for the qualification to 
issue bachelor degrees, scrutinizing their application materials and making bountiful 
suggestions as how to make modifications. And when the four private universities 
succeeded in their application, all the top leaders of the provincial government 
attended the celebration convention, which is an honor that even well-established 
public universities rarely have. 
The government often does not trust the education quality of private universities, 
regarding them as lacking educational experiences and capacity. However, with the 
development of private universities and the social recognition of their quality, some 
private universities begin to see that they do not have to place the government 
recognition as the only or the most important factor for the survival of the university. 
They view the recognition of the larger society as another indicator of success. For 
example, Xi’an Translation University issued its students the graduate certification in 
the oral translation program that is not officially recognized by government. However, 
the president of Xi’an Translation University was confident that the students would 
still find good jobs since the market and the society recognize the quality of education 
and training students receive in this program. His confidence got through the test of 
the market. Wang told us that when private universities obtained social reputation and 
recognition, it is easier for them to get the recognition from the government. 
To break from the pattern that private universities are still clustering at the 
bottom of the national higher education pyramid as a whole, private university 
presidents perceive that one prerequisite is the establishment of an accreditation 
system that assesses private universities based on their distinct roles in the economy, 
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and their strength and merits with respect to their services to the society. Since the 
beginning of this century, many private universities have called for and attempted to 
collaborate with research institutions for the establishment of independent or semi-
independent accreditation agencies, and some research organizations are also brewing 
the idea as they see a potentially big need. The private education research center in 
Yuhua University is doing a research on the existing accreditation system in other 
countries, and is actively designing the accreditation system and accreditation 
standards that suit China, as a guide for interested semi-independent and independent 
accreditation agencies to adopt. An accreditation system, which involves multiple 
parties other than only the government, will assist the public in judging the merits of 
private higher learning institutions; meanwhile, it will decrease the excessive control 
of the government over the private sector of higher education. In a word, the 
involvement of third party will allow private universities alternatives in seeking social 
recognition, mobilizing social support, and establishing a sphere for public 
participation and discussion in its development. 
Summary 
In the present chapter, a case study is performed to illustrate the development of 
a private university in China since 1990s. The policy change in the later 1980s 
enabled the emergence of private universities. Both the number and the scale of 
private universities have been increased rapidly because of the high social demand on 
post-secondary education such as vocational higher education. However, the 
development of private university also experienced resistances from both existing 
administrative system and the legal system. Benefited from their increasing influence 
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on society and education system, private universities like Yuhua are gaining the trust 
and recognition from the government, which helps with the changing of the 
administrative system and legal system to be in favor of private universities.  
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CHAPTER 7 
SEESAWING BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND CONTROL: CASE 
ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY 
 
The rapid growth of private higher education institutions was witnessed during 
more than one decade from 1990s to 2000s. According to the educational statistical 
communiqué issued by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in 1991 and 2005, 450 
private higher learning institutions existed in 1991, and the number reached 1,329 in 
2005. The 1993 government document, “Outline of Chinese Educational Reform and 
Development,” stipulated that the state will “change the structure of government 
monopoly of running schools, establish step by step a system centered around 
government’s operation of schools, with the help of social forces.” And in the Outline, 
the government should adopt the attitude of “active encouragement, strong support, 
proper guidance and sound management” toward schools and universities established 
according to law by social organizations and individual citizens. In the case of Yuhua 
University, we found it takes several years for the government to establish a system 
with “proper guidance and sound management,” and there are evidences to show that 
government is making efforts toward “active encouragement and strong support,” 
although it is not clear how long this process would take.   
It is the state government that took the initiative of allowing non-governmental 
individuals and groups to run educational organizations. However, the institutional 
support from the government has far lagged behind the development of non-
governmental education organizations. Non-governmental individuals and social 
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groups, through their efforts, remind the government of problems in the current 
system, and also remind the government that private universities have become a force 
that cannot be neglected.  In 2000, for the first time, MOE discussed and then 
accredited one private higher education institution, the Yellow River University of 
Science and Technology to issue bachelor’s degree. In 2002 and 2003, MOE 
accredited seven more private higher education institutions as undergraduate 
institutions. In 2005, 17 additional private higher education institutions were granted 
such qualification. Thus despite the popular opinion of the government officials that 
private universities only provide low-quality vocational education, the government 
has to recognize that private higher education institutions have worked on their 
quality and made contributions to the field of education. The drafting and 
enforcement of the Law of Promoting Private Education also reflects the response of 
the government toward efforts made by private universities in institutional building. 
This chapter analyzed the factors leading to the new spaces for civil society actions, 
the meaning of the new spaces in social development, and the changing model of 
state-society interaction because of the entry of new actors into the social system. 
7.1 Factors Engendering the New Spaces for Action 
The replacement of the central state planned economy with a market economy 
enables non-governmental social forces to self-organize themselves, carving out 
autonomous spheres, increasing their influences and negotiating with the state-
governments. From the case of Yuhua University, the prerequisites in the self-
organization process of the society are the loosened state control, accessibility of 
public resources, and the diffusion of ideas. And the intellectual and entrepreneurial 
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leadership of key founding members is the key in integrating all these transforming 
factors to initiate the self-organization process and to achieve social change. 
7.1.1 Development Ideology of the Government
Before 1977, China was under extremely tight control by a group of leftist 
government leaders. The political atmosphere took a huge shift in 1977. Deng, the 
leader after the demise of Mao, was a pragmatic statesman rather than an ideologue. 
His well-known “cat theory” (Whether it is a white cat or a black cat, whoever 
catches mice is a good cat) shows his lack of interest in “isms,” but his pragmatic 
emphasis on what can make China competitive in the world economy. This shift in 
focus influenced all aspects of the Chinese society, including the recruitment of 
government officials that gives more weigh to their competency more than their 
loyalty to the “socialist” cause, the evaluation of local officials primarily based on 
their achievement in promoting the local economic development, and the adjustment 
of the formerly egalitarian policy to accelerate the pace of economic development. 
Thus, local government officials became pragmatic and placed economic 
development on the top of their priority list, and shows support to groups, 
organizations and corporations that can make contribution to local economic 
development, while keeping their eyes wide open on every social activity to 
determine if it aligns with the “socialist” and “Marxist-Leninist” line, as Deng’s other 
doctrine is “stability surpasses everything.”  
Mr. Lu, a scholar-type government official in the provincial Office of Education 
Run by Non-Governmental Sector (OERNGS), said that in the initial stage the 
government did not interfere with private universities since private universities were 
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thought to do public good and would not harm the socialist development cause. 
According to Lu, private universities had poor conditions and unqualified teachers at 
the initial stage, and it was the relaxed policy environment that enabled these 
organizations to survive. Lu observes, “private higher education will not have today’s 
success without the support of the government” (Interview with Mr. Lu, June 19 
2005). And administrators in the private universities also agreed that the laissez-faire 
attitude is the biggest support to the private universities. Thus, founders of the private 
university had a lot of freedom to organize resources and recruit teachers and conduct 
educational activities without the notice of the government.  
7.1.2 Availability of Resources 
The state-government in China does not only have a dominant control on the 
society through administrative structures and the chain of commands for policy 
making and implementation, but also through the possession and allocation of 
resources. In socialist China, all the land of the country belongs to the state, and 
individuals and corporations can only use them for a certain period of time, that is, 
they have only “use right.”  Thus, actors and organizations are dependent on the 
government for resources, such as housing, production materials, job opportunities, 
and information and monetary resources. Dependent on the government for survival 
and success, civil society actors and organizations are therefore rendered powerless 
according to the definition given by Max Weber in his Basic Concepts in Sociology: " 
‘Power’ is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out one's own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests. " (Weber, trans. 1962) 
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The state-government of China released a part of its control over resources 
during the economic reform era in order to build up a market-oriented economy 
where private ownership can shrive. Especially after the mid-1990s, many resources 
can be accessed and acquired by social groups, such as production materials, 
information, and monetary resources. This means that civil society actors and 
organizations could decrease their dependency on the state-government by acquiring 
resources through diverse channels. As a result, their ability to resist state control 
increased since their survival is not completely determined by the resource 
distribution of the government. 
In the case of Yuhua University, several categories of resources are needed for 
organizing educational activities: space and land, facilities, knowledge and 
information, and human resources. Although the ownership of land still belongs to the 
state-government, the regulation about the use of land is loosened. Thus civil society 
actors can negotiate with the government on the use of the land, the land’s use right 
of which was bought or rented, to organize and conduct public activities for their own 
benefits. Also the actors have access to knowledge and information so they could edit 
textbooks and design programs. On the other hand, that people in the society have 
more monetary resources due to business undertakings ensures the university has 
relatively stable funding resource.  
Human resource is another important resource for non-governmental actors to 
organize social activities. If people do not have choice on their career, it would be 
very difficult to gather people for sustained society-initiated activities. In the case of 
Yuhua University, the university was able to recruit its own teachers. However, the 
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private university has no right to grant title to its own faculty, and teachers in private 
universities could not enjoy the benefit of health insurance and pension as teachers in 
public universities did. These make the private universities much less attractive to 
highly qualified teachers and scholars. In this case, the private universities developed 
through the recruitment of part-time teachers from public universities. Xi’an has 
many higher education institutions, which provided a favorable condition for the 
development of private universities. People in the public universities retire around the 
age of 60, while people at this age are at the peak of their career and still have 
energies. The private university recruited these retired professors, who bring their rich 
knowledge and experiences to the private universities. For example, it invited the 
former president of Northwestern Politics and Law Institute, who was also the legal 
consultant of the provincial government, as the leading professor of the university’s 
law program; the vice president of the Shaanxi Financing Institute who is also the 
economic consultant of provincial government as the leading professor of the 
economics program; and a famous professor from the Northwestern Industrial 
University as the leading professor of Yuhua’s computer science program. This 
strategy helped the private university to improve its education quality in an unfriendly 
official environment.  
7.1.3 Access to Ideas 
One important outcome of China opening itself to the world again after forty 
years of isolation its door is the increasingly frequent and inevitable encounter with 
different policies, practices, cultures, values, norms, conventions, and etc from 
outside the country. With the assistance of new technology, especially the highly 
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advanced communication and transportation technology, there are many opportunities 
for exchange of ideas and learning. In the political and economic area, there are 
increased discussions on pluralistic systems, autonomy, freedom of research, civil 
society, and the call for human rights.  
In the case of Yuhua University, the founders of the private university got 
aspirations from the models of private universities in other countries. As researchers 
in the academic field, Dr. Wang and Mr. Wu have had many opportunities to get 
access to diverse educational ideas and educational practices around the world. Wang 
and Wu even have experiences of staying abroad and examining the actual 
implementation of educational ideas and practices in other countries. These 
experiences affected their leadership styles and the management of their universities. 
In technical aspect, the founders designed programs and curriculum based on their 
knowledge of professional training programs abroad. In conceptual aspect, the 
founders were influenced by the autonomy that universities enjoyed in American and 
European countries, and they expected that private universities in China also have 
similar level of autonomy. In one of the book series edited by Wang, he 
systematically reviewed the education system in Western countries. In the Western 
countries, whether the private university is for public good or for private benefit is not 
the criterion for determining if its existence is justified. Private universities have a 
control on its own property, which is the guarantee for the minimal autonomy of the 
private university. For the purpose of examining its profit-making or non-profit status, 
the government can establish a financial check and audit system to supervise the 
financial situation of the private university and to determine whether to grant tax 
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exempt privileges. Besides, the government can also establish effective channels for 
students and parents to appeal through the legal system if their interests are harmed.  
In the personal interview with a vice president of the university, he expressed 
that government encouraging the existence of private universities and granting them 
autonomy would contribute to the construction of social and cultural pluralism. He 
reminded that there is a connection between cultural pluralism and private education 
in the history of Western countries. Private universities provided people with more 
choices who thus could find a good fit between their personal interests and campus 
cultures. In one of Dr. Wang’s articles (2003), he also mentioned that civil society as 
the primary actor in public area would engender a shift to ethnic and cultural 
pluralism that increasingly characterizes modern societies.  
Recently, scholars and private universities’ administrators look upon the 
accreditation systems in United States as an exemplary model of the future 
accreditation system in China. Private universities in China have been complaining 
about the unfairness of the government in evaluating public universities, in treating 
“independent colleges” and private universities differentially. They believe that the 
government should transfer more power to the third-party organization to carry out 
the accreditation function.  
7.1.4 Leadership of Intellectuals 
Individual leadership plays an important role in social change engendered by the 
private universities. However, the space for individual leader is closely connected to 
the contextual conditions. When all the resources, including material resources and 
institutional resources, were under the control of the state-government, the only path 
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of the individuals to realize their ideas of social change was to get the recognition of 
the rulers in power and to preach their ideas to them. This was exactly the life pursuit 
of the “scholar-official” class in the ancient China as well as in the socialist China 
period. In this context, leaders with independent political or cultural thoughts could 
hardly be found.  
The official endorsement of a market economy has not only fostered the 
emergence of a private sector, but also created far more socio-economic opportunities 
for Chinese citizens. In the new market setting, many people acquire, through setting 
up their own businesses or schools, social and economic independence from the state-
government. This independence enables them to seek alternative ways to make an 
influence on the society. In the case of Yuhua University, Dr. Wang found that the 
public university he worked in provided limited opportunities for him to make any 
influence in the society, but he could make a significant difference in the private 
sector. He would be able to mobilize resources to accomplish things in his own plan. 
He broke the existing hierarchical structure and built a new social network around the 
University. For example, his cooperation with the companies, public schools, and 
factories in classroom renting, program design and student training has reflected a 
new kind of relationship and network outside of the state’s control. Through these 
relationships and networks, his vision of education impacted on the higher education 
system in the country.  
Wang’s role in the development of Yuhua University is crucial. The most 
important feature of a leader in the context is not his knowledge of education, which 
is also very useful, but his determination to make a difference and his courage and 
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fearlessness to break the norm and conventional procedures. Wang envisions Yuhua 
University to be a comprehensive university that could have a position in the higher 
education system in China, going way beyond the government’s definition of private 
universities as merely vocational training colleges; he envisions that the university 
should be the result of the cooperation of a variety of social groups and organizations, 
and he did attract many people and organizations to join his team. In the transitional 
period to a new order, leaders are those who are able to persuade followers to 
embrace innovative or revolutionary ideas, and thus to alter or break the "frame" or 
interpretive scheme by which individuals locate, perceive, and label occurrences in 
their life consistent with the status quo. 
7.2 New Spaces of Action and its Meaning 
The relaxing of control of resources, labor, and information from the monopoly 
of the state saw the emergence of multiple non-state organizations that bear different 
structures and values. With the emergence of a non-state sphere, a variety of 
suppressed social interests have the opportunity to be expressed and realized in 
multiple ways. In the network around the private university, people aspiring for 
fulfilling their self values find venues to realize their interests. Shaped by these 
interests, the homogenous and wholly “public” under the socialist regime was 
replaced by multiple “publics” where individuals have a vital role in determining 
social outcomes. The private university is one of these “publics,” and founders with 
strong visions and social values sought followers, supporters, and collaborators in 
setting up its own management system, making rules, and conducting social activities. 
In this public space cooperative effort is required to bring about commonly desired 
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outcomes. The diverse “publics” provide the fundamentals for the appearance of 
pluralism in power and culture. The diverse “publics” carry the following functions: 
the capacity of mobilizing resource to conduct public activities; the capacity of 
culture buildings, and the capacity of restructuring social networks. With the input of 
new resources, new persons, new ideas, and new alliances, the public space is 
expanding, and institutions like Yuhua University have the power to influence 
changes in the society. 
7.2.1 Self-Organizing Public Activities 
With possibility of access to educational resources that previously were 
completely controlled by the state-government, including land, facilities, teachers, 
and students, the civil society social forces are able to autonomously organize 
themselves outside the dominant official sphere. In this case, the founders of the 
private university were able to construct a campus, a physical space where 
administrative, academic and student activities can proceed with limited state 
intervention. And it is not only a physical space, but also a public space where people 
are able to identify their own interests and other’s interests, and collaborate with each 
other based on the convergence of their interests in order to achieve their common 
goals. Public space helps different people to find a balance between personal interests 
and the demands of the collective as a whole. In state-owned institutions in China, 
people for a long time are placed on a fixed track. They are not allowed to innovate, 
nor are they required to take risks. What is used by the state to motivate people was 
abstract and loft ideals: Individuals need to give up their personal interests and focus 
on serving for the nation and the Communist cause unconditionally. Individuals 
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harboring high self aspirations could not find any means to explore their personal 
interests and aspirations. When the state receded a little bit from its total domination 
of public affairs, people are able to carve out a space where they have more control on 
their own lives and seek for self actualization. More importantly, the relaxed control 
loosened the fetters on one’s thinking. People can authentically think about what they 
want, look for meanings of life, explore diverse ways to fulfill their interests in life, 
and develop their own life paths. They are able to seek the best way to achieve life 
fulfillment and self actualization. In this private university, the founders and senior 
administrators chose to work together because they are able to achieve their self-
interest through the private university, either the self-interest being the realization of 
one’s ideas toward education, or obtaining social status, or serving others through 
education. And by working with each other, a collective interest of the group was 
formed based on the understanding of the role of education in making positive social 
change and their own roles in this process. 
 With cooperation in this space people are able to establish an academic system 
with its own distinct features, such as adopting a decentralized administrative 
structure for the university, instituting market-driven curricula, and providing 
professional development opportunities for its faculty. The founders extended the 
space of autonomy to a broader sphere through establishing connections with the 
other individuals, groups and organizations outside the University. The network it 
reached consists of the corporations from which it rented the land, the companies it 
contacted for employment of its students, other schools and universities for 
cooperation in academic programs, and the scholars for cooperation in research. 
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Through the networking, the university succeeded in carrying on education activities 
and head towards its expected academic goals. 
7.2.2 Cultural Building 
During the centralized state-planning economy era before 1978, culture 
production was a state-administered process. In the absolute compulsion the 
education system became an intellectually dismal place, where minds became 
calcified, regimented and constrained. Apathy ruled the day. Independent initiative 
was met with strange glances. With the emergence of an autonomous space, 
alternative channels have been opened in producing and molding the social culture. 
The primary incentive for Dr. Wang and the other founders to leave the public 
university and found their own educational organization was to put their own 
educational ideas into practice and to influence the education system. The emphasis 
on skills rather than political correctness, on capacity rather than credential, and on 
uniqueness in personality rather than the “standard good student model,” all 
challenged the orthodox educational practice, and these gradually were accepted by 
other private educational institutions. Taking advantage of their new found autonomy, 
other individuals in the University also participated in co-building the understanding 
toward “education” and toward the idea of “university.” One teacher in the 
University’s industry design program told the researcher that different from his past 
colleagues in the public university, he rarely gave students exams, instead, he 
evaluated students from their practical works. Another teacher teaching Chinese said 
she tried using an interdisciplinary methodology in her class, and her experiments 
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were encouraged by the university’s administrators. People’s participation not only 
influences their own life, but also influences the environment they live in.  
The private university not only contributes to the pluralism of educational ideas 
and practice, but also contributes to the pluralism of social culture making. Different 
from the traditional culture that emphasized hierarchy and obedience required from 
the subordinator to the superior, the private university aspires to create a culture that 
emphasized mutual understanding and consensus-building. In this case, out of self-
interest, people stepped out of the governmental unit and pursued their self-interest. 
Thus the individual interest is justified. On the other hand, people’s self interests and 
goals are framed by the interaction with others and other’s opinion toward them. In 
the process of exchanging resources, information, labor and services, people identify 
their own interests as well as the interests of others. The process of transferring and 
sharing resources is also a process of people being aware of their mutual connections 
and developing the consciousness of the necessity of co-dependence. People 
cooperate with each other not because they are required to do so but because of the 
awareness of the co-dependence between them. The cooperation between the 
university and other companies, corporations, schools, and academic institutions were 
all based on voluntary agreement and mutual benefits. 
Internally, people carried their own plan when they came to the university, but 
they sought mutual recognition, and in this process, some fundamental commonness 
were recognized and kept, and rules were set for future communication and 
interaction. For example, the founders in the university were willing to give up their 
property right to the university after the discussion about the “public” vs. “private” 
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characteristics of the university. Though not everyone agreed with it at the beginning, 
based on the common concern in the role of education for serving public good, they 
finally reached the consensus that accepting this rule would benefit the university’s 
students as well as the larger public (Interview with one founder, June 17 2005). This 
is because everyone bears certain obligation toward the community in that he has a 
sense of belonging and hope to get recognition from other community members.  
Some administrators and teachers expressed that they like to work in the private 
university because they like the culture here. Their personal opinions would be 
respected even though they are not the high-level decision makers. This culture also 
influenced their expectation toward the government behavior. They expected that the 
government consult the opinions of people in the private university and consider more 
carefully of these opinions when they make policies concerning private education 
(Interview with a vice president and an administrator of student management, June 18, 
2005). Although it is uncertain that how the university culture would influence the 
broader political or social culture, a trend of diversification of culture could be 
observed in this case. 
7.2.3 Restructuring Social Network 
The former state-planning system in socialist China determined not only the 
production and distribution of each product, but also the production of labors it 
needed and the role of each person to play in the society. It bound each person to a 
fixed post or location, and individuals could hardly change their life and career 
according to his own will. In addition, the relationship of social groups was defined 
by the government, for example, peasants and workers were “partners” and “friends,” 
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bourgeois and landlords were “enemies,” and intellectuals were those “who need help 
and re-education” from the proletarians. And even marriages were evaluated by the 
government as appropriate or inappropriate based on the couple’s family background.  
With the gradual retreat of the state-government from some domains of public 
affairs, new forms of social networks were constructed as a result of voluntary 
association. The “partnership” among groups is not defined by a supreme political 
entity, but defined by the social members according to their own judgment. In this 
case, partnership exists between diverse social groups in all forms: resource sharing, 
contractual relationship, and academic cooperation.  
During the era of economic reform, the CPC government realized the close 
connection between the country’s schemes of modernization and the need for science 
and technology, and has taken many measures to improve the social status of 
intellectuals. However, the current status of intellectuals has different characteristics 
with the status of intellectuals in the imperial China. In the past the intelligentsia 
served for the interest of the state and assisted the ruler in governing the country, and 
thus gained their high status in the society. Since the economic reform was launched, 
the existence of non-governmental sphere provides the intellectuals a new choice 
other than directly serving the state-government. In the case of Yuhua University, the 
intellectual groups in the university have more autonomy and interact with the state-
government in a more equal status as compared to those working in the governmental 
organizations. In sum, the new space enables the participation of social members in 
reconstructing and shaping the social network and government-intellectual 
relationship.  
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7.3 University-State Interaction 
When Yuhua University was very small, there was minimal interaction between 
the university and the government. The university expected little government 
intervention, and the government thought it would not bother with paying attention to 
the educational organization. But with its scale expanded and the number of teachers 
and students rapidly increased, the university attracted more attention from the 
government. The self organization of the society enables the birth of rising new 
power. The private university, by mobilizing its own resources, establishing alternate 
social institution, and establishing a broad social network, hence has been able to 
produce a great influence on the society. In this process, unavoidably, conflict and 
divergence rise up between the existing power holders and the new actors in resource 
allocation, the status of the new comer, the realm of power it should have and key 
values it holds.  
7.3.1 Sources of Conflict 
Conflict emerges when the new actors aspires for certain social status that is not 
granted by the state government. In the socialist state-planning system, it was the 
state that defined the status of each organization. Since the private universities were 
not in the system, they were automatically placed in the lowest echelon. A lot of 
problems the private universities encountered were due to this reason. For example, 
the students in private universities did not have the benefit of applying for student 
loans or getting discounted student tickets as the students in public universities while 
taking public transportation, and the teachers in the private universities did not have 
the health and retirement benefits as those in public universities, and private 
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universities had many more hurdles to jump through in getting their organization 
registered, getting approval for using land, and applying for new programs. And the 
factor most threatening the development of private universities was that they could 
only enroll those students who were not qualified to enter public universities. Seen as 
“outsiders,” the private actors were excluded from the mainstream circle as regular 
players and were not allowed to enjoy the benefits that members in the original 
system have. However, private actors would not accept that they are the second class 
of citizens. The founders and administrators of private universities are aware that they 
will lose attractiveness to students, teachers, and other partners or collaborators if 
they do not improve their status and acquire benefits for the university as well as 
members in the university. 
As the private university developed, the realm of power inevitably became the 
arena of major conflict. With its financial independence, private universities have 
greater autonomy than public universities, especially in the recruitment of faculty and 
staff. However, the state government still controls the way and the result of education 
through multiple channels, such as, the establishment of the position of a party 
secretary in the private university’s administrative level, the implementation of 
required curriculum on Marxist theory and moral education, the registration of new 
programs, and the government accreditation of degree-issuing qualifications. 
Applying these regulations and constraints to private universities manifests the 
intention of the government to incorporate private universities into its realm of 
control.  This contradicts the interests of the private universities, who want to set their 
own rules and standards in their practicing of educational activities. Currently, their 
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educational ideals are subject to enormous constraint in implementation, because the 
trustees and administrators have much restricted decision-making power. They can 
hardly decide the standard of students they want to enroll in, or the standard of 
students qualified for graduation. These are two keys to the quality improvement of 
the university, and thus are the main issues on which Yuhua University has strived for 
more participation and influence in politics and the academic arena. The resolution of 
this conflict may take a long time, because it demands basic change to the 
government administrative system, a change that the government would be resistant 
to.   
Difference in world-views and values is another source for protracted conflict. 
The emergence of private universities founded by normal people brings an awareness 
of anti-elitism to the education system. For a long time, there is a common 
understanding among the government and the general public that knowledge belongs 
to and should serve the nation state, and that people carrying knowledge belong to 
and serve the nation state. Thus the quality of knowledge, such as central and 
marginal, true and false, useful and useless, and the status of people, such as noble 
and humble, are uniformly assessed and decided by the state. However, people in the 
private sector refuse to hold these dichotomies as absolute and permanent, and instead 
they see the value of knowledge rests on the individual choice and social need. The 
state is no longer the sole authority to set up and interpret the legitimacy of 
knowledge; instead, it is held that the location of authority shifts to each individual 
and social organization. This emphasis on the value of individual choice is a 
challenge to pre-established hierarchy and order. The debate on accreditation of 
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private universities is one manifestation of such conflict. Private universities 
considered that instead of MOE who favors public universities, the evaluation result 
will be more fair and legitimate if the evaluation is based on the judgment of a third-
party organization and on public choice, such as, how many good students choose to 
enter the university.  
7.3.2 Strategies in Dealing with Tension between the State and the Society 
Conflict is not necessarily negative. It can be a factor for constructive progress 
or a cause for disruption. In the case of Yuhua University, the tension between the 
state and the society became a constructive force in pushing for institutional building 
of private universities. For its survival and development, the university was seeking 
for ways to make its complaints heard and situations understood. And when the 
complaints from private universities increased, the government recognized it needed 
to take the problems seriously. During the centralized planned economy the 
government used to be the only power in the economic and political system, and 
problems occurring in the system were possibly either not discovered or intentionally 
neglected by the government. But now the autonomous social groups would not 
accept whatever the treatment imposed on them, and the government is under 
pressure to consider the request of the society for institutional change. Both the social 
groups and the government take a practical stance: showing the attitude of 
understanding to the other side and trying to seek for a peaceful solution to address 
the concerns of both sides.  
Tolerance is one distinct feature in Chinese culture. People tended to show high 
level of toleration when they received unfair treatment. On one hand, it is the result of 
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the inculcation of Confucius culture for thousands of years that emphasizes hierarchy 
and order, and that the people in low levels should show their respect and obedience 
to the people in high levels. On the other hand, it is the result of calculating the cost 
of resistance that prevents people from confronting with the authority. People 
choosing to defend their own interests will risk their career, jobs or even lives under 
the old authoritarian regime.  
In the case of Yuhua University, at the beginning toleration to the indifference 
or even discrimination of the government was almost the only choice, since people in 
the private sector did not have other alternative channels to get things straightened out. 
So they had to accept the treatment they received from the government, made their 
best effort to establish personal relationship with the government, and won its trust in 
order for the university to get approval for its founding and to sustain.  
As time passed and Yuhua University had grown, the university still depended 
on the government for obtaining social recognition and status. Even with its 
increasing influence, adopting a tolerant attitude became a strategy for the 
university’s development which the founders consciously took. As Wang said, “there 
is no need to act in the ‘diamond cut diamond’ way. The goal is to get things done 
and improved, while standing opposite to the government only gets things stuck.” 
Wang, other administrators in the university, and founders of other private 
universities all expressed that they thought the government has been making its 
efforts to improve the situation and private universities need to have certain patience 
and give the government a little more time for its improvement. But they also took 
opportunities of informal occasions or formal meetings to actively talk with 
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government officials in order to make the government understand their situation. The 
goal is to achieve a mutual understanding in both sides. The strategy is effective and 
the government official expressed that “it is not easy for private universities to sustain 
until today. They encountered many difficulties, including financial shortage and 
government strict regulation, and some of them survived and the other failed. Despite 
of the shortcomings still existing in current private universities, we must recognize 
they made great efforts.” (Interview with one government official, June 18, 2005) 
With the accumulation of resources and the building of social network, Wang 
and other founders chose negotiation or some form of joint problem solving as ways 
to handle their conflict with the government. He persuaded the authority that they are 
for the “common good,” though he insisted that people have a say about the definition 
of “good” and the path to achieve that “good.” Such negotiations can lead to the 
harmonization of the two points of views, in such way they see each others no longer 
as a threat, and both parties see the possibility of reaching an agreement that promotes 
the interests of both or allowing both to be accommodated within one polity. For 
Wang, the negotiation with the state-government enables his visions of education to 
be institutionalized in policy and in law. The government also realized that private 
universities have become a force that cannot be neglected, and consequently some 
founders of private universities were selected as members of the CPPCC, or deputy to 
the NPC.
Thus establishing mutual understanding and building trust is the most important 
strategy adopted by the social groups when interacting with the government. But 
people in the private sector like Wang are also aware that their status does not come 
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from the closeness to the government, but from their influence in the society. So they 
want to keep an independent status in educational ideas and institutional building.  
However, despite its seeming effectiveness, Wang’s wisdom of “doing good 
things and making contributions first so as to become qualified to negotiate with the 
government” may not help the participation of other social groups. One reason for the 
disadvantageous position and low social status of some social groups, for example, 
the peasants, is social deprivation, that is, the group members are denied access to the 
tools for self-sufficiency. These include capital, education, information, health, 
employment, and a responsive support system. For these groups they can hardly 
improve their status and be included in decision-making without changing the power 
structure first.   
7.3.3 Responsibility vs. Power: The Role of Government 
Privatization of higher education is being subjected to huge criticism in the past 
decade. With a clear inspection, the criticism can be classified into two categories: 
first, the criticism is on the politicization of privatization (Apple, 1999; Geo-Jaia, 
2004;). The privatization policy negatively affects matters of equity in and delivery of 
education, the ability of most public colleges to hold down tuition costs is directly 
related to the state funding they receive. The government cutting down its financial 
support to college and universities and the consequent high cost of receiving college 
education force many students to give up the idea of going to colleges. The second 
stream of criticism is questioning the intention of those who run private schools. 
Privately run schools are regarded to place profit-making as their priority and pay less 
attention to the improvement of quality (Carnoy, 1998; Lin, 1999). 
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The privatization policy since early 1980s related to the acceptance of human 
capital theory by the state-government. With technology playing greater role in 
productivity in contemporary world, the attention of economists shifted from physical 
to human capital, that is, human being themselves are capital and are seen as a key 
determinant of economic performance. The primary implications in education derived 
from human capital theory are: Education is an important allocator of jobs and 
income; educational institutions play a central role in the development of human 
capital, providing trainings that raise knowledge and improve work skills and enhance 
employability; there is direct relationship between coverage of education and levels 
and speed of development. Getting access to education and acquisition of knowledge 
and skills thus becomes an investment decision of both individuals and the 
collectivity, and this investment would overall increase earnings of individuals, while 
strengthening the economy and raising the standard of living.  
Increasingly used in official language, human capital theory provided a kind of 
modern rhetoric and enabled educational policies to be more scientifically based. In 
the document on “Decision on Development of Higher Vocational Education” issued 
by Shaanxi province in 2006, the government decided to “implement the scientific 
development concept, and place development of professional education as the 
foundation of economic development and the strategic emphasis in the education 
work.” It explains, “Promoting higher vocational education, and accelerating the 
development of human resources is the strategy of developing Shaanxi into an 
economically prosperous province. It is the key measure to push for the 
industrialization, to advance the employment and re-employment, and to solve the 
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“Three-Nong” problems20. It is the key path to improve the quality of populations, 
and to transform the pressure of population into the advantage of human resources, to 
improve the comprehensive competitive ability of Shaanxi province, and to construct 
the harmonious society. It is the necessary part to implement the education plan of the 
Community party, to follow the education rule, and to accomplish the sustainable 
development of education cause.” The higher vocational education is connected with 
economic prosperity, employment, elimination of poverty, maintenance of social 
stability.  
Consequently, the government recognizes that it benefits the economic 
development if there are more educational institutions that increase opportunities for 
more people to receive education. However, the government was also convinced that 
instead of increasing government investment in education institutions, it is more cost-
effective for the beneficiaries of education, namely the students, to pay for their 
education. The government hence implemented the privatization policy, requiring 
public universities to financially support themselves, and also encouraging non-
governmental groups to run educational organizations. Indeed, since 1980, the 
percentage of government education investment in the GDP has not increased, and 
even reduced in a few years. In such way the government shirked its responsibility in 
funding education.  
On the other hand, the government has greatly delayed establishing institutional 
rules to support the entry of non-government actors in the existing education system 
so that the government kept the control of education to itself. Although non-
                                                 
20 The “Three Nong” problem refers to Nong Ye (agriculture), Nong Cun (rural society), and Nong 
Min (peasants).  
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governmental actors agreed it is a good policy to allow non-government actors to 
enter the educational field, they complained that the government did not grant 
autonomy to them and simultaneously failed to fulfill its responsibilities of funding 
education of all types. As one economic entity, the government achieves the 
maximum benefit for itself: having all the power and make the minimal spending. 
In their interaction with the government, the non-government actors strives to 
talk with the government with the aim of transforming the role of the government, 
from a “taking-all-under-its-control” dominator to a power-sharing authority with 
increasing legal responsibility and improved functions of welfare support and service 
delivery. Education should be the right enjoyed by all the people and the government 
has the responsibility to ensure the education right to be enforced. But there is a 
difference between the government sponsoring education and the government running 
education. The government running education will subject education to political 
interests rather than academic interests, especially in a non-democratic system. Non-
governmental schools provide channels for the people to input their educational ideas 
into the cultural system.  
In response to the criticism about the poor quality of private schools, it cannot 
be denied that many private investors deem running education as a profit-making 
activity. In China, there are many private universities that charge high tuition and are 
of poor quality. And Apple is correct to say that, in general, reliance on the market in 
education “did not encourage diversity in curriculum, pedagogy, organization, 
clientele, or even images” (p.9). However, there have been positive examples in 
which non-government schools did encourage all these. In China, education for 
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migrant students and innovative programs for disabled students are initially provided 
by non-governmental schools. 
There would be a long way before the completion of transition from a society 
with a unitary power agency to a society with plural power agency, but it is a trend 
that seems impossible to be reversed, because the government has lost its ideological 
ground to be the solo power in the nation, and the social groups have accumulated 
forces to exert pressure, even though in a mild way, to press the government to 
continue the pace of transition.  
Summary 
Institutional analysis shows that the change of political and economic structure 
has a visible impact on the pattern of state-society interaction. The government is less 
capable to control every social activity, and the non-governmental organizations are 
financially more capable and culturally more independent to carry on their activities. 
Although their behaviors are framed by the rules in the existing system, (e.g., in this 
case the university’s strategies in student enrollment, teacher recruitment, and dealing 
with property right were limited by the education and legal system,) they do not 
passively accept institutional rules. Instead, they constructed a space of public 
discussion of the reform of the education system, talked with the government officials 
to further their understanding of the private education, and sought or even created 
alternative mechanisms for social recognition of their status other than the 
government recognition. In the transitional period of China which occurred in a 
global context, the interaction between the macro-structure and the social behavior is 
reciprocal: The transformation of macro-structure is influencing the change of social 
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behavior, and simultaneously the action of social members is influencing the macro-
structure. 
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CHAPTER 8  
EDUCATION FOR AWARENESS:  
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSTITUTE OF PEASANT EDUCATION 
 
The historical problems facing rural areas in China still exist in rural society 
today:  rural areas lack financial and educational resources, rural peasants are 
exploited in the economic system, and peasants are not organized and powerless both 
economically and politically (Lin, 1993, 1999).  Thus the goals and methods adopted 
in the Rural Reconstruction Movement in late Qing era that focused on livelihood 
education and self-governance still have relevance today. However, adult education in 
rural areas also faces new challenges in the reform era in China today.  The political 
and economic systems are driven by the need for political control and the need for 
modernization – these needs also dominate the function carried out by education.  A 
tension exists in the cultural environment between the often conflicting appeals of 
modernization values such as growth and individualism and post-modernization 
values such as sustainability and cooperation. The Dingxian Institute of Peasant 
Education (DIPE) described in the present case is located in Zhaicheng village, 
Dingxian County, Hebei province. The development of DIPE reflects the efforts of 
Chinese intellectuals to influence social change especially for rural societies.  DIPE 
works to address the problems facing rural areas taking inspiration from historical 
practices to respond to contemporary cultural and political reality. The Institute 
collects mainstream and non-mainstream ideas, and attempts to explore a set of 
comprehensive solutions to a dearth of rural problems. This chapter first introduces 
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the program structure of DIPE, then describes the pressures encountered by DIPE-
facilitated peasant organizations in their process of development, and finally 
discusses the evolution of government-Institute interaction in different stages, which 
is explored further in the analysis of the nature of civil society development in the 
next chapter. 
8.1 Dingxian: History and Today 
Before the twentieth century, Dingxian County was an obscure place, out of 
sight of historians. It acquired a place in the modern Chinese history because of 
events that transpired in the early 20th century. In 1904, one squire in Zhaicheng 
village, Dingxian County, Mi Chunming and other village heads led villagers to 
establish schools, organized literacy education society for peasants, and established a 
series of rules for the education and development of the entire county. These “public 
rules” included an education promotion plan, crop preservation rules, forest 
preservation rules, well digging promotion rules, public well and fountain 
preservation rules, and student loan regulations. In 1908, one villager proposed the 
whole village to buy cotton seeds together and distribute them among peasants to 
save the cost of transportation of buying seeds separately. Based on this experience, 
the village decided to establish economic cooperatives which included a financial 
cooperative, a consumer cooperative, a purchasing cooperative, and a marketing 
cooperative. This might be the first peasant economic cooperatives in Chinese history. 
The village also established a committee for assessing the quality of agriculture 
products. In 1914, the Head of Dingxian County suggested to build Zhaicheng into an 
exemplar self-governance village. Zhaicheng became the first village in China to 
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write its own self-governance organization plan. Following this, it established a 
charity fund, a clinic, and other economic, cultural, and social organizations. The 
reforms adapted by the village had far-reaching influence in other regions during the 
Nationalist Government era. When the Head of Dingxian County became the Head of 
Shanxi province, he promoted Zhaicheng’s experience of village self-governance in 
the whole province. In 1928, the Nationalist government issued its county 
organization law, and two chapters on village self-governance referred to the Shanxi 
experience. 
Zhaicheng village became an important base of rural reconstruction in China 
under the Nationalist Government (1911-1949) because of James Yen (1893~1990). 
Yen was born in China in a venerated scholarly family. He graduated from Yale 
University in 1918. Two days after his graduation, he went to France to provide 
service to Chinese laborers there. While there, Yen created textbooks to teach the 
illiterate laborers. He articulated, “I began to realize that what these humble, common 
people of my country lacked was not brains, for God has given that to them, but 
opportunity…They had potential powers waiting for development, waiting for 
release.” (Buck, 1945) In 1920 he went back to China to dedicate his life to mass 
education and rural reconstruction, and founded the Chinese mass education 
association.   
In 1925, James Yen met Mi Digang, son of Mi Chunming, and mentioned that 
he wanted to find a site for his rural reconstruction experiment that included 
education and development projects. Mi Digang invited him to come to Dingxian 
County. In 1928, the experiment began, and the mass education association led by 
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Yen established a branch in Zhaicheng village to conduct literacy education and 
social investigation. Later they moved the headquarters of the mass education 
association to Dingxian. Hundreds of intellectuals followed Yen to Dingxian, 
including those who held important positions in the government. It was the first time 
that “intellectuals go back to the rural areas.” James Yen’s plan included the 
establishment of a mass university, a mass publishing house, and a mass film studio. 
Due to change in political circumstance in 1940s, his plan was unfinished. After 
1950s, James Yen continued to promulgate mass education and rural reconstruction in 
Southeast Asian countries.  
This unique history has a marked influence on Zhaicheng village.  To this day, 
the village has preserved its patrol team for public safety and still maintains certain 
village public property including lands and houses, and recruits electricians 
responsible for maintaining the electrical infrastructure of the whole village.  The 
village committee has the capacity to organize public activities, such as one for 
planting trees surrounding the village. This is quite different from other rural villages 
where no public property is left after the implementation of the household contract 
responsibility system 21  that began in 1978 in the country, and most village 
committees  have lost their authority as well as mobilization capacity among the 
villagers.  
Like the historical “Ding Xian experiment,” the establishment of DIPE is the 
result of the village committee actively seeking cooperation with intellectuals. The 
                                                 
21 Household contract responsibility system contains two features. First, farmland is still owned by the 
public. Second, production and management are entrusted to individual farming households through 
long-term contracts. During the contract period, the farmers pay taxes to the State and collective 
reserves to local governments, and keep all the other produce for themselves. 
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history of Zhaicheng village makes it a good site for a contemporary experiment in 
rural construction. Besides, Zhaicheng village is located in Hebei province, which 
surrounds the capital of the nation, Beijing, and thus it has access to intellectual 
resources. DIPE attracted scholars and student volunteers to contribute their ideas and 
time to the Institute.   
8.2 Sources of Inspiration for Adult Education 
The President of the Institute, Dr. Fang, is a senior policy analyst working in the 
government. In 1980s, he worked in the Central Government Rural Policy Research 
Center, also called State Department Rural Development Research Center. According 
to the category set up by Hamrin and Cheek (1986), he is an establishment 
intellectual who directly served rulers, as compared to a non-establishment 
intellectual who did not serve the state. At that time, he was doing research on rural 
development, and provided advice to the policy makers. During the five consecutive 
years from 1982 to 1986, all the Central Government No. 1 Document, which is the 
most important government document outlining the most critical issues the 
government have identified and decide to work on that year, pinpointed the need for 
the policy of rural reform. In the early 1990s, the concern about rural development 
diminished. Fang is among the intellectuals who first raised the “Three-Nong 
Problems”: Nong Ye (agriculture), Nong Cun (rural village), Nong Min (peasants), 
and repeatedly emphasized in the intellectual circle on the critical importance of these 
problems. His and others’ efforts made the government once again to shift its focus to 
rural society. After eight years of not mentioning rural policy as the key issue, 
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beginning from 2004, the central government has mentioned “Three-Nong” problems 
in its No. 1 Document for four years in a row.  
Viewed as an expert on agriculture and rural society, Dr. Fang was often 
consulted by government leaders in each level, from the State Department to the 
county-level officials. However, he was also a maverick in the establishment 
intellectual circle. He was famous in the circle for “doing research with feet,” a style 
meaning that he did a lot of fieldwork and data collection with first-hand materials 
which was different from other establishment intellectuals who “do research with 
brain,” relying on reading second hand materials primarily. When he was the Editor-
in-Chief of the China Reform Magazine, he brought his strong concern about rural 
society to the magazine by opening a special version called “China Reform - Rural 
Society version.”  This version of the magazine reported the poverty of peasants, the 
corruption of local governments, the lack of welfare mechanisms in the rural areas, 
etc. which was in conflict with the “beautiful pictures” the establishment intellectuals 
attempted to paint as a result of the reform. The rural society version also explained 
the CPC central government policies and laws to the peasant so that they have legal 
instruments to defend their rights. Fang said, “we do this (transferring legal 
knowledge to peasants) not for encouraging peasants to rebel, but just giving them 
basic treatment as citizens.” The magazine offices received many peasant activists 
who went to Beijing to appeal to higher authorities for help or justice on many issues. 
And Fang was called by the peasants as the “voice” of Chinese peasants. For his 
sympathy toward the peasants and the “negative” tone of report in the Reform 
magazine, Fang was forced to leave the China Reform Magazine in 2005. 
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In 2003, Fang founded DIPE to practice his ideas of social reform.  An early 
source of inspiration was the “Rural Construction Movement” in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The rural construction movement was a way of transferring technology, inculcating 
the idea of self-governance, and constructing a prosperous and democratic nation. A 
second source of inspiration came from the “New Rural Society Campaign” in Japan 
and Korea. In these two countries, the government ensured that all peasants had their 
own land, and provided financial and legal support to peasants.  Furthermore, 
peasants were organized in multiple levels and cooperated in multiple areas including: 
purchasing and marketing, loans, insurance, processing, storage, agriculture-related 
industry, technology and information service, medical service, etc. The “New Rural 
Society Campaign” greatly improved the conditions of rural society in both countries. 
The third stream of inspiration came from civil society practices around the world. 
The normative concepts and strategies employed by some civil societies around the 
world for rural development (such as empowerment, participation, ecology, and 
sustainability) were embraced by DIPE.  A fourth source of inspiration came from the 
domestic revival of concern for rural society and rural development which began in 
the late 1990s.  Chinese theorists began to analyze rural problem and seek solutions 
for rural problems from multiple perspectives, including property rights, governance 
structure, bureaucratic system, household registration system, welfare system, 
preservation of traditional culture, all of which created a vibrant environment for 




8.3 DIPE’s Ideas of Rural Construction 
Fang’s central idea is the deconstruction of modernization. According to Fang, 
it is impossible for China to copy the path of Western modernization. To achieve the 
level of industrialization and urbanization seen in advanced Western countries, a 
country needs to invest substantive material resources, which in Western countries 
was accomplished by colonization and plunder of other countries through war.  
According to Fang, China has tried to achieve industrialization and urbanization 
through the internal exploitation of the rural society.  Beginning in the 1950s, China 
adopted the Soviet model and devoted a large proportion of national resources for 
large-scale heavy-industry construction. Heavy industry is a form of capital-intensive 
industry, and in order to accumulate the necessary capital, the state chose to sacrifice 
the interests of the peasants. Capital that could have been invested in agriculture was 
invested in urban construction – this created a “price gap” between the heavy industry 
and agricultural sectors. Specifically, to develop its heavy industry, the state 
monopolized the purchase and sale system, including the purchase and sale of 
agriculture products, equipment, and resources such as fertilizer and pesticide. All 
these broadened the economic gap between the urban city and rural areas, and 
deepened inequities in economic and social status between urban and rural residents. 
The country’s first ten years of rapid economic development at around 9% 
annual GDP growth was the process of depriving peasants of their benefits. With the 
industrialization of agriculture (which features regionalized cultivation and 
specialized production) through the investment of commercial and financial capital 
the exploitation of peasants was aggravated. In addition, the peasants were required to 
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take more risk because of the regionalized cultivation and specialized production 
system.  Neither the government nor the companies involved provided necessary 
insurance measures to offset the increased risk for rural peasants. Fang explained that 
in China the government is an economic entity and seeks the maximum benefit for 
itself. If the exploitation continues, it definitely will cause the bankruptcy of peasants.  
If China continues to follow the Western path of modernization and urbanization, 
people will see an increase in the number of slums in urban cities as well as pollution 
of environment on the scale seen in Latin America.  Fang argues that China needs to 
recognize its own reality and seek its own development path. The reality is that for a 
long time the majority of the Chinese population sustained themselves in the 
traditional agricultural area. The principle of rural reconstruction should be based on 
this demographic and economic reality.  For Fang, members of the rural society 
deserve to be treated as equal human beings and citizens.  The rhetoric of 
modernization can no longer be allowed to sacrifice the peasants.  
8.3.1 Peasant Organization 
Since the 1990s the central government began to pay attention to rural areas, 
and have issued policies that benefit rural areas, such as reduction or exemption of 
agriculture tax. However, Fang regards that the problem of rural areas are not really 
addressed, because the power system and benefit structure is not changed. The basic 
elements of agriculture do not stay in rural  areas: resources especially land are 
gradually occupied during the expansion of urban cities, labor force flow to urban 
cities, and capital flows to urban cities too. In addition, many economic fields related 
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to agriculture are not accessible to the peasants, such as marketing, finance, 
processing, transportation, etc.   
Today absolute poverty and illiteracy have been largely eliminated in rural 
China. However the process of urbanization keeps marginalizing rural areas. Fang 
believes that peasants are the biggest minority group in the world, and this 
phenomenon won’t change if peasants aren’t organized. He states, “dispersed 
peasants cannot establish normal contractual relationship with the external body 
through negotiation” (Interview with Fang, August 2006). 
After many years of investigation in rural areas, Dr. Fang concludes that the 
reason for the marginalization of rural society is that peasants are isolated from each 
other, which have three consequences. First, they are unable to collect money to 
expand their production, or attempt to engage in the business of processing, 
manufacturing, finance, or market sale, and thus unable to compete with those who 
have abundant funds. Their influence to the economic system is minimized. Second, 
peasants lack opportunities to communicate with others beyond their immediate 
neighborhood, and thus do not get information about the production activities of the 
others. The lack of information leads to a disadvantaged position of peasants while 
interacting with the other economic body in the economic system. Third, they lack 
organizational power to express their common interest. For example, when the 
education rights of their children are violated, or when they are cheated during the 
trade of fertilizer, pesticides, and agriculture equipments, the action they can take is 
limited and usually has no results. In sum, when they are faced with the external 
highly-structured power system, they are in an extremely disadvantageous position.  
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To change this situation, Fang believes that peasants need to organize 
themselves. The key principles are that the organization is to be owned by people, 
managed by people, and its benefits are shared by people. The goal of the cooperative 
is not only to satisfy the economic needs of its members, but also to cultivate certain 
cultural and moral values, such as mutual help, voluntary participation, and self-
determination. 
8.3.2 Ecological Economy 
Modernization was based on intensive exploitation of resources from nature. 
The modernization process of developed countries was accompanied by their 
exploitation of natural resources from their colonized lands. Currently many 
developing countries are on the way to depleting their resources in the race to 
modernization. The modernization of China also repeats this model: China has 
become the second largest consumer of petroleum in the world.  More and more huge 
and environmentally unsustainable dams are being built to satisfy the need for 
electricity. The expanding transportation system occupies large acreage of agrarian 
land and simultaneously results in serious pollution of the air.  
The current economic system does not include these social and environmental 
costs in the calculation of production cost. People are happy to see the growth of GDP, 
but at the same time nature is being destroyed and the populace is suffering from the 
consequence of this detrimental form of economic growth. One deceptive assumption 
of modern economics is the existence of infinite natural resources. Holding this 
assumption is dangerous. Fresh air and fresh water is more and more rare today. The 
reserve of mineral resources is diminishing. According to an increasing amount of 
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evidence, the life-span of livable area for organic bodies in the biological circle is 
measured by decades, not hundreds of millions of years (Meadows, 1972). 
Although the slogan of sustainable development is often heard in the media, 
official documents, conferences, and business press around China, people use it as a 
fashionable word to glorify their speech or actions without knowing what it means. In 
a better situation, people may be aware that the word is connected with saving water 
or planting more trees. However they are not aware that for sustainable development 
their high-production-high-consumption model needs to be changed. In many ways 
the goal of modernization and rapid economic growth threatens the sustainability of 
the ecological system, especially when the goal is expected to be achieved in a 
condensed time frame.  
In the last few decades, rural areas have been confronted with new problems 
accompanying with the process of modernization. While the average family income 
has improved due to increased production and increasing commercialization, the cost 
to the environment has been great in terms of water pollution, and reduction in soil 
fertility, vegetation area and diversity of species. These conditions are not a good 
omen to rural areas because the land is all that the peasants can rely on. The 
environmental degeneration will be fatal to their survival and production activity. 
They are the direct victims in this collective plunder and destruction of nature.  
According to Fang, it is a mistake that all levels of government use GDP growth 
as the only indicator of development. China has paid the price for this model. Fang 
argues that the government must change this kind of thought and working style.  For 
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example, DIPE has adopted a bottom-up strategy to work with rural communities to 
change the conception and living style of the common people.  
8.3.3 Restoration of Cultural Life in Rural Society 
In the reform era, the “household contract responsibility system” was 
implemented in the agricultural sector. Land was contracted to individual peasants, 
factories and agriculture equipments were either contracted or sold out, and there was 
no public asset anymore in many villages. The function of many village committees 
has been reduced to collecting tax and all kinds of fees from the peasants. Due to the 
large numbers of peasants who defaulted on the submission of taxes and fees, many 
village committees carry a huge amount of debts. Most village committees have 
neither the financial capacity nor the moral authority to carry out public undertakings.  
Villagers themselves have gradually lost the sense of being in a community and 
have become less concerned with public affairs. The long-term and mandatory 
command that the state should replace local forms of commune and community, e.g., 
the traditional lineage family which maintained social order in rural China has 
removed the cultural and ethical base of cohesion in rural society. Today, old people 
are keepers of traditional art and skills in villages. However, when getting rich 
becomes the dominant goal, and money making becomes the dominant language in 
the rural life, the older people are marginalized in the rural social order. Young 
people find jobs in the urban areas, and their advantage in earning capability makes 
them become significant figures in rural society. In reality, they are a long distance 
from rural life and “not present” in the rural cultural life. Working in urban cities as 
migrant workers, they cannot actively participate in the construction of rural culture. 
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Today rural society is no longer a cultural concept, but instead a regional (relative to 
the urban) or economic (relative to the developed) concept. It has gradually become a 
desert of culture. Rural life has gradually lost its distinctive cultural and spiritual 
meaning. The popularity of gambling and lotteries and the increasing crime and 
violence are evidences of the absence of rural culture and spirit. Responding to this 
phenomenon, Fang thought it is important to revive the cultural function of the rural 
society.  
8.4 Establishment of DIPE in 2003  
8.4.1 An Encounter between the Villagers and Intellectuals 
Qin was a reporter for the “rural society version” of the China Reform 
Magazine.  As a proponent of James Yen’s thought on mass education, Qin was also 
a founder of the Research Society on James Yen in Beijing. During the Spring 
Festival of 2003, Qin led a team of university student volunteers to conduct research 
in Zhaicheng village. On the eve of the spring festival, Qin wrote a couplet on the 
door of the house he lived in：“平民教育诚可嘉，乡村建设慨而慷” (“Following 
the path of mass education, being engaged in rural construction with great passion) 
with the banner “继往开来” (“Inherit past traditions and break new grounds for the 
future”). The secretary of the party branch in the village, Mi, saw the couplet and was 
surprised that there were still people who remembered James Yen and wanted to 
inherit his willingness to develop rural China. Several days after the spring festival, 
the party secretary with several village committee members went to Beijing to visit 
the son of James Yen. The following is the conversation during that visit, which 
catalyzed the foundation of DIPE. 
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Mi said, “the five thousand villagers in Zhaicheng village respected Mr. Yen 
very much, and hopes to continue his great cause. The village has an abandoned 
middle school. We planned to buy it to build an agriculture technology school, and 
we will make a sculpture of Mr. Yen. We hope to get your support.”  
Mr. Yen replied, “I am too old (81 years old at that time) to do this thing. To 
continue the cause of Mr. Yen, you need to work with Qin and Dr. Fang in the China 
Reform magazine.”  
Qin said, “There are too many agriculture technology schools now. We should 
make it into a mass education school. Only in this way can we revive the spirit of Mr. 
Yen.”  
Mi responded, “Well, we’ll plan it together.” (Qin, 2003) 
Since then Mi decided to choose the China Reform Magazine as the 
collaborative partner. After contacting Dr. Fang, the village collected 390 thousand 
RMB to buy the unused school in the village as the working site of DIPE. In March 
2003, the James Yen Institute of Rural Reconstruction was founded, staffed with 
persons from several organizations: the China Reform magazine, the UK Action Aid, 
and the Community Service and Development (CSD) research center in Hongkong.  
In July 29 2003, Qin came to DIPE and started the planning work of the 
Institute. Because the school site had been abandoned for many years, there was no 
running water and electricity, and the buildings and dormitories looked dilapidated. 
The villagers helped to clean and refit the campus. In August, one newspaper in 
Hebei province used four pages to report the story of James Yen and DIPE, and DIPE 
206 
has since entered into public sight. In August 25 2003, DIPE registered in the Bureau 
of Education in Dingzhou city. Several days later, the board of trustees was formed 
and the village committee members account for 30% of the Trustees. The first trustee 
meeting was held, and Fang was selected as the chair of the board of trustee as well as 
the president of DIPE, and Zhendong Yen, son of James Yen, was selected as the 
honorary president.   
The Institute staff reached agreement with the village committee: first, DIPE is 
a public undertaking and its aim is not for profit- making. It will consider the 
economic needs of the village, but at least in the first three years the village cannot 
expect DIPE to bring direct economic benefit to the village. Second, the village is 
responsible for the investment in DIPE’s buildings, and the other partner 
organizations are responsible for the investment in facilities as well staff during the 
operation of DIPE. Third, the village committee can not intervene in the programs 
and management of DIPE. 
8.4.2 Registration in the Government 
When DIPE was registered in the Bureau of Education in Dingzhou city, it 
specified its focus was to provide training to peasants, and the Dingzhou government 
thought DIPE was to hold training classes on agriculture technology for the local 
peasants. So at the beginning the local government showed a welcome attitude to 
DIPE, although it did not provide any material support. The government did not pay 
much attention also because the institution had very limited funding and staff and did 
not appear to be able to produce any big influence. 
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8.4.3 The First Workshop on Peasant Cooperative 
DIPE had a limited budget and staff shortage, with only Qin and his wife as 
resident staff in the Institute for in October the three founding organizations had each 
only contributed 30 thousand RMB.  In 2004, DIPE succeeded in getting a project 
grant of 400 thousand RMB from the Asian foundation. But it still worked on a tight 
budget. 
On April 18, 2004, the first workshop on economic cooperative was held in 
DIPE. The recruitment advertisement was placed on DIPE’s website and the “China 
Reform” magazine. Not surprisingly, there are many peasant rights activists among 
the participants in the first workshop. As the director of the office in the Institute said, 
“the first workshop was a summary of our previous work. Half of the students are 
already our acquaintances. These contacts are established when the peasant rights 
activists come to the magazine (the China Reform magazine) for advice or when we 
did investigation in the country” (interview with the Director of the Office, July 15 
2005). 
The first workshop lasted two weeks, and focused on introducing and sharing 
previous experiments in peasant cooperation. The majority of the cases shared are 
domestic cooperatives, and one is on the experience of India, the Kerala movement. It 
invited scholars and practitioners working on peasant cooperatives to discuss their 
experiences with peasants.  Bai Lin is a pioneer working in peasant cooperative 
finance. He is an official in a municipal bank supervisory bureau but devoted most of 
his time in thinking about how to reform the finance system in rural areas. In 2001, 
while faced with a lack of policy support, he mobilized peasants in Li Shu County, Ji 
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Lin province to establish a peasant finance cooperative. Yu Shi is a famous economist 
as well as the founder of a highly influential non-government economics research 
institute in China, and he helped found a micro-credit mutual fund in Shuilongtou 
village, Shanxi province. Zhen Bang, a researcher in the World Economic and 
Politics Research Center in Social Science Institute, experimented on peasant 
cooperative in Shandong province. The Director of Office of DIPE said, “The 
workshop provides an opportunity to take retrospective view of the road we have 
been through, and gain confidence that it is a road we should continue to explore” 
(Phone interview with the Director of Office, February 15 2006) 
In the whole year of 2004, DIPE explored a variety of ways for rural education 
and development. The initial curriculum scheduled by DIPE reflects the diverse 
aspects of rural society that the Institute staff pay attention to: sustainable 
development theory, hygiene system, modern farming methods, peasant cooperative, 
civic education, self-protection of rights, history, theory and practice of village 
construction and alternative economy, gender awareness and women rights, 
agriculture science, participatory method, communication, social psychology, and 
education science. However, DIPE cannot find enough instructors to teach these 
lessons, and peasants don’t have so much time to be engaged in lessons with complex 
theories or lessons that last several months. 
8.5 Goal Setting between 2004 and 2006 
DIPE entered into a developmental stage since 2004. In 2004, the other two 
founding organizations, Action Aid and CSD respectively, sent one staff to DIPE, 
Liana and Tan. Liana who has been working in Hong Kong said, “working in a rural 
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area and putting the idea of rural development into practice are always my ideal. 
Hongkong is too small and crowded. Every non-government organization has only 
one small office to work in. DIPE not only has so many rooms for training and 
research, and also has such a big piece of land for doing agriculture experiments, 
which is a luxury to NGO staff in Hong Kong. I am glad that I am here” (Interview 
with Liana, July 19, 2005). Tan, the President of a student association about rural 
issues, said: “we always talk about theory, theory, and theory. Now it is time to do 
some real things and to see what would work” (Interview with Tan, July 20, 2005).  
DIPE also recruited two other persons: Zhi You and Xiao Hui, both from a 
prestigious agriculture university, and both once the President of student associations 
concerned with rural problems. In 2004 the resident staff of DIPE added up to seven 
people. Although they have different backgrounds, they are all concerned with rural 
development. As one staff claims, “The Institute provides a space for idealist and 
social activists. Here is a group of people that would not feel comfortable in the urban 
cities and mainstream organizations. It is both a place for escaping (from urban life) 
as well a place for seeking partners and taking collaborative actions for change.” 
(Interview with one staff in the office of eco-farming, July 23, 2005) 
The staffs were divided into two sides: one side holds that DIPE should focus 
on Zhaicheng village, experimenting ways to promote its development. Another side 
believed that DIPE should be a platform of training, academic discussion, and 
information exchange. At the end of 2004, the Institute spent one month in internal 
discussions, from mission and vision, to work focus and programs, and to details in 
practice. After the discussion, the Institute staff reached a level of consensus. 
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Considering its own capacity in human resources and expertise, it decided to focus on 
providing training to peasant leaders nation-wide, while also giving attention to local 
community development. The training would focus on two areas: economic 
cooperative and ecological economy. The focus on economic cooperative is primarily 
influenced by Dr. Fang, who believes that the key to revive rural China is through the 
peasants organizing themselves for their own improvement. The focus on ecological 
economy is influenced by the other two groups of people: one is Dr. Lu, the founder 
of CDS, who is also the trustee of DIPE. Dr. Lu has been concerned with 
environmental problems and gender issues for a long time. She has close contact with 
Asian and international NGOs and collaborate with them on these issues. And thus 
she brought the importance of ecological economy into the attention of DIPE. 
Another person is Mr. Xie, who is an architect from Taiwan. Xie helped the Thao 
tribe, the indigenous residents living near Sun Moon Lake for generations, to rebuild 
their homeland after the earthquake in Taiwan on September 21 1999. Different from 
the mainstream post-disaster construction work, Xie realized the key is to recover the 
tribe’s faith in their homeland, and thus to prevent the migration of the tribal people 
and the consequent vanishing of their culture and the disappearance of the ethnic 
group. Thus he adopted the model of “cooperative house-building” model, mobilizing 
the tribal people to rebuild houses using local materials and simplified techniques. In 
April 2004, Xie visited DIPE, and proposed the practices of “ecological architecture” 
and “cooperative house-building” to the Institute. 
Although Fang, Liu and Xie are the key persons in promulgating the ideas, these 
ideas were accepted by the staff after full discussion and debate. The priority given to 
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cooperatives and ecology is based on their integrative understanding of the economy, 
environment, social life, and culture in rural China. These aspects are interconnected 
in a complicated way. Economic cooperative is the institutional form that helps to 
integrate resources in rural society, and ecological economy is the value and way of 
life which sustain the rural society, enabling people to reconstruct the relationship 
between human and their environment. As one staff comments, “Finally we are 
confident about what we are doing. We do not intend to bring more capital or 
introduce foreign investment to advance economic growth, but to improve the 
livelihood of rural people, and to reconstruct a rural society with a new culture and 
social vitality. We hope they (the peasants) become the main force in local 
development instead of us.” (Interview with the assistant of the President, July 21, 
2005).  
8.5. 1 The Economic Cooperative 
Since the first workshop on economic cooperative, DIPE has held more than ten 
training workshops on peasant economic cooperatives. The Institute kept collecting 
and summarizing experiences of those cooperatives that were established with the 
help of DIPE. The current curriculum included lessons on the organizational structure, 
institutional rules, financial management and administration of cooperatives. In the 
past three years, the workshop attracted peasants and urban activists in grassroots 
organizations and also attracted village-level, town-level, or municipal government 
officials.  
The staff in DIPE believes that peasants are the leaders and main actors in rural 
reconstruction. And to become main actors in rural reconstruction local people need 
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to know their problems and to seek for solution by themselves. One important activity 
in the training is to ask peasants to be divided into several discussion groups, e.g., 
economic group, environmental group, social welfare group, and culture group, to 
discuss the problems they observed in rural society, and to brainstorm the solutions. 
Peasants told the staff that before the training, they complain a lot about rural life, but 
seldom understood rural problems in a comprehensive way, nor did they consciously 
think about solutions, especially about what they themselves can do for these 
problems. But after each group presented its discussion they began to realize that 
many problems are connected. For example, in the environmental group, participants 
mentioned several problems: local villains have set up check points and extort 
vehicles passing through; garbage was thrown everywhere, and the drinking water is 
not clean. They analyzed the underlying reason is that people are not aware of the 
importance of environmental issues, and there is no joint efforts in the village to solve 
the problem. One village party secretary added that basically currently there is little 
government investment in the infrastructure construction in rural areas. Usually the 
county or municipal government officials concentrate their public financial 
investment in several towns to build up “exhibition models” to show outsiders and to 
boast of their achievements. Several other peasants discussed why the government did 
not pay enough attention to rural development, and they concluded that it is because 
peasants have low social status and do not have powerful social networks. Another 
peasant commented that it is because the peasants are not united. He said, “Today we 
seldom feel the existence of community in rural areas. No one is thinking about the 
provision of public good, or concerned with the environment, or considering the 
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impact of his action on the other people. No one is feeling guilty when he fells down 
the tree on the hillside, or pollutes the water. Due to the degeneration of the 
environment, rural areas no longer have pastoral beauty. It is not only that urban 
people see rural areas as a dirty, chaotic and uncultured place, but peasants also hold 
such opinion” (Zhou, 2005). Finally participants in this group concluded that it is 
important that the peasants should become united and start to work on the problems.  
In the social welfare group, participants described the miserable lives that many 
old people or sick people are living in the village. They analyzed that these old and 
sick people are not taken care of because of their low income and the deterioration of 
ethical standards in the rural community.  Participants provided different opinions and 
stated that the cost of medical treatment is too high for peasants who are not covered 
by health insurance. One participant mentioned that only when all people are 
concerned with public finance and participate in decision-making of financing health 
care and other important matters can the problem be resolved. During the one hour 
and a half discussion, participants also mentioned the increasing number of people 
suffering from “unknown diseases” because of industrial pollution. Many people also 
had occupational diseases and injuries from working in construction sites or mineral 
mines. 
The team discussion is a process of people developing the consciousness that 
they are the principle actors for taking initiatives for rural development. At the end of 
the training sessions, there is a mock practice of forming cooperatives, in order to 
make participants realize the complexities and conflicting interests that can exist in 
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one small village and the possible obstacles they may encounter in establishing and 
maintaining an economic cooperative. 
Besides equipping them with knowledge and information on cooperatives, 
another goal of the workshop is to develop the habit of self-management. On the first 
day and by their own will, students are divided into teams for discipline study, 
logistics and cheering. These teams are responsible for maintaining discipline, 
organizing discussions, make daily arrangement such as campus cleaning and 
maintenance, and cheering up participants respectively. Each team reports on their 
work at the end of a day. When the training workshop finished, students responded 
that the life in the Institute vividly taught them the necessity and the advantage of 
cooperation. 
After students went back to their villages, some of them initiated peasant 
cooperatives and mobilized villagers to join them. DIPE provided 10,000 yuan as 
startup fund or as loan to some of these cooperatives. Currently there are about forty 
institute-facilitated peasant cooperatives located in Chongqing city, Henan province, 
Shandong province, Anhui province, Hebei province, Shanxi province, Sichuan 
province, Hunan province, Fujian province, Shaanxi province, Jiangxi province, 
Beijing, and Jilin province. Some cooperatives have a good reputation in local areas 
and have expanded to a certain scale, such as Jiang Zhuang cooperative in Shandong, 




8.5.2 Ecological Economy 
“Healthy land= healthy plant = healthy food= healthy human” 
This slogan is written on the wall of the office for sustainable agriculture. It 
reflects their perception that land is the root of human life. The primary task of 
ecological farming is to restore the soil back to its healthy state. Different from the 
“non pollution farming” that uses chemical fertilizer and low-poison pesticides, 
ecological farming is a system that does not use any chemical fertilizer, pesticide, 
growth regulator, forage additive, or genetic engineering life-form or its product. The 
large amount of chemical fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide used in agriculture 
seriously polluted the soil, water, air, and lead to the worry for food security. The 
essence of organic farming is to establish and restore the biological diversity and the 
healthy cycle of the agriculture ecological system, to maintain the sustainable 
development of agriculture. In this system, crop straw, animal dung, legume crop, and 
green manure are the primary sources of fertilizer; crop rotation and a variety of 
physical, biological and ecological measures are the main strategies to control weed 
and pests. 
The staff experimented organic farming themselves in the Institute. They made 
compost using the dung of animal, the skin of fruits, and rotten leaves. They killed 
pests manually or through biological ways, such as pepper water or tobacco leaf water. 
In addition, they left weed on ridge and at the edge of field. There were peasants who 
could not understand why they did this and voluntarily offered to remove weeds for 
them. One peasant said in fury, “this is not like a cropland with so much weed!” Even 
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the village party secretary regarded that the institute’s staff are a bunch of people who 
do not know farming.  
The Institute staff explained the reason for not eliminating all weed in the 
cropland. After so many years of using pesticides and chemical fertilizer the soil has 
been highly polluted, and it usually takes four to five years to de-pollute and restore 
the fertility of the land. Weeds can absorb the residue of pesticide. Another important 
reason to preserve weeds is that the perished weed activates the microbe to 
metabolize and produce organic humus. The organic humus in the soil is related to 
the nutrition absorption of the plant.  
Another staff gave a philosophical interpretation for the preservation of weeds. 
He regards weeds as part of the biological system, and as such that they are the 
symbol of diversity of forms of life. Weeds are not only the cure to the leanness of the 
earth, but also the cure to the weakness of the vegetables.  
Vegetables are domesticated grass. In the space with only one life, their 
life force will only be weakened. So the space for weed is necessary. Weed is 
both the opponent and tutor of domesticated vegetables……We need to respect 
the power of nature. In Mongolia, people worship the wolf because of its 
courage, cunningness, and the ability to embattle. The fight with the wolves 
keeps Mongolian people  strong. Similarly the vegetables get strong in the 
competition with weeds. (Interview with one staff in the office of eco-farming, 
July 20, 2005).  
 
Although the logic does not sound scientific, it reflects the universal perspective 
that the Institute staff holds toward the relation between things in the natural system. 
The Institute staff also call for a new perspective for looking at pests. The 
existence of pests is a symptom of the feebleness of plants. Thus instead of using 
pesticide, the Institute adopted biological pest-killing as a short-term strategy, and 
217 
restoring the fertility of the soil and increasing the health of plants as a long-term 
strategy. 
The Institute staff felt that people have lost their connection to their root: the 
earth. In the past people have a natural concern and care for the earth; but gradually 
this intimacy is lost and people do not perceive the earth as a life system, but only as 
something to earn a living. The eagerness to catch up with the pace of modernization 
has replaced the concern for the life of the earth. One staff in DIPE warned: “One 
alarming thing is the images that the modernization process created for the 
‘developed’ and the ‘under-developed’ regions. High buildings and large mansions, 
concrete roads, the possession of cars, computers, and mobile phones, are all being 
seen as the symbol of modernization. If you don’t have these, you are seen as out of 
date. But people don’t think about whether they really need cars, concrete road, or 
computers.” (Interview with one staff, July 27 2006) 
The Institute creates a different image of civilized life. Many visitors to the 
Institute were disappointed to see that the Institute did not have high buildings, but 
just rows of flat houses.  Instead, there are many trees, bushes, and wild grasses 
growing around the buildings. Even the villagers say that the Institute does not look 
like an academic institution. However, for the Institute staff, the flat houses with 
bricks and tiles provide comfortable places for living and working.  The trees, bushes, 
and wild grasses are necessary to restore a dynamic ecological system. Through 
maintaining a natural setting for the institute, the staff hope to elicit the attention of 
people in a monetized society to see the connection between human life and natural 
system.  
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Combining traditional Chinese farming culture and recent ecological theory, 
DIPE is exploring a sustainable agriculture model that considers both ecological 
protection and economic benefit. DIPE has a 26-acre farm land that grow wheat, 
corns, peanut, cotton, sesame, beans, tomato, potato, beans, green pepper, etc. In the 
breeding area, the Institute breeds donkeys, ducks and geese. A 20-cube-meter 
compost pond was established in the breeding area to make high-temperature 
compost using animal dung, life garbage, and crop straws. The Institute bought a 
donkey to substitute for modern farming machine, and developed energy-efficient 
irrigating method to replace the mass irrigating method. 
There are scholars who criticized that as intellectuals, the institute staff’s roles 
should be setting up bridges between the rural and urban area, and between experts 
and peasants, not experimenting farming themselves, which is a waste of their 
knowledge, skills and social networks. However, the Institute staff insists, “How do 
we promote the idea of ecological economy if we don’t live this way?” They believe 
that a community should develop the ability to self-sustain their living. 
Before 2005, DIPE did not give systematic instructions on eco-farming 
technology because they haven’t accumulated enough experiences in eco-farming. In 
the workshop on cooperative economy, they introduced the concept of eco-farming, 
but since they cannot transfer useful practical skills, peasants responded with 
indifference to the idea. In 2005, DIPE invited experts from Kadoorie Farm and 
Botanic Garden22  to provide training, including the concept of organic farming, 
                                                 
22 Kadoorie Farm and Botanic Garden (KFBG) nestles below Kwun Yum Shan (Goddess of Mercy 
Mountain) in Hong Kong. The Farm was established in the 1950s to experiment crop production and 
livestock breeding and to bring agricultural aid to poor farmers. Today, KFBG plays an active role in 
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designing of organic farm, how to inspect the component in the soil, how to make 
organic fertilizer, and how to control weed and pest. The training is for the staff and 
volunteers in DIPE, as well as peasants from around the country. After the training, 
some peasants showed willingness to practice the idea of organic farming.  
In November 2006, inspired by the expert from Kadoorie Farm and Botanic 
Garden, DIPE staff began to hold seminar on eco-farming for the first time. Seven 
peasant cooperatives as well as some non-governmental organizations that adopted 
the model of “community-supporting-agriculture” sent representatives to the seminar. 
The seminar lasted five days, and during the first three days the representatives 
exchanged their experience in traditional farming technology. From the change of 
rural environment, to pest prevention and cure in traditional farming, and to the skill 
of compost making and soil maintenance, peasants were actively engaged in 
discussion and contributed their ideas and experiences. They themselves began to talk 
about the harm of chemical fertilizer. The participation of NGO representative 
enables the peasants to understand the concept of eco-farming from the perspectives 
of consumers. One participant concluded that for the marketing of eco-farming, the 
key is not the price of the organic food, but the communication between peasants and 
consumers. The following two days focused on the “doing” of eco-farming. All 
participants made the nutrition liquid for the plants, and collected local microbe in the 
woods. In the final evaluation, many participants mentioned that they were most 
impressed by this activity because it is very useful and improved their confidence 
                                                                                                                                           
promoting the conservation and biodiversity in Hong Kong and South China, allied with sustainable 
agriculture and creative nature education. 
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toward eco-farming. The Institute staff summarized that in the promulgation of 
alternative concepts, the availability of techniques is very important.  
8.5.3 Ecological Architecture 
Ecological architecture is another issue DIPE focuses on. Xie explained why he 
is so enthusiastic about promulgating ecological architecture and cooperative house-
building in rural China:  
In China, there are around 900 million peasants living in rural areas, and 
for most of them building houses is the most important thing in their lives. The 
cost for building houses received higher and higher, and most peasants spent all 
their savings for building a decent house. In the early time of the history people 
used natural materials and the community members all participated in house 
building. House building at that time is part of people’s lives. The cost was very 
low; resources were efficiently utilized; and human resided harmoniously with 
the nature. But in “modern” villages, people adopt commercialized mechanism 
in building houses, utilizing industrial materials, professional equipment and 
techniques. Since the materials are expensive, and the building technique is 
monopolized by professionals, it is getting more and more difficult for peasants 
to build houses. The modern house-building aggravate the poverty of peasants. 
In addition, resources are over consumed, the environment is polluted and 
destroyed, and the health of people is threatened. The house-building is no 
longer a part of people’s life, but a commercial and professional activity, and 
nature is no longer an environment to nurture people’s life and spirit and thus to 
deserve their respect, but just a space to satisfy the desire of people. (Interview 
with Xie, July 24 2005) 
 
In another conversation a few days later, Xie continued to expound his 
perspectives on modern architecture.  
Without the concern for natural environment, modern architecture 
unscrupulously transforms the natural landscape, destroys the ecological 
balance, and alienates people from the land and the natural environment. It also 
changes the tradition that people help each other in the house building and 
community building. In addition, culture attached in traditional architecture is 
lost due to the change of building style” (Interview with Xie, July 29 2005). 
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For the Institute staff, adopting the same attitude with ecological agriculture, 
ecological architecture is not a work, but a way of life, a kind of “Tao.” One Institute 
staff explained why he thought ecological house-building is so important:  
Architecture is another area where human closely interact with the 
environment. It is closely related to our perception of the human-nature 
relationship. That we see nature as a lifeless space that people can modify at 
their will, or we see it as a life system which has its own will, determines how 
and where we design and construct our buildings (Interview with one staff in the 
office of ecological architecture, July 25 2005).  
 
To avoid the monopolization of the expanding commercialization in rural areas, 
and to establish the local independent house-building system, from 2004, Xie 
practiced ecological architecture in cooperation with DIPE staff in Zhaicheng village 
as well as other rural villages. They promoted it from three perspectives: 1) 
Environment. They hoped to design and construct houses that is “green” and in 
harmony with the environment, and advocate a healthy and friendly relationship 
between human life and the nature. 2) Economy. They advocated utilizing the extra 
labor in the village and local construction materials to build houses, so as to reduce 
the construction cost. 3) Social culture. Through mobilizing community members in 
participating and cooperating in house-designing and house-building, the Institute 
hopes to awaken the awareness of the community.  
Xie and the Institute staff designed and constructed a building complex in the 
Institute. The first experiment is the ecological toilet built in front of the dormitory. 
The water-flushing toilet consumes a huge amount of water, which takes up 20~30% 
water consumption in urban cities. The infrastructure such as sewage system and 
waste water processing area needs astronomical amount of investment, and the 
222 
emission of waste water results in the pollution of the environment. Rural areas 
cannot afford the investment on the infrastructure for the water-flushing toilet. To 
decrease the investment on infrastructure and to reduce environmental pollution, Xie 
designed the dry urine-faeces-separated toilet that does not use water.  The dry urine-
faeces-separated toilet prevents and controls the spread of intestinal infectious disease 
and disease of parasite, and shortened the time of making non-pollution compost. The 
construction of the toilet used natural materials: crops straws, wood, grass, and mud.  
Following the invention of the toilet, DIPE and the architect wanted to find a 
household to build an ecological house, but received no response from the villagers. 
The villager told them, “now we no longer use soil to build houses. If one household 
build houses like that, the son in that household won’t be able to get married.” 
Currently, the villagers use concrete to build houses covered with ceramic tiles on the 
external wall.  
Thus, the Institute had to build an exemplary eco-house inside the Institute. But 
Xie adopted the form of “work camp” and recruited university students and peasants 
to the “work camp” so they can learn the concept of ecological architecture and the 
practice cooperative house-building from participating in the house-building process. 
The construction team used natural materials such as wood, soil, straw, bamboo, hay 
mattress, and a series of reed product (including: reed mattress, reed foil, reed board, 
etc.), and so on, and reduced the use of non-recyclable materials such as bricks and 
concrete. The function of warm-keeping in the winter is achieved through the local 
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traditional way, Kang23, but they improved the traditional form and built the double-
level energy saving Kang to suit the two-floor houses. With low energy consumption 
during production and processing, the building materials can reduce the emission of 
CO2 at maximum level. Most of the materials are wood and plant straw, which can 
reserve CO2 at maximum level. 
Since March 2005, DIPE has held four training workshops on eco-architecture 
for peasants and university students, each lasting about one month. Peasants and 
students in the training workshop participated in the design and construction of eco-
houses and auditoriums in the Institute. They asked for advices from local 
experienced people, and discussed and debated on technical issues. In the training 
workshop, students also did research on grass-mud wall, bamboo-woven plank, 
temperature-keeping window, and other architecture theories. Together with Xie, 
peasant and university students explored natural materials and their processing for 
better performance, and ways to simplify the technique so all people, including 
children and youth, women, and old men, can participate in the building process. In 
this way, the local culture of collective house building can be revived, which 
contributes to cultural diversity in the society. 
After participating in the training workshop, the cooperative members in HeCun 
village, HeNan province, invited the Institute staff and the architect Xie to build 
houses for them. The Institute staff and architect Xie organized another work camp in 
the village consisting of student volunteers and local peasants. They designed a model 
                                                 
23 Kang is a heat-able platform made of bricks, invented and used in northern China to adapt to the 
cold condition in winter. It is built like a large oven and people sleep on top. It is a place to sit, sleep, 
chat and eat.
224 
of eco-house for the local village, which is a three-room-two-storied house with an 
attic. It adopts lightweight steel structure, grass-mud filled wall, and bamboo plank. 
The building provides spaces for three generations to live. In HeCun village, 
altogether four households built eco-house adopting this model, and the HeCun 
village cooperative construction team is the main force in the construction process.  
8.5.4 Institute-Government Interaction: Tension over the Boundary of Activities 
When the government found out that DIPE was focusing on peasant 
organization, and the participants were from around the country, they reprimanded 
that DIPE’s work is out of its allowed boundary. According to the government policy, 
if an education institute is registered under the municipal department of education, its 
activity cannot be beyond the boundary of the city. To respond to the accusation, Dr. 
Fang visited the Bureau of Education in Dingzhou and stated that DIPE was 
providing free education to peasants, expecting that the government would show 
understanding and tolerance in the aspect of student enrollment and training. 
However the request was denied. Until Dr. Fang was appointed the Dean of School of 
Agriculture Economics and Rural Development in People’s University, and DIPE put 
the tag “training base of 98/5 Project”24 on the door, the training of the Institute 
became legitimate again. Since then DIPE has held training in the name of the 
People’s University. The relationship between DIPE and the local government has 
always been tense, and it did not get improved along the three years. In 2006, the 
Institute did not get through the annual review of Dingzhou municipal Bureau of 
                                                 
24 A  government project that gives top universities a huge sum of money to build up their research 
capability to become “world class universities.” It was named after the announcement of the then 
president Jiang Zemin in May, 1998, about China’s aspiration to build internationally known 
universities through government support. 
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Education for this reason 25 . However, DIPE was not mandated to close off. 
According to the Institute staff, the local government knew that Fang had close 
relationship with the central government, so it had reservation in harassing the 
Institute while taking actions against the Institute.  
The local government was also angry that DIPE seldom reported to the 
Department of Education about their activities or invited them to visit the Institute 
and give instruction. One government official said, “Anyway I am the governor here. 
They should let me know what they are doing. Are they thinking they can do things 
without the support of the government?” (Personal Interview, July 30 2005)   
What annoyed the local government even more is that there are many people 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or overseas countries who came to visit DIPE. In 
Dingzhou, the local government officials are wary of the media, being afraid that they 
will report negative news about the government. They are worried that the visitors to 
DIPE may hold hostile attitude toward the government and may say words 
unfavorable to the government after they leave Dingzhou. Especially after the June 11 
event26, the local government forbad anyone from foreign countries entering into 
Dingzhou. Even before the June 11 event, every time there are visitors from foreign 
countries, the government will send people to stay in the Institute and to watch their 
activities. 
                                                 
25 Every year the provincial and municipal governments conduct an annual review about educational 
institutions run by non-governmental sectors to see if their programs follow the requirements of the 
government. 
26 In June 11, 2005, some local peasants occupied a factory because it impropriated peasants’ land in 
illegal ways. Denying their wrongdoing, the factory’s owner led a group of people to fight with the 
peasants. A passerby peasant took photos of the process and sent them to the media.  
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DIPE often invited officials of the Bureau of Agriculture in Dingzhou city to 
give lecture in its training workshop. However, the officials stated that “the 
development of DIPE has nothing to do with the government.” The government did 
not provide any financial support to DIPE. In addition, the government set obstacles 
when DIPE applied for project grant from the central government for the village. 
When the researcher went to interview the person in charge of adult education in the 
Bureau of Education in Dingzhou city, he did not want to say anything about the 
Institute. It implies that the relationship between DIPE and the local government is 
not harmonious.  
8.6 Peasant Organization Stumbling on the Road between 2004 and 2005 
8.6.1 Thriving Growth of Peasant Cooperative  
The situation of peasant cooperatives is the tests of DIPE’s theory and work. 
Five peasant cooperatives were founded after the first workshop, including Zhaicheng 
village where DIPE is located. Zhaicheng villagers founded peasant cooperative on 
May 4 2004. Till 2006 there are about forty cooperatives initiated by the students of 
DIPE, located around the country. Generally the organization of these cooperatives 
follows the model of the Institute: the members’ convention is the supreme power 
body, and they elected the trustee board and supervisory committee. When the 
cooperative was formed, the cooperative members collectively drafted the “Statute of 
Cooperatives” to stipulate the organizational structure, function, duties and rights of 
its members, and the mechanism of profit-sharing. DIPE referred to the principles set 
227 
up by the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers27 and provided a template of the 
statute, and those cooperatives adapted it to fit in their own considerations. Take the 
“Statute of Cooperatives” of Zhaicheng as an example to see how it reflects the key 
principles and cultural values of cooperatives.  
Article 15 delineates the organizational structure, manifesting the principle 
“owned by people”: the members’ convention is the supreme body of power of the 
cooperative. It is constituted by all members. With its authorization, the 
representative convention can perform the function of the members’ convention. The 
representatives are elected by the members, serve a term of three years, and can be 
reelected and reappointed.  
Article 16 manifests the principle “managed by people”: the members’ 
(representative) convention has the following power: 
1) Deliberate and decide if to pass this statute, make decisions on critical 
issues like the dismissal of the cooperative, and the merging with other 
associations, etc. 
2) Elect or dismiss the members in the trustee council and the supervisory 
commission. 
3) Deliberate and pass the annual working report and financial budget 
report of the trustee council and supervisory commission. 
                                                 
27 Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, founded in 1844 in Rochdale, England, by 28 Lancashire 
weavers. Influenced by the theories of Robert Owen, they opened a grocery store that was so 
successful that they were able to establish a cooperative factory and textile mill. It is considered the 
first successful cooperative enterprise. The Rochdale Pioneers are most famous for designing the 
Rochdale Principles, a set of principles of co-operation that combined a fixed interest on capital with a 
distribution of profits in proportion to purchases.  
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4) Deliberate and approve the guideline of production and management, 
development plan, and annual budget proposal.  
5) Deliberate and determine the amount of total shares, the amount of each 
share, and the maximum share that each member can subscribe, and the 
standard of membership fee. 
6) Deliberate and decide to expand the capital shares. 
It is expected that the cooperative is not only an economic entity, but also a 
social and cultural entity that carry out work for the public welfare of the community. 
Thus besides dividend-distribution among the members, part of the profit is reserved 
for the commonwealth fund. However the fund is still owned by the members and 
how to use the fund is determined by the members. 
At the starting period of the cooperatives, members had positive responses 
toward the cooperatives and their excitement was obvious, and they contributed a lot 
of time to the cooperatives. Nearly all members said the cooperatives were good. The 
starting period is the period when the trustees are most united and most confident in 
the cooperatives. The cooperative leaders were busy in drafting the constitution, 
discussing projects, organizing voluntary community service activities, and 
organizing art and entertaining activities. They were also enthusiastically reaching out 
for the development of economic cooperatives. In the first month after the 
establishment of the economic cooperative in Zhaicheng village, the eight trustees in 
the trustee board were busy doing the things listed above. They even do not have time 
to take care of their own cropland. 
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Among these cooperatives, the primary economic activity is collective 
purchasing of production materials, such as seeds, fertilizer, tools, etc. In this way, 
they can buy things in wholesale price rather than retail price. This activity is low-risk 
and for sure can benefit the peasants. Almost all the cooperatives choose this activity 
as the start-up program. For example, in Zhaicheng village, HeBei province, the 
cooperative members bought coal together in the winter at a price 20% lower than the 
retail price. In Jiangzhuang village, Shandong province, the cooperative signed 
contract with a seed company. The company transported the seed to the village, and 
sold the seed to the cooperative members and other villagers at the price of 2.9 RMB/ 
500g, while the market price was 3.5 RMB/ 500g. In Nantang village, AnHui 
province, the peasant cooperative established relationship with the municipal Bureau 
of Commodity Price (BCP), and bought fertilizer and pesticides from it. In this way 
the quality of fertilizer and pesticides were guaranteed. 
Collective marketing has higher risk and needs high-level organization. In 
Jiangzhuang village, pig-cultivating associations were established under the peasant 
cooperative. Rabbit-breeding associations were also formed which uniformly 
prepared forages for its members, and supervised the unitary epidemic prevention. 
The associations publicized advertisement in local TV station for marketing. The 
lowest selling price was prescribed to prevent vicious price competition. The pig-
cultivating association in Zhaicheng loaned money to build a pig-production farm 
outside the village, established a management team and recruited a feeder to take 
responsibility for the farm. Other members provided labor for free. In the winter, 
members took turns to watch the farm.  
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In 2005, after DIPE invited experts from Kadoorie Farm and Botanic Garden to 
give instructions on eco-farming, several peasant cooperatives showed interests in 
practicing eco-farming in their villages. In Zhaicheng village, there were five 
villagers who were willing to practice eco-farming. Some of them have opposed the 
using of pesticides for a long time. However, they lacked opportunities and 
appropriate venue to discuss this issue with others. They felt they are the “minorities” 
in the village. Now, with a few people experimenting eco-farming together, even if 
they are still “minorities,” they felt their previous worries were justified, and they are 
not isolated any more. They felt that they are connected and they are more confident 
in insisting on not using chemical fertilizer. 
DIPE chose peanut planting for them to experiment eco-farming, because as a 
legume crop, peanut needs less fertilizer and have stronger resistance to pests than 
other kinds of crops.  The Institute adopted a mechanism to guarantee their benefit: if 
their income from peanut harvest is not as good as previous years, the Institute would 
compensate them.  
In another village, Sun Zhuang village in Anhui province, the peasant 
cooperative chose to use10 mu (or about 2 acres) of public land to practice eco-
farming. The cooperative purchased human feces from the residence committee in the 
city, and then allocated to each villager to make manure. Mr. Wang, 68 years old, was 
the most passionate promoter of this project, because several years ago all the chicken 
he kept died for eating crops poisoned by pesticides. 
In rural areas, finance is a big problem for development. Peasants have the habit 
of depositing their money in the bank. In Zhaicheng village with 2000 households, 
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there are about four million Yuan deposited in bank altogether. However, it is very 
difficult for peasants to loan money from the bank. To the bank the transaction cost is 
too high: usually the loan peasant asks for is small-amount, and it is difficult for the 
bank to investigate the real use of the loan and to assess the possibility of the debt 
being paid off. Thus the bank is not willing to provide loans to peasants. The 
consequence is that the money of rural areas is flowing to the urban city, impairing 
the capability of rural society to develop. In many rural areas, peasants borrow money 
from usurer or underground illegal bank. To solve the peasants’ financial problem 
some peasant cooperatives a initiated micro-loan program or form financial mutual-
aid groups. For example, in Lan Kao, the financial mutual-aid group helps resolve 
peasants’ financial difficulty in production and other aspects. It operates as micro-
credit loan society. The applicant submits application explaining the amount, purpose, 
return period, and the warrantor of the loan, and then the cooperative convenes a 
meeting of five parties: trustee board, supervisory committee, advisory board, 
member representatives, and common members, having discussion based on the 
individual credit of the debtor and the purpose. The trustee board made the final 
decision. 
The cooperatives play a role in promoting the formation of other kinds of local 
peasant organization, such as a women’s association, an elders’ association, arts and 
entertainment groups, etc. The cooperatives also mobilized villagers to participate in 
public work or commonweal affair. In Zhaicheng village, the cooperative trustees 
organized members to send commodity and food to the home of senior people during 
the Spring Festival, and persuaded villagers to give donation to one family whose 
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daughter contracted leucocythemia. In Jingjiang, Chongqing province, the 
cooperative leaders organized villagers to contribute money and labor to pave a 
gravel road. 
8.6.2 Internal Conflicts 
The honeymoon between the members and the cooperatives did not last longer 
than two months. When cooperative members found out that the cooperatives cannot 
meet their initial expectations, gradually they lost their passion and were less active in 
participation. And even trustee board members and supervisory committee members 
gradually lost their optimistic attitude toward the cooperatives. 
People expected that the cooperatives can quickly make them rich when they 
joined the cooperatives. However, agriculture products do not have much space for 
added value. Even after cooperation, the profit obtained from uniform purchasing and 
marketing is limited. Unless the cooperatives are engaged in food processing or other 
kinds of industry, cooperation can hardly bring big change to the peasants’ income. 
However, the cooperative members lack money, technique and management 
experiences to be engaged in such industry. And when cooperatives invest in food 
processing or other forms of industry, due to the fact that a big amount of money is 
involved, the management of the money will become an enormously sensitive 
problem and internal conflict will increase dramatically.  
The concern of who benefit from the cooperative is a main factor for the 
internal conflicts. In Zhaicheng village, the cooperative decided to collectively buy 
the coal. Because it was the brother of the president of the trustee board who was 
responsible for buying the coal, other people doubted that he made the profit for 
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himself, and reprimanded the president. However, he felt wrongly reprimanded and 
explained that his brother devoted a lot of time and energy to the cooperatives, and 
even spend his own money for others’ good (his brother paid for a high amount of 
mobile phone fee). Actually, this kind of dispute happens among many cooperatives. 
Many cooperative members have similar doubts that cooperative leaders use the 
collective money for personal benefit.  
 Financing problem haunted many economic cooperatives. At the initial stage, 
both trustees and cooperative members volunteered to offer their labor and time in the 
activities of the cooperative for no compensation. However, as time goes on, to 
maintain the enthusiasm of their members, some cooperatives considered giving 
certain compensation to trustees and members who contributed their labor. The 
compensation plan elicited debate among cooperative members. In Fengan village, 
Chongqing province, the Chair of the board of trustees made a lot of phone calls for 
the cooperative, and so the trustee board decided to reimburse him the phone call fees. 
This led to complaint of some members who thought the Chair used the phone also 
for personal affair. Financing was not transparent in some cooperatives, which invited 
wide discontentment from cooperative members. And some cooperatives have been 
in debt since the income generated cannot cover the administrative cost. Some 
members expressed their dissatisfaction toward the decision-making process and 
complained that it is always the Chair of the board of trustees who made the decision 
and who did not consider the opinions of other people. 
In addition, cooperative members gradually felt that participating in the 
cooperative does not bring real difference to their income and life. They began to 
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complain that the trustees do not have capabilities to bring in lucrative projects for 
them. One member in the Zhaicheng village cooperative said, “The cooperative has 
done nothing meaningful.” And according to the survey and case study conducted by 
the Institute staff, this kind of opinion is popular among many peasant cooperatives 
initiated by the students of the Institute (Interview with Fang, 2006).  
One interesting finding is that the cooperatives that have relatively high level of 
internal cohesion are those that originated from peasants’ rights group. Some 
founders of economic cooperatives are peasants’ rights activists who once led 
peasants to guard for peasants’ rights in land issue and tax issue. The Nantang village 
in Anhui province is one of such cases. In 1990s, the unreasonable high tax and 
miscellaneous fees levied on peasants were beyond the affordability of the peasants, 
and government corruption enraged the villagers. The rights activists led peasants to 
overthrow the village government, and the leaders of the rights activists were elected 
to the leaders of the village. They have high prestige in the local area. After receiving 
the ideas of economic cooperative in the training workshop held by DIPE, they 
established an economic cooperative in the village. Despite a lot of difficulties that 
the other peasant cooperatives also experienced, the cooperative members are still 
making concerted efforts for the development of the cooperative. The long-term 
shoulder-to-shoulder cooperation during the rights defense campaign has built mutual 
trust among the members. 
8.6.3 External Pressures 
Story 1: Nan Tang village, Anhui province. The cooperative bought fertilizer 
from a fertilizer factory and sold them to its members. This irritated the fertilizer 
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dealers. They went to the municipal business administration bureau and accused the 
cooperative of engaging in illegal commercial activity.  
Story 2: Nantang village, An Hui province. Currently Nantang peasant 
cooperative hasn’t registered because the township government has an hostile 
attitude toward the cooperative. Since the leaders of the cooperative are previous 
peasants’ rights activists, the township government officials consider these people as 
always “making trouble” and impeding  the work of the government even though the 
cooperative members have transformed the focus of their work from rights-defending 
to rural development.  With the help of some university volunteers, they decided to 
establish an “elder people society” under the cooperative. The goal of the society is 
that “old people are taken care of, old people enjoy life, and old people make 
contributions.” The first activity was to select ten daughters-in-law in the village who 
take good care of their families and old people. In order to ameliorate the 
relationship between the cooperative and the government, they invited the town 
government officials to attend the award ceremony, and they plan to introduce the 
“elder people society” after the ceremony. However, when the head of the Society 
took out his speech draft, the official jumped up and left.   
Story 3: Jiang Zhuang village, Shan dong province. During the period of the 
establishment of the cooperative, the village committee spread rumors about the 
initiator and proponents of the cooperative, and even threatened the family members 
of some cooperative members. 
The above stories illustrate that beside the internal conflict, the development of 
the cooperative also encountered external pressure. Powerful families, the village 
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committee, upper-level government, and businessmen and companies are all involved 
in the politics around peasant cooperatives. When the peasant cooperatives were 
formed, the existing power holders viewed it as a new rising power, with the 
capability of contending with them. The government in each level primarily viewed it 
as a potential political body rather than an economic body. It is not surprising that the 
cooperative incurs dissatisfaction and even opposition from the existing power 
holders. The external pressures came from the following three sources. 
First, many cooperatives can not get official recognition. In many areas, the 
local government is holding hostile attitudes toward peasant organizations, thinking 
the goal of organizing the peasants is to act against the government. Among the 
cooperatives that keep close relation with DIPE, only three registered in either the 
Department of Civil Administration or Department of Business Administration of 
their respective county government. In Nantang village, Anhui province, peasants 
formed a financial mutual-aid group. As a financial derivative organization from the 
cooperative, it helps to drive away the high-interest underground financial 
organization in the rural area, and explored a new system that fit in rural areas with 
clear property rights and strong supervision. However, it did not get official 
recognition from the local government. The cooperative members referred to the 
Central government No.1 Document to claim that their action is justified. The No. 1 
Document regulates: “to develop competitive rural financial markets, the relevant 
bureau needs to establish admission conditions and regulation mechanisms for new 
forms of financial organization and diverse forms of ownership. With the prerequisite 
of taking precautions against financial risk, local government should initiate 
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experimental units as soon as possible. In those places which have such conditions, 
the government can explore micro-finance loan organization.” However the financial 
mutual-aid cooperatives did not get response from local government. The founder of 
the cooperative in Yongji city, Shanxi province was even interrogated by a police 
officer. 
Compared to peasant cooperatives in the Western countries that can obtain 
financial and policy support from the government, peasant cooperatives in China 
seldom get any kind of support from the government. In comparison, those who have 
government connections are able to win support and favorable policy easily. For 
example, of a Vegetable Society in XinXing village, Hebei province, the primary 
managers are the officials working in township government and serving on the village 
committee. The township government provided 200 thousand yuan to build a trade 
market, and 1000 yuan for each greenhouse. The irrigation bureau helped build the 
underground DIPEs; the electricity bureau installed the transformer; the 
transportation bureau built the main road; and the science and technology bureau 
examined and certified the quality of the non-pollution vegetables free of cost. All 
these services are not accessible if the cooperatives are initiated and run by common 
peasants. The state Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has special funds to support the 
cooperatives. However, these procedures are complicated. The application documents 
have to go through village, township, county or municipal, and provincial government, 
and finally to the central government. Most of the funds were given to government-
related or government-supported large-scale “cooperatives.” 
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Among the cooperatives supported by DIPE, the peasant cooperative in LanKao 
County is an exception because it has received government support. The key person 
who promoted the idea of cooperative in LanKao is Li Cen, a sociology professor in 
People’s University, and deputy head of the county government. She persuaded the 
country government to fund the training workshop on cooperative in HeCun village 
and NanMaZhuang village. People chosen for the training are recommended by 
Bureau of Agriculture and village Communist Party branch. Thus the cooperatives in 
LanKao County have close connection with the local government. In NanMaZhuang 
village, the initiator of the cooperative is the head of the village committee. Although 
he is not the executive member of the cooperative, he plays an important role in its 
decisions. In Huzhai village, the head of the cooperative is the son of the secretary of 
village Communist party. The cooperative get support from the village council. 
HeCun village and NanMaZhuang appointed the secretary of the village Communist 
party as an independent supervisor, and the secretary of township Communist party as 
special counselor. The county finance bureau purchased equipment with a value of 
RMB 20, 000 for HeCun village. In NanMaZhuang village, the application for non-
polluted rice project received support from the township party secretary and county 
agriculture bureau. 
But even in Lankao, the cooperative and the local government are not always in 
the honeymoon. Fang used his network in the central government to obtain project 
fund directly from the state MOA for the peasant cooperative. However, this incurs 
discontentment from local government, since they thought the application does not 
follow the formal procedures. Although finally the cooperative in NanMaZhuang 
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village still got the project fund, 100 thousand Yuan, the relationship between the 
cooperative and the township and municipal government get tense. And He Huili, 
friend of Fang Tiejun, was elbowed out by other government officials. 
Second, the peasant cooperative was viewed as competitor of the existing power 
body and thus their relationship with village committee is in tension. Many village 
committees have heavy debt, and they can hardly mobilize villagers to carry on the 
development work in the village. In many areas, the village committees do not have 
much authority among peasants. The emergence of peasant cooperative provides a 
channel to develop the rural economy and to organize social life in rural society. The 
village committees are uneasy about this situation because they thought that the 
cooperatives may take over the function of the Communist party organization and 
village committees, further reducing the authority of the local government in the 
village. In ZhaiCheng village, Hebei province, the party secretary said in 
dissatisfaction, “Peasants have the misconception that cooperatives can oppose the 
government, oppose the village committee, and contend for resources.”  
One scholar analyzed the reason for the tense relationship between the 
cooperative and local government: “Currently the resources of village and the power 
to dispose the land is in the hand of village committee, and the township government 
can also dispose these resources through the control of village committee member. 
But once peasants are organized under the cooperatives, the capability of local 
government to dispose the public resources may be weakened” (Personal 
conversation, July 27 2005).  
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Third, the cooperatives also met resistance from the market. The peasant 
cooperative in NanMaZhuang village is one example.  The cooperative initiated a 
non-pollution rice production project. The cooperative distributed seeds and fertilizer 
uniformly to members participating in this project, and the cooperative is responsible 
for taking precautions against and killed pests, applying for the rice brand, and selling 
the rice. It received the accreditation from the MOA. However, the cooperative 
members encountered a lot of unpredicted difficulties when they attempted to enter 
the market. First, they had to compete with the merchants who sold the fake non-
pollution rice. They often failed in this competition because those merchants asked 
for lower price, and the consumers chose rice with lower price since they cannot 
identify what is authentic non-polluted rice. Second, they were often cheated and 
discriminated when they did sale promotion for their rice. Third, supermarkets or 
grocery store offered low price to their rice. In order to help sell the rice, Li Cen and 
other scholars advertise the rice in the academic circle, but the sales are still limited. 
So in a seminar held in a bookstore, Li Cen called for the support from attendants. 
This lecture received the attention of the media. After reports on TV and on the 
newspapers, some supermarkets contacted them and agreed to sell their rice for them. 
However, one problem of the supermarket is the long default of payment, while 
timely money in-flow was very important for the peasants to purchase necessary 




8.7 Withstanding the Pressures between 2005 and Now 
8.7.1 Program Adjustment  
The unmet expectation of the peasants led to tension between DIPE and local 
villagers. The party secretary of the village commented, “Peasants need money. They 
feel that their investment (in DIPE) does not get rewarded. What DIPE is doing looks 
illusive to them.” Peasants also responded coldly to the eco-farming and eco-houses, 
because they did not see much profit in the ecological economy. Disappointed by the 
Institute, one villager even said, “the Institute won’t last long if it continues its current 
working style.” 
The media gave close attention to DIPE from its very beginning because of the 
high reputation of Dr. Fang and the avant-garde activities of DIPE. But noticing the 
disagreement and conflict between the villagers and DIPE, many outsiders gave 
negative comments about the Institute and thought it was not successful. In 2005, the 
“Phoenix TV”, a very famous TV station in China, reported negatively about DIPE. 
The cooperative tends to be the target of most of the negative comments. The village 
party secretary told the reporter, “We supported the Institute because we expected 
that it can bring change to the village. We expected that it would help us to 
accomplish rural restructuring and lead us on the path of getting rich. However, they 
have different thoughts. They help establish the peasant cooperatives, but it does not 
work well.” In the report, some cooperative members also expressed their 
disappointment toward the cooperatives. The report was titled as “Xiu Cai Xia 
Xiang” (scholars went to the village), implying that the staff in the Institute did not 
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understand what the peasants need, and only sat inside the Institute and designed 
programs out of nowhere. 
The village requested the Institute to introduce some “real projects” to the 
village. Villagers believe that being engaged in industrial and commercial activity is 
the right way to getting rich. However DIPE responded, “Several international and 
domestic NGOs are conducting projects in rural villages. However, there are 800,000 
villages in China, and it is impossible to do projects in all these villages. Different 
from these NGOs, we attempt to explore a way that can be generalized. We hope to 
find out those people who have the capacity and the passion toward the development 
of their hometown, and to encourage those people to explore the solution based on 
their experiences.” DIPE places “human” at the center of the development, and views 
itself as a base that provides inspiration to the local capable men and women and 
continuously cheers them up. However, there is disagreement between the village and 
DIPE on the focus of DIPE’s work.  
When asked how they deal with these pressures, the Institute staff responded, 
“Whatever you do, there is always people who do not like it. We would not give it up 
because of opposition. But we also need to listen to what people say and think about 
what improvement we can make.” Since 2006, they tried to keep low-key. “It took 
five years for James Yen to experiments before promulgating his rural education 
method in Zhaicheng village. We also need to stand on solid feet and solve 
problems.” 
In the workshops of peasant cooperative, DIPE began to put more focus on 
capacity training and finance management. They are aware that managing an 
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organization within democratic principals needs more organizational input. 
Democracy is not something on paper; practicing democracy needs concrete 
institutions and procedures. And on eco-farming, DIPE placed more emphasis on 
marketing strategy. Eco-farming is a non-mainstream concept and practice needs to 
be based on ultimate concern of the earth and the ecological system. However, it costs 
more time and money, but produces fewer yields at the beginning. Without wide 
social recognition of eco-farming, the practice of eco-farming takes high risk.  
DIPE set up a “green alliance” consisting of several peasant cooperatives. These 
cooperatives need to promise to practice eco-farming. The hope is that through 
allying with each other they can have stronger negotiation power in the market and 
more easily get recognition from the consumers. Currently seven peasant 
cooperatives have joined the alliance. But according to one staff in the Institute, the 
fate of the “green alliance” is not optimistic, since “the market is unpredictable. The 
other business companies and retailers who have rich experience in the market will do 
everything to edge out the ‘green alliance’ stores. And nobody in the Institute is 
familiar with the existing market rule” (Interview with one staff, July 23 2005). 
DIPE is also experimenting non-market strategies for promoting eco-farming in 
the villagers. They established connections between the urban community and the 
peasant cooperatives in a variety of ways, such as urban residents subscribe to a 
peasant’s land and buy the product produced on that land, or the community store 
purchase agriculture products directly from the peasants. The producers and 
consumers settle the price through consultation. The price should guarantee the 
reasonable production cost and life expenditure of the producers. This practice saved 
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the expensive expenditure in accreditation, and reduced the transaction cost in the 
process. Currently the accreditation power of “green products” is in the hand of the 
government, and peasants or companies that want to have the label of “green 
products” have to pay huge amounts of money to the government. The production-
consumption relationship is built on mutual trust and mutual respect, and the 
peasants’ labor will get more recognition. 
This year in 2007, the village party secretary showed a more positive attitude 
toward DIPE. DIPE has become more and more famous in the Chinese society, which 
has also made its location, Zhaicheng village, more famous. The party secretary now 
regards DIPE as an invaluable asset of the village. He plans to apply for the “Yen 
Yangchu” brand and uses the brand in the agriculture product, even though DIPE 
does not support this idea.  
Despite the dissatisfaction expressed by some peasants toward DIPE, there are 
still many villagers who supported DIPE. One peasant noticed that the village was 
more vibrant after the establishment of the Institute. The existence of the economic 
cooperative, the women’s association and the arts and entertainment team made the 
village life more organized and animated. Several peasants said that the Institute is 
doing the right thing in promoting eco-farming. The party secretary also recognized 
that the villagers, especially the cooperative and association members, are different 
from the past. They are much more expressive, more concerned with public affairs, 
and more willing to share their ideas with others. The party secretary commented, 
“Even the children in our village are at a higher level (compared to other villages) in 
communicating with others.” 
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8.7.2 Institute-Central Government Interaction 
President Fang has maintained a close relationship with high-level government 
officials. Despite the tense relationship with the municipal government of Dingzhou 
city, DIPE had close contact with governments at every level. The position of Dr. 
Fang inside the establishment system as well as his closeness to rural people and the 
rural communities – the grassroots - influenced his working style in DIPE. On the one 
hand, he had a good knowledge about the problems that peasants and rural society 
have. He believes that institutional reform in rural society is the only way out of the 
current problems. On the other hand, he emphasized that people should understand 
and have belief in the Party and in the government. He mentioned that the 
government has become more and more concerned about common people, and is 
working hard to draft and enact policies to resolve rural problems in the form of 
provisions for health care, education, and tax burden of peasants. But due to the 
internal political conflicts in local governments and different interests of multiple 
government departments, many policies are not well implemented. 
DIPE is financially independent from the government.  Ninety percent of its 
operational costs are funded by grants Asian Foundation, and the rest of the resources 
come from personal donations by Dr. Fang and the other two founding organizations, 
UK Action Aid and the Community Service Development Research Center. DIPE 
operates in complete independence from state control.  Dr. Fang’s connection with 
the central government does however allow DIPE to apply for project grants for the 
village. Usually the application for central government project grants need to be 
approved by the local government who then recommend the application to the central 
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government.  Currently, DIPE bypasses the Dingzhou municipal government for 
central government grant applications to MOA in Beijing.  However, objections from 
the municipal government prevented the village from actually receiving the grant they 
have been approved. The municipal government felt offended that the Institute had 
skipped their approval process.  In response, MOA criticized the attitude of the 
municipal government and said, “if the application of the Institute was objected to 
again, the Ministry would not approve any application of the municipal government.” 
After Dr. Fang was appointed the Dean of School of Agriculture Economics and 
Rural Development at the People’s University, he applied for the “985 project” for 
the School and made DIPE an experimental site of the “985 project.” In summary, 
DIPE received benefits due to Fang’s connection with the central government.  
The central government has closely watched Fang’s work with rural society 
especially the practice of peasant organizing themselves into associations. As the 
assistant to the president articulated, “Our idea of rural reconstruction has already 
created conflicts with the central government. The mainstream theory focuses on 
urban development, and from this perspective the solution for rural areas and peasants 
is to receive job opportunities in the town and city. The government doubts our 
motives for organizing peasants. They think the solution (for rural development) is 
resource allocation.” 
To date, Fang has been successful in convincing the central government that 
their activity of peasant organization is an economic activity, which not only helps to 
advance the economic welfare of the peasants, but also helps to maintain the stability 
of rural society because these associations facilitate the transfer of government policy 
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to the grassroots level. He has emphasized this opinion in many formal official 
meetings, newspaper and television interviews, and academic seminars.  According to 
Liana, the assistant of the president, the primary goal of DIPE is not public policy 
advocacy but she thought that it is natural for Fang to take the role of advocating 
policy in his position.  
Recently, the central government has issued a law concerning the establishment 
of peasant economic cooperatives, calling for the support of local governments to 
these cooperatives.  Some economic cooperatives have been organized under the 
leadership of local government with the reasoning of reducing” transaction costs.” 
When asked how he assesses this situation, Fang said that “it is inevitable” and 
currently what development organizations can do is to “occupy the territory as fast as 
possible” and mobilize peasants to organize peasants-led-peasants-managed 
cooperatives. He articulated that currently the government is still an economic entity 
rather than a “night watcher” for the malfunctions of the market. So the chief goal of 
the government’s policy is to maximize its own benefit. Recently the issue of food 
security has also received attention from the government. The central government 
issued a policy statement to encourage the use of “low-poison” pesticide and the 
practice of “non-pollution” farming. However, one Institute staff member commented 
that the policy is based on concern for urban people’s safety rather than for the 
welfare of peasants.  
Currently the government is still monopolizing agricultural sectors such as 
insurance, finance, purchase and marketing to peasants. Peasants face a lot of 
difficulty in their attempt to enter these fields. To further rural development, the 
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government needs to open up the access to these areas. However, this process will not 
come soon since these are profitable areas for the government. It takes time for the 
government to become an entity outside of the market and to take responsibility for 
making regulations and adjustments.  Fang also reminds peasants not to take radical 
actions, such as to establish regional or even national level peasant associations, 
because that will definitely cause the government to take action to suppress it (speech 
on a workshop not proper form of citation). He states, “The government reform is 
intended to solidify the rule of the Party in power. So we cannot expect the 
government to tolerate those initiatives that challenge its rule. We are reformists, and 
we won’t be engaged in any ‘battle’.” Fang is calling for the establishment of 
communication channels between the peasants and non-peasant - outsiders, including 
the government and the market. 
Summary 
In the present chapter, a case study is performed to illustrate the development of 
adult education in China. Instead of adopting the mainstream adult education model 
and focusing on training of skills, the Institute of Peasant Education described in this 
case focused on raising the peasants’ consciousness of the importance of organizing 
themselves, which elicited the attention from the government immediately. Despite of 
the central government’s doubt of the Institute’s education ideas and the local 
government’s attempt to ban the Institute from provision of training workshop on 
peasant cooperative, the Institute continued its educational practice and facilitated the 
establishment of more peasant cooperatives. Peasant organizations in the present case 
encountered a lot of obstacles, but it is undeniable that these organizations have 
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produced a positive effect on local cultural and economic life. The Law of Peasant 
Economic Cooperative in People’s Republic of China was passed in the 10th National 
People’s Congress on October 31, 2006, which manifested that the social groups’ 
efforts in promoting peasant cooperative have gained the recognition from the 
government.        
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CHAPTER 9  
FROM GOVERNMENT DEMAND TO SELF-ORGANIZATION 
--- CASE ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTE OF PEASANT EDUCATION 
 
In 1958, as a part of the grand scheme to reconstruct the Chinese society, the 
state initiated the “people’s commune” movement in the rural areas. Peasants were 
asked to put their lands together, share agriculture equipment, and work together. All 
the properties belonged to the communes, and the peasants earned work credit 
through contributing their labor. This was a mandatory state action. It met limited 
resistance from the peasants, which does not mean that the model was welcomed by 
the peasants, but that the peasants had little organizational structure to resist state 
order and authority. Qin Hui (2005) compared China with Soviet Union, which had a 
long tradition of having a village collective economy. However, when the Soviet state 
forced the village to be merged into “people’s communes,” it led to large-scale 
peasant revolt. While in Chinese rural society where there was no tradition of a 
collective economy, the resistance to “people’s communes” was small-scale, mainly 
in some areas where lineage influence was comparatively strong.  
The “people commune” was not a voluntarily organized “collective economy” 
as many people assumed. Production plans, the sale and placement of products, the 
allocation of resources, and the nomination of leaders, were centrally determined by 
the government, instead of the “commune” members. This structure facilitated the 
state to draw resources from the rural society to accomplish the government’s strategy 
of capital accumulation for rapid industrialization of the country in the 1950s. We can 
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say, the rural economy was a form of “state economy,” the same as “state-owned 
industry” in the urban areas. After the economic reform was launched in 1978 which 
featured distributing land and resources back to the farmers in order to stimulate their 
motivation for production, the “people’s communes” gradually dissolved, and 
peasants returned to the status of working individually on their separate land. 
Today, intellectuals perceived the “reorganization of the peasants” as the 
solution of development problems for the rural society. This campaign of 
“reorganizing” peasants is different from in the efforts during the people’s commune 
period. In this campaign, peasants are the main actors who choose whether to 
organize and how to organize. Thus compared to the private university, in the case of 
the Institute for Rural Peasants, it is not only the intellectuals who organize public 
discussions and collective actions, but also the peasants who participated in the self-
organization effort to defend their interests and negotiate with other parties in the 
existing economic and political system. Thus the power redistribution process is 
influenced by multiple parties, the state-government, the Institute, the local 
government and the peasants. This chapter will analyze the factors enabling self-
organization of peasants, the roles played by the Institute in constructing a civil 
society, and the strategies used by the Institute in interacting with the government. 
9.1 Factors Enabling Self-Organization 
9.1.1 The Development Ideology of the Government 
Since 1980s, achieving rapid and comprehensive economic development has 
become the primary goal of the government. And this goal has been taking a more 
and more important position in the agenda of the government. Since the fading out of 
252 
Maoist-Leninist thoughts as the guiding ideology from the political stage of China in 
1970s, it is through economic growth that the Communist party proves its ruling 
capacity and legitimates the one-party rule.  
Rural development is the weak spot in China’s overall economic development 
trend. Either agriculture restructuring or the growth of hundreds of thousands of 
township enterprises since the mid 1980s did not bring long-term development to the 
rural area. The urban-rural gap continues to enlarge. Thus the government is seeking 
for solutions that lead to tolerating a variety of non-governmental experiments in rural 
society. This is the reason that the central government permitted the initiation and the 
spread of peasant cooperatives when they were convinced that peasant cooperatives 
would contribute to improving the economic situation of peasants. 
Local governments were more ambiguous toward the idea of peasant 
cooperatives. They are more interested in initiatives for local economic growth which 
would add to their claims of achievements under their governance. In the overall 
context of holding social stability as the top priority by the central government, local 
government officials are those who directly interact with people and any sign of 
social instability threatens their career more than the blame of slow economic growth 
in the local area. For conservative government officials, they do not want to take risks.  
However, in the case of DIPE, it did not have difficulties to get registered, 
because the Bureau of Education considered it not an organization to create social 
problem butas a non-government technical school, which would help local 
development. And the successful registration enabled the Institute to organize its 
future operation.  
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Even when the local government knew that the Institute’s training focused on 
peasant cooperative and frowned upon the Institute’s work, it did not force the 
Institute to close off, because of Fang’s relationship with the central government as 
well as the Institute’s national reputation. On the other hand, the Institute’s education 
activity were not impacted by the local government’s attitude, because it has financial 
and personnel independence from the government.  
9.1.2 Availability of Resources 
In this case, the availability of the land is a key element of the establishment of 
the Institute. The villagers bought the use right of the public land and decided how it 
should be used. With the Institute in the village, education could be combined with 
daily living and agriculture production, and discourse could happen between peasants, 
students, scholars, officials, and social activists. Involving the public in the 
management of local resources instead of the government monopolizing all the 
resources is crucial in the construction in civil society. However, the property right of 
the land still belongs to the government despite of the fact that the land is in the 
village. In the rural area, that the government arbitrarily sold the public land to 
companies for personal benefit had been a huge corruption problem. How to establish 
a mechanism to give the public more power in the management of public common 
property is the future effort that the government and social organizations should make.  
9.1.3 Access to Ideas 
In this case, President Fang got inspiration from a range of international 
cooperative experiences, especially the experiences of Japan and South Korea. In 
many occasions, Dr. Fang described Japanese and Korean peasant cooperatives as a 
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model that Chinese scholars and practitioners on rural development can learn and 
borrow from. Japan and Korea’s rural economy is based on the peasants who have 
small pieces of land, different from farmers in the United States and Europe. In these 
two countries, peasant cooperatives operate in multiple areas, including production, 
finance and marketing. And governments provide administrative and financial 
support to them. The rich knowledge that Fang had toward rural China enabled him to 
choose among many models the one he regarded appropriate for the rural areas in 
China. And this idea attracted the attention of peasants as well people from civil 
associations, inspiring a new round of public discussions on rural reform, and 
promoted the collaborative efforts toward alternative practice on rural development.  
The concept and practice of ecological economy in the global civil society is 
another source of inspiration to the Institute. It provides a useful lens to inspect the 
problem that the Chinese rural society encountered in the modernization process, and 
it provides a solution as well. This idea convened a group of people who are 
concerned about the decaying environment, problems of globalization and urban-rural 
dichotomy. 
The emerging of new political and cultural ideas is key for social change. 
People tend to adhere to the pattern in their behavior and in their interaction with 
others. Even if people sensed something is wrong, they seldom question the rules 
behind the phenomenon and therefore seldom challenge the routine. People are so 
immersed in existing institutions, customs, and collective sentiments that they tend to 
accept what existed as justified. However, the availability of new ideas provides a 
new perspective for people to look at the system, and to think that “another reality is 
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possible” or “another solution is possible.” New ideas are often a weapon that 
individuals, organizations, and social movements take upon to mobilize people and to 
challenge the existing system. 
9.1.4 Leadership of Intellectuals 
“Ideas compete for attention and legitimacy and the ones that gain ascendance 
do not win the day on their merits alone.” (BornsStein, p. 91). Generally, it is not only 
that ideas move people but also that people move ideas. With the availability of 
resources, awareness of self interest, ideas, and a more tolerating political 
environment, it is up to people to organize the resources, bring the ideas to the 
attention of the public, mobilize people to work on that ideas, and influence the policy. 
In this case, the role of Dr. Fang is important. Although the experiment of 
micro-credit fund and peasant cooperative has been around in various forms for a few 
years, it is Dr. Fang, through his prestige in the research field as an alternative / 
grassroots economist, who brought the idea of peasant cooperative to the upfront of 
rural change.  
Dr. Fang has high reputation among the peasant groups who viewed him as “the 
representative of the Chinese peasants,” because he understood them and spoke for 
them. So when looking for someone for cooperation, the villagers found Fang. And 
they showed trust to Fang even when the operation of the peasant cooperative was 
below their expectation. To cause fundamental social change is to ask people to 
change how they do their work and how they relate to others. It is predictable that 
there would be incalculable difficulties during such process. Trust is fundamental, as 
it is impossible for them to follow someone if they don’t trust him.  
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Fang also has a high reputation in the academic circle so that the Institute 
attracted scholars to volunteer their time and knowledge to the Institute’s work. Inside 
the Institute, Fang calls for people holding different ideas together, to learn from each 
other, to discuss theories and practices, and to reach a certain level of consensus. In 
all, he plays a key role for the Institute to work cooperatively and to navigate during 
difficult times. 
9.2 New Center of Power  
The establishment and development of the Institute definitely set up a public 
space which has several functions: capacity of mobilizing resource to conduct public 
activities; capacity of culture buildings, and capacity of restructuring social networks. 
The space keeps expanding with the input of new resources, new persons, new ideas, 
and new alliances. With these capacities, the Institute has the power to influence the 
social reform.  
9.2.1 Public Space for Collective Action 
The establishment of the Institute attracted people with similar concern of social 
reform to come together. In the past, these people did not have choices but to adjust 
themselves to mainstream thinking. Now in the Institute, they could practice their 
innovative ideas in collaboration with others. It is a space where shared understanding 
is developed and where joint action based on such understanding is initiated. The 
Institute gives a different reward other than salary and promotion: the feeling of 
fulfillment. With a different mechanism from the government, the Institute is an arena 
outside the reign of the state-government where people allocate natural resources and 
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human forces and organize public affairs to serve both individual interests and 
common interests.  
9.2.2 Cultural Building 
Through its workshops for the peasants, and other multiple educational 
activities including editing newspapers, holding online forums, organizing academic 
seminars, the Institute has become a space of cultural building. First, the Institute 
aroused the awareness that the problem of rural society does not lie in the gap of 
knowledge or skill, but in power, which results in the lack of financial and social 
capital in the rural society. It changed the image of “rural society” by claiming that 
the poverty of rural area is not a burden for the country’s modernization, but a 
consequence of modernization. It brought a twist to the “modernization logic” that 
blames the disadvantaged areas for lack of capital, lack of a modern mind or lack of 
risk-taking spirit. The Institute brought the issue of “power of the powerless” on the 
table. The cleavage between the “powerful” and the “powerless” used to be clear and 
taken for granted. Now the Institute helps to justify that the “powerless” can strive for 
power by organizing and by making their interests be heard and taken care of. 
The Institute also attributes new meaning to the word “development.” They 
remind people not to equate “development” with accumulation of materials, products, 
or wealth. “Development” should incorporate: the balance among different regions, 
the balance between growth and preservation, and the balance between human and 
nature. The seeking for balance is reflected in the Institute’s attention to rural society, 
in its practice of ecological farming and ecological architecture, and in its integration 
of economic organization with cultural organization.  
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The Institute cultivates not only the value of self-determination but also the 
value of community building. As one staff in the Institute articulated, “people always 
think that the villagers know nothing, and they should be taught, whether about how 
to grow crops or how to participate in democratic election. However, on the opposite, 
what the villagers really don’t know is that they have the knowledge and they have 
the creative ideas.” They just have no power to speak out their ideas and no network 
to practice their ideas. Instead of being told what to do by the government, peasants 
can determine for themselves about how to build their living environment and 
conduct their economic activities. Besides the importance of self-determination, the 
Institute also emphasizes the importance of learning to work with other people, only 
through which the community has the capacity for sustainable economic, political, 
and cultural development.  
The Institute changed our understanding and practice of education in the 
following aspects:  1) Different from formal education institutions, the organizers of 
the Institute are both intellectuals and peasants; teachers are from different groups 
such as scholars, professionals and practitioners; the students are not a traditional 
group of students, instead, they include peasants, officials as well as university 
students.  2) The relationship between teachers and students is different. One peasant 
said initially he thought he was in some heresy group since he had never been in such 
a place where the teachers live with students, eat with students, do morning exercise 
with students, work in the cropland with students, and talk with students in such an 
amiable way. He was shocked when the teachers encouraged them to discuss what the 
problems in rural areas are and how to find solutions. He took some time to get used 
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to the concept that “there is no teacher, no student here. All are participants and actors 
in rural development.”  3) The curriculum is different, and the form of carrying on 
education is different: short-term workshops, hands-on work camps, and doing and 
learning in groups.  4) The goal is different：other than transferring knowledge and 
skill, the Institute regards education as a tool for arousing awareness of one’s identity 
and one’s position in the society .  The Institute brought fresh understanding and a 
great level of diversity to the concept of “education.” 
9.2.3 Restructuring Social Structure 
Through organizing peasants, the Institute mobilized new constituencies for 
active participation and decision-making in the economic and political system; 
through working together with other intellectuals, it formed an intellectual circle that 
raises concerns and provides opinions in a more independent way than before; and 
through forming alliance with other non-government organizations, it established 
cross-region, cross-group coalitions that have potential to initiate joint actions, to alter 
understandings of interests and identities, to transform social practices and to even 
influence policies. The horizontal networks were developed to complement with the 
vertical relationship in the government system that dominates socialist China.   
The Institute took a gradualist strategy, and did not want to achieve 
transformation overnight. Fang called himself a “gradual reformist” who did not want 
a revolution, but social reform taking a moderate pace. As he said, “we adjust our 
ideas and methods through practice.” “We spread our influence gradually, with every 
footstep in a solid ground.” “People are eager to see the result, a totally different thing 
from the past. We can give them result easily. We can mobilize hundreds of peasant 
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cooperatives and the outsiders would say we are successful. But things can not be 
done in such a way. The result will be shallow without good institutions to support it. 
And the development of institutions takes a long time.” “If the cooperative failed, it is 
hard to mobilize peasants for the second time” (Interview with Fang, July 15 2006). 
They do not expect that people would take in their ideas immediately, but wait for 
time to come when people recognize the values of the ideas and practice them by 
themselves.   
9.3 Institute-Government Interaction  
9.3.1 Autonomy and Control 
Generally, the Institute values autonomy. It has financial independence from the 
government, and it designs and implements educational programs without 
government direction. It complements the governmental functions and makes 
independent contribution to the changes of the rural society.  
The relation between the Institute and the government evolves over time. At the 
initial stage, the existence of the Institute did not elicit much attention from the 
government. The Institute was neither a partner nor a contender of the government 
because it seemed not to have high financial and organizational capacity to make real 
impact. And it got registered without much difficulty because it looked like a 
common technical training institute.  
However, the development of the Institute is seen to have stepped out of the 
government’s expected track lately. It is not a traditional school as the government 
had thought. And in the Institute peasants are not students in the traditional meaning. 
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They are expected to take initiatives to make change in the local economic and social 
system. The Institute is potentially a place for mobilizing a social reform movement. 
These prospects upset the government, which is afraid that the movement would be 
out of the government’s control and threaten the government’s authority as well as 
the existing social order. This is the key factor leading to the tension between the 
Institute and the government. 
As a new rising power, the Institute enters a realm where the power of the 
government used to predominate. Before the establishment of socialist China, the 
Communist party greatly expanded its scale and power by mobilizing the millions of 
rural peasants to support its cause. After 1949, the village-level Communist party 
branch has worked on organizing peasants for decades. Under the era of economic 
reform, while the government has significantly diminished its authority in the rural 
society in recent years, and lacked effective measures to direct their behaviors, the 
Institute gained the trust of peasants and was able to organize them for economic and 
social reconstruction, which is seen as threatening to the power of the government. It 
is the Institute instead of the government who influences the peasants’ thinking and 
guides their work, which is considered as the institute having crossed a boundary. The 
mobilizing capability of the Institute makes the government alert to its activity. Thus 
the government began to keep a close eye on its practices. And correspondingly, the 
legitimacy of the peasant organization is in question.  
With time passing by, the central government began to believe that if under 
appropriate direction, the organization of peasants could benefit peasants and enhance 
social stability in the countryside, which would benefit the government as well. The 
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government has been bothered by the recent increase in peasant protests in many 
regions. And they found that peasant cooperatives make peasants shift their attention 
to community construction and development rather than resorting to complaining and 
protesting to solve their problems. Furthermore, peasant organizations help reduce the 
transaction cost for the government to deal with the peasants. With the peasant 
organizations, the government could communicate with peasants in a more organized 
way, which helps the government to deliver policy or co-work with peasants for 
possible solutions on problems that peasants face with. Thus the central government 
shows a level of support to the idea of peasant organizations, as long as they are 
limited to the economic area.  
However, the local government, in this case, is still upset by the practice of the 
Institute even though they found out the peasant organization is not confrontational 
and rebellious. It is not happy with the existence of the Institute because the local 
government has no effective measures to exert its power on the Institute or influence 
its practice. The Institute has no need to issue academic certificate or diploma, and 
also does not strive for status in the formal education system, because it never sees 
itself as a mainstream education institution. Thus it does not need to follow the 
government requirement for obtaining the qualification to issue academic degrees. 
Compared to Yuhua University, the adult education Institute has more autonomy in 
its organizational structures and program design. The Institute seldom reported to the 
government its education programs before the workshops are held, which irritated the 
local government because the government thought as the “parenting official” (父母官) 
of the local area, they have the right to know what is going on in the area, and to exert 
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an influence on it. The local government is not happy about the declining influence 
on local affairs. In the present case, they used their regulation power and failed the 
annual review of the Institute. However, due to the famous status of Fang in the 
government as well as in the academic sphere, they did not force the Institute to close 
off. And the failure to pass the review did not prevent the Institute from continuing its 
educational programs.  
In addition, the self-organized peasant cooperatives were formed and conducted 
their activities without the direction of the government, and the government could 
exert very limited influence on what was going on. The village-level party secretary 
in Zhaicheng is on the board of directors of the peasant economic cooperatives, but he 
could not control the direction of the cooperative either, and the municipal 
government saw him as on the side of the peasants. Even though that the government 
is aware that peasant organization advances their economic situation and promotes 
local stability, they rather hoped it was the Party branch instead of the villagers 
themselves who took such initiative. Consequently they barred the Zhaicheng peasant 
economic cooperative from applying for government grant.  
9.3.2 Financial Interest 
Besides the tension between autonomy and control, conflict in financial interest 
is also a factor leading to the tension between the government and the peasant 
organization. Originally peasants were passively involved in the economic system, 
and they sell food or purchase requisites whose price is not determined by them. Now 
they enter the market as a collectivity and have potential power to negotiate and 
influence the price, which annoys some business organizations. In addition, they 
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became competitors with other dealers or companies in the market, and met resistance 
from these dealers and companies. These business dealers either directly adopted 
commercial strategies to beat peasant organizations, or used their relationship with 
the government to persuade the government into announcing the peasant 
organizations as illegal.  
However, some government officials or big food processing companies also 
found out that by organizing peasants into economic cooperatives, the cost of 
transaction is actually reduced. This is why some local governments show enthusiasm 
toward the idea of peasant cooperatives. Thus, peasant organizations can be seen as 
collaborators of the government or contenders for financial profit.  
9.3.3 Whole Perspective vs. Linear Perspective 
One distinctive feature of the Institute is that it holds a the-world-as-a-whole 
perspective. In inspecting the problems of the rural areas, it did not only notice what 
is lacking inside the community, but also placed the rural society in the whole 
economic system, and concluded that the solution for the underdevelopment of rural 
society is to change the power structure of the system. This is a challenge to the 
input-output linear model. The institute focuses on interdependence among different 
elements in the world and aspires to promote a mutual-nurturing relationship among 
people and between people and nature. This stands in opposition to the belief of 
“national benefit beyond individual interests” as promoted by the state government, 
as well as to the preference of “individualism” as promoted by the liberalists. It is a 
conflict in both worldview and value system, and the resolution of this conflict would 
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be as difficult as the resolution of the conflict between the society and the state in the 
definition of the boundary of state power. 
9.4 Strategies of Dealing with State-Society Tension 
Conflict is the start of conversation. As a replacement of the social groups 
tolerating and accepting coercion from the authority before 1980s, open conflict 
between the civil society groups and the government represents the consciousness of 
the social groups to defend for their interests and values. To the Institute having 
conflict not necessarily leads to direct confrontation. The Institute does not want 
government intervention, however it recognizes that the peasant organizations need at 
least the recognition of the government to survive and develop. The peasant 
organizations can hardly conduct activities if the local government is against them. 
Thus it encourages peasant cooperatives to actively interact with and keep good 
relationship with local government to win their trust.  
The founder and president of the Institute, Dr. Fang, recognizes that the 
majority of financial and organizational resources are in the control of the 
government, thus for his ideas about peasant organization to spread to the country and 
to be practiced in a broader scale, Dr. Fang hopes to influence the government’s 
policy through establishing examples of well-functioning peasant organizations.  
The Institute regards that it is important to seek for channels for discourse, for 
the different parties to understand each other. Thus the Institute creates opportunities 
for different people and organizations to talk with each other, such as encouraging 
people to exchange ideas and experiences in workshops, inviting government officials 
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to visit the village, presenting the village committee members and cooperative 
members in forums and seminars on rural development, and bringing urban 
consumers to meet and talk with the peasants. The channels of discourse serve 
multiple goals: to set everyone as an independent bearer of interests and to 
reconstruct identity, to build trust, and to encourage collaborations. 
9.4.1 Reconstructing Identity 
There are two different theories explaining the structural relations in 
traditional/historical rural China: one theory sees the rural society as a society 
dominated by a dichotomous relation of landlords vs tenants. Peasants were under the 
exploitation and suppression of the landlords. Since the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) liberated peasants from the landlord-tenant relationship, and distributed land to 
them, peasants become free. Another theory sees traditional rural society as a 
harmonious community with high consensus on values and high moral cohesion. The 
relationships in this community, including landlord-tenant relationship, rich people-
poor people relationship, esquire-plebian relationship, kin head- kin member 
relationship, are based largely on agreement. The community order is maintained by 
custom and ethics; the kinship system ties the members in the rural society together.  
Qin Hui (2005), a historian and a professor in Tsinghua University, believes that 
neither of these two theories provides a real picture of the Chinese traditional rural 
society. Both theories are not well supported by historical evidence in China, and 
cannot persuasively explain the hundreds of peasant revolutions in the history of 
China. Emperor Qin (259-210 BC) united China and established a kingdom with a 
complicated administrative system similar as that of the modern state. The 
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hierarchical administrative system enabled the power of the state to extend to the 
village level. In order to suppress lineage power, he dismissed the lineage families by 
force and relocated lineage family members to different places. Thus, in the rural area, 
the safe-guarding net that protected peasants from arbitrary state intervention was 
removed. Individuals were forced to face with the state’s power directly. In such 
situation, the capability of the state to mobilize resources reached an unprecedented 
level. In the dynasties after Qin, the state kept strong control on rural society, except 
the period of Wei and Jin Dynasty, when the state was weak and fell into pieces, and 
the lineage grew strong. 
According to Qin Hui (reference), the primary conflict in Chinese society is 
between the official and the common people. And among the common people, 
peasants are staying in the bottom of the society. They have nearly no economic or 
political power. The dismissal of lineage and other commune associations forced by 
the state in many areas removed potential protection from them and exposed peasants 
directly under the unrestricted state power. With the land as their only property, and 
nearly no social network, peasants was powerless in this confrontation. When the 
state power has no confinement, the absence of lineage and other commune 
associations does not mean that people have more individual freedom in the 
community. Lacking collective wills and collective actions, they can hardly make 
decision on their own living environment and their lives. The state has unlimited 
capacity to draw resources from the rural society, in the form of taxation, levy, or 
labor drafting. Only when the state exploitation was over the toleration limitation of 
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peasants, and combined with losses from natural disaster peasants would rise up and 
revolt.  
Consequently, peasants are either attached to the state-government or they 
confront the state-government. In the history, they never interacted with the state-
government in an equal status. The only exception is during the 1940-1970s, when 
peasants were regarded by the Communist Party as partners of the worker class, and 
peasants as a group had high political status, although in the authoritarian regime 
peasant as individuals did not have much decision-making power. During the 
economic reform in 1980s and 1990s, the political and economic status of peasants 
declined rapidly. The peasants either tolerate the existing living condition or go 
against the government, and their oppositions were usually repressed by the 
government. Peasant cannot find an effective way to change their condition.  
The Institute encourages peasants to establish channels of discourses with the 
government officials. When peasants succeeded in establishing such channels and 
having conversation with government officials in a regular way, their identity is 
changed: from passive participants to active participants in the social-economic 
system, from subjects to citizens. Besides keeping silent or revolting, peasants found 
that they have a third choices: to state their interests rationally and to be heard, as 
well as listening to the rationale of others, and to work together for a solution that 
considers interests of both parties. In this way, peasants are neither the subordinates, 
nor the people who are always suppressed, but the people who can make change to 
the society in a constructive way.  
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And during the discourse, the government officials also changed. One 
government officials said in a workshop, “in the past I thought, why these peasants 
are so difficult to regulate? Why they make so many troubles? Now I understand their 
situations. It (the problem in rural society) is very complicated, and we need to know 
more to find out solutions to these problems.” When the channels are established, the 
government officials have opportunities to listen to people who used to be regulated 
and not to be talked with, and to understand that these people have their interests that 
are justified in certain ways. Although certainly there is still much distance between 
the government officials and the peasants, this distance is possibly narrowing in the 
on-going discourses.   
9.4.2 Seeking Common Interests and Building Trust 
At the central government level, Fang made great efforts to gain the trust from 
the government. He tried to convince the government that they are holding similar 
goals. For example, recently “harmonious development” and “social stability.” have 
been proposed by the government as the result of increasing social unrests which 
arise from widening gaps of inequality under the economic reform. Fang mentioned 
that peasant cooperatives help peasant to deal with the market, and appease their 
accumulating discontentment. In addition, formulation of peasant culture and art 
organizations enrich the life of peasant,. Although it did not bring direct economic 
benefit, it helps enhance the stability of local areas.  
When the Institute promoted ecological farming, the staff used the words 
popular in the international development circle, such as “sustainable development” or 
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“green GDP” to justify their initiatives. The strategy is not to outrightly criticize the 
government doing things in a wrong way, but to propose an alternative model that has 
theoretical underpinning or has been adopted in other countries. They tried to 
convince the government that this is not a goal pursued by the non-government 
organizations as opposed to the government, but a goal that benefit the whole country 
and can be pursued through the collective effort of the government and the society. 
9.4.3 Promoting State-Society Collaboration  
According to Dr. Fang, it is unnecessary to follow the state-society dichotomy 
model, or to place different social groups in each side of an invisible wall. 
Emphasizing that all groups are potential collaborators, the Institute welcomed 
cooperation with other non-governmental organizations, intellectual groups, student 
associations, and government branches. As a result, many local governments invited 
the Institute staff to hold training workshop in their territories. Recently the Danzhou 
municipal government in Hainan province asked the Institute to cooperate with the 
government in the construction of “new villages” in the city. The Director-General of 
the Institute went to Danzhou and was appointed as the Director of the Office of 
“New Village Reconstruction,” which will be co-operated by the government and the 
Institute for the coming five years.  
Many peasant cooperatives also sought cooperation with local government. For 
examples, the peasant cooperative in Nantang village, Anhui province bought 
fertilizer and seeds from the agriculture supply and marketing branch of the 
government. The government has realized that the peasant cooperatives made 
contributions in terms of promoting cultural activities and peasants’ participation in 
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the public arena in local areas. However, the cooperation between the government 
and the peasant cooperative still stays in the superficial level.  
In the macro level, the Institute believes they are providing policy-makers with 
evidence of experiments in rural areas so that policy-makers could refer to the effect 
of existing peasant cooperatives when they are searching for solutions for the rural 
problems. Although we do not know in which level the social experiments on peasant 
cooperative influence the legislation, from the newly enacting of the Law on Peasant 
Cooperative it is observed that the government and the society reach some common 
understanding in the importance of peasant organization. 
9.5 Change and Continuance  
The practice of DIPE is the combination of “transforming force” and “inertia 
force”. It challenges many development theories with an emphasis on marketization, 
industrialization and urbanization, and it illustrates peasant self-organization as the 
key for rural development. Only by organizing themselves can peasants defend their 
economic benefits. And a peasant cooperative is not to be treated just as a service 
organization, but should be allowed to enter the market area. The government should 
recognize that the peasant cooperative is an economic entity with a “non-profit” status. 
The Institute expects the government give the peasants more financial, legal and 
policy support, and also grant more economic power to the peasant organizations, 
which also means, the government should retreat from the monopoly of the 
agriculture-related field and share the economic benefit in these fields with the 
peasant organizations. 
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However, there is a paradox in Fang’s attitude. Similar with Dr. Wang in the 
first case, Dr. Fang does not intend to confront the government outright. He does not 
expect peasant organizations to rise as a new political power. On one hand, peasants 
are convinced that they should organize for their wellbeing; on the other hand, 
peasants are not told that their isolated situation make them politically powerless and 
thus easily exploited by the government or other economic entities. This brings 
dilemmas to the identity of peasants. The peasant cooperatives do not immediately 
bring economic benefits to the peasants, but in the long term increases its status in the 
political and economic system, and consequently increases the peasants’ negotiation 
capacity with other economic entities in the market, including the government. Fang 
did not mention it to peasants because he is worried that it would lead to the unrest of 
peasants and break the trust between the Institute and the government. In the 
workshop on peasant cooperative, the Institute staff intentionally emphasized 
economic benefit so that the peasants focus their attention on the economic benefits 
while ignoring the power of the collectivity in their long-term interaction with other 
parties. This prevents peasants from recognizing their collective interests and being 
devoted to collective actions. 
Summary 
Institutional analysis attempted in this chapter illustrates that the change of 
political and economic contexts impacts the shift of values and behaviors of 
intellectual groups. Intellectual groups have access to resources and diverse ideas, and 
more importantly, have gained certain level of autonomy to put their vision of social 
change into practice, in this case the establishment and operation of Dingxian 
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Institute of Peasant Education. The government held suspicious attitude toward 
DIPE’s educational practice—training on peasant cooperative and ecological 
economy, but it did not force it to close off. Instead, the experiment of DIPE on 
peasant cooperative has gained increasing social influence. And convinced that the 
peasant cooperative benefits the rural economic development and social stability, the 
central government enacted the Law of Peasant Economic Cooperative to provide 
policy support to the economic cooperation among peasants. Analysis shows it is not 
the state government alone determines the direction of reform in the future, but the 
non-government sectors are also involved in participation of institutional reform.  
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CHAPTER 10  
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation studies two cases: a private university providing formal higher 
education to students who want to get academic degree, and an institute offering 
informal education to peasants interested in rural development. The former 
undertakes education to serve the mainstream market need and the modernization 
goal; the latter undertakes education to change the economic structure and promote a 
sustainable development model different from the pure “economic growth” model in 
the rural development. The two educational institutions are quite different in their 
missions, program structures, curriculum design, administrative structures, etc. Their 
differences exemplify the diversity of social reform ideas and practices in 
contemporary Chinese society.  
Despite their apparent differences, both are the results of the government’s 
initiatives of encouraging multiple forms of property-ownership, and both take 
education as a way to change the society. Their establishment and development bear 
one common message, that is, there is an emergence of public spaces that are not 
completely under the government’s control and there is a rise of non-state power in 
China. Here we are not talking about dramatic changes such as the formation of 
oppositional party or new election system, but changes starting from people having 
gained an awareness of the value of participating in public affairs and having put their 
strong desire for social changes into actions. As new political and social actors, they 
shape the direction of the Chinese society together with the state-government and 
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market actors. The active and constructive participation of these social actors in 
facilitating institutional changes in the transitional period of China provides a 
promising prospect of civil society development in China. This final chapter will 
conclude previous discussions and give answers to my research question: How has 
state-society relationship changed within the broad economic and social 
transformation in China? And what is the nature of civil society development in 
China?  
10.1 Contextual Changes Engendering Public Space 
10.1.1 State power 
One significant consequence of the central government’s market reform is a 
form of social class stratification. From 1950s to late 1970s, the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) saw itself as the “party of the proletarians,” and enforced the 
“proletarian dictatorship,” the goal of which is to prevent other classes, mainly the 
“bourgeoisie,” to usurp the power of the nation. However, with the ongoing economic 
reform, the representativeness of the party of the working class and the peasants is 
declining. The Party is absorbing members from the entrepreneur class who used to 
be viewed as the “bourgeois class.” In addition, with the increasing number of 
unemployed workers and the increasing income gap between the “proletarian class” 
consisting of workers and peasants, and the “bourgeois class” consisting of 
entrepreneurs, managers, and intellectuals, the social status of workers and peasants 
are rapidly declining. Thus, the party is transforming itself from being a “Party of the 
proletarians” into a “Party of the people” inclusive of all social classes, and thereby it 
is losing its entitlement to a “proletarian” dictatorship over the society. To justify its 
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continual authority, it needs to focus on establishing an economic and social order 
that “the people” can accept. And the way to achieve this is to modify existing 
institutions or establish new institutions.  
However, the state can still use the logic of economic development and the 
increase of national competitive power in the global environment to justify the Party-
rule. In the middle of 1990s the theory of “neo-authoritarianism” got popular for this 
reason. The theory argues that the authoritarian rule by CPC is necessary for 
mediating and resolving the conflicts among diverse interests in the government 
system and in the society, and to guarantee the success of reform and the rapid growth 
of economic development. However, Kluver’s analysis shows that CPC no longer 
commands absolute authority over China’s population, and the massive economic and 
social changes have undermined the CPC’s dominance over the avenues of public 
discourse, such as media, economic organization, and public entertainment (Kluver, 
1999, p. 21). Neither does CPC command the legitimate authority to control every 
social activity as it did in the planned economy era. This explains why we found that 
in both of our two cases government supervision of the organizations was not rigid, 
especially at their start-up stage. Since the Party no longer controls the salary and 
promotion of those in the non-governmental sector, its ability to direct them 
significantly deteriorates. This means people in these non-governmental organizations 
are less constrained by government agenda and have a degree of freedom to promote 




10.1.2 Diffusion of Ideas 
The founders of both education organizations got inspirations from the 
education practices in contemporary Chinese history. Private universities in the 
beginning of the 20th century focused on practical education, and Peasant Education 
activists at that time focused on self-governance of rural society. These two new 
educational organizations are partly a continuance of that history. But they also 
absorbed new concepts and practices from other countries. In the first case, Xi’an 
Yuhua University takes on the “human capital” perspective and connects education 
with employment and economic needs. Its program design is clearly after the 
vocational education model of some countries that emphasized learning-by-doing. In 
the second case, Dingxian Institute of Peasant Education takes the “human 
awareness” perspective, and connects education with helping peasants to become 
aware of their own situations and their relationship with others. And the Institute also 
integrates the concept of “ecological economy” with Chinese farming traditions into 
its education program.  
In the context of globalization, people running diverse the organizations are also 
confronted by diverse and sometimes antithetical ideas, models and practices, which 
they evaluate according to their vision of the need for social change. Specifically, the 
autonomy enjoyed by non-governmental organizations in other countries makes the 
non-governmental organizations in China believe that there should be a boundary 
between the society and the state in exerting their respective power. The laissez-faire 
government in Western countries makes the social actors believe that the state-
government in China should change its role from being the “parent” of a family to 
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that of an “arbiter,” from the role of “surveillancer” to the role of being “supporters,” 
and from the sole authority to one of multiple power-holders. President Wang in the 
Yuhua private university thinks that the government should not simultaneously be 
both the supervisor of the education system and manager of specific operations of a 
private educational institution. President Fang deems it inappropriate for the 
government to be the coordinator /regulator of the market and an economic entity in 
the market at the same time. 
10.1.3 Access to Public Resources 
In the state planned economy before reform was launched, all property belonged 
to the state-government. People did not own property, nor the use right of property. 
Decisions and implementation related to public affairs management were 
concentrated in the state, and individuals and groups out of the official arena had no 
way to organize socio-economic activities and exert influence on the economic and 
social arena. Working for the state government was the only way to participate in the 
decision-making process for public affairs. The growing of a market oriented 
economy due to the reform of reform and opening China to the world causes a flow of 
resources out of the control of state-government, which makes it possible for: 1) the 
construction of public space where people can socialize and work together on their 
common interests; 2) survival of people and organizations independently of state 
support; and 3) participation of the society in public affairs and the exertion of 
influence on social issues as well as policy.   
Both of our organizations have brought significant material and human 
resources from the society to bear on problems of education and development. This 
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signals the increasing influence of civil associations in resource mobilization and 
redistribution. The access to resources is one condition for the operation of non-
government organizations, enabling its independence from the government. Land is 
the key resource in these two cases. Access to land enables the organizations to 
construct a space where people can be organized and educational activities can be 
conducted. Human resource is another key resource in both cases. Xi’an, as a 
provincial capital with many research institutions, provided private universities with 
part-time teachers they need. Dingxian, due to its proximity to Beijing and its own 
history, attracts scholars and university students to work or teach in the Dingxian 
Institute of Peasant Education. 
10.1.4 Leadership of Intellectuals 
In scholars’ discussions of social transformation in China today, there is a 
prevalent expectation, that the economic reform will catalyze the emergence of a 
middle class in China, which will in turn lead to the development of a democratic 
culture. This assumes that in a nation that is undergoing industrialization and that 
adopts a market-driven economy, the main body in the economic system is the middle 
class. In China, the development of private enterprises and the expansion of white-
collar groups during the economic reform era seemed to predict the emergence of 
such a social class. 
Change in the configuration of resources provides the condition for the gestation 
of a new social structure. The rare resources monopolized by the state not only 
included physical resources, but also included space where people are engaged in 
self-organized social activities. One consequence of 20 years of reform is the free 
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flow of resources and the emergence of public space autonomous from state control, 
access to which nurtured the development of new social groups: an enterpriser group 
and “white collar” employees who worked in technology-intensive industry. From the 
1980s, these groups have rapidly expanded, with the enterpriser group consisting of 
previous government officials, university teachers, previous administrators of state-
owned enterprises, discharged military officers, a small number of workers and 
peasants, and “white collar” employees consisting of university graduates. The 
emergence of these social groups means not only new forms of economic planning 
and production, but also new actors who can exert influence in the socioeconomic 
field. In other words, the Chinese society has seen a fundamental change in terms of 
who organize economic and social lives. 
However, do these new actors form the “middle class” in the Western sense? 
The majority of the new private enterprise managers, especially those at the top of 
this group, come from the power center: they are either previous government officials, 
or are those having close familial or social ties to high-status government officials. 
They are familiar with the power structure and the culture of the power circle and 
their entering into the economic elite status come from their utilization of this 
familiarity and network to get rare resources and advantageous policy for themselves. 
They are the beneficiaries of the existing power system. There is a certain level of 
tension between the state and these new economic elites, because the close 
relationship between this new economic elite and the power center is based on 
personal relationship. From the perspective of the state-government, the behavior of 
this group may disturb the normal economic order, which elicits strong dissatisfaction 
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from other members of the society. To further economic development, the state has to 
take measures and create a fairer competition environment, and the economic elites 
are worried about losing the advantages they have been enjoying. Thus, even if they 
may not be the firm defenders of the current regime, they are not thereby supporters 
of political reform towards more equal distribution of power. In addition, due to their 
primary interest in profit, they are impossible to become the legitimate moral leaders 
of the society to call for change of the political culture.  
The “white collar” group, although claiming autonomy and ideological distance 
from the state authority, are depoliticized. As enterpriser managers or technicians, 
their professional knowledge and skills are the guarantee of their quality life. There is 
no evidence that they have sufficient cohesiveness to form an independent class and 
to impact the government policy.  
Sweeping generalization from these two social groups is not warranted; 
however, findings about them echoed previous research findings of the increasing 
influence of intellectual group on society (Bonnin & Chevrier, 1991; Gu 2000). The 
intellectuals have always enjoyed special social status in Chinese history as the carrier 
of the Chinese culture and assistants to the ruler of the country. As Cheek (1994) 
states, “the close relationship between members of the educated elite and the state has 
been a constant feature of Chinese history” (p. 184). Despite dynastic suppression, the 
continued existence of such scholar-officials enabled continuity of social structures 
and political ideologies across dynasties. But even though they served the state, 
Confucian intellectuals regarded it their responsibility to think and speak for the 
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people. Intellectuals have been defined by their inclination to speak truth to power 
and thus seek to humanize the power.  
In the 1900s the role of intellectuals saw a dramatic shift. This change has two 
reasons: Their contact with the Western political system and culture inspired them to 
question the relationship between the ruler and the people; second, in the past, serving 
the state is the only way that intellectuals can apply their ability and wisdom to 
achieve their political aspiration. But in the 1900s intellectuals found multiple ways 
to contribute to national development. Between 1949 and 1976, however, intellectuals 
were seen as the potential allies of the bourgeoisies and the status of intellectuals 
descended to an unprecedented low level. But since 1976 the status of intellectuals 
rose gradually and they now enjoy influence on the society in multiple fields and 
through diverse channels.  
In the two cases described in this dissertation, the president of the Yuhua private 
university made innovations in the university’s program design, administrative 
structure, and student management, and influenced education policy through his 
social reputation and later his position in the political system; the founder of the 
Dingxian Institute of Peasant Education, although an established intellectual, adopts a 
different definition of “development” and practiced the alternative development 
model in the society. Unlike their intellectual peers who express their opinions 
mainly through academic work and within the academic circle, these two founders 
reflected on their roles in the development of the country and within available public 
space took social actions that exhibit pioneering characteristics. As the old 
ideological constraints break down and technology opens up avenues for the 
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dissemination of information, intellectuals are more prone to be influenced by 
Western conceptions of liberty, social discourse, and economic organization. 
However, Chinese intellectuals have demonstrated an ability to avoid slavish 
obedience to Western ideologies in the attempt to create a Chinese philosophical and 
cultural framework. In these two cases, these founders are influenced both by 
Western ideas and practices and by their own experiences with and understanding of 
the Chinese reality. They emphasize autonomy but also recognize that the state-
government in China has great power and thus civil associations need to cooperate 
with the state-government in reforming the system. In their effort to promote new 
education and development ideas, they are considering how these ideas fit China’s 
situation and help the national development.  
Cheek (1992) uses the phrase “from priests to professionals” to describe the role 
change of the intellectual group in China. He states, “Although many still serve or 
hope to serve the current government, a significant group has been disestablished, 
forcibly alienated from the regime by its leaders, and has thus moved closer to 
professional autonomy.” Gu (2000) describes the four intellectual groups and their 
relatively independent status in thinking and acting. Most of the intellectuals, whether 
on the left or the right of the political spectrum, and whether inside or outside the 
establishment, called for a variety of political and economic changes to alleviate the 
grievances induced by the economic reforms, or at least to channel the growing 
protest into less disruptive responses. The intellectual discourse in the 1990s was the 
most pluralistic it had been since 1949, less directed by the top political leadership 
and more diverse in challenging the party’s policies (elite-based discourse). The 
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existence and expansion of public space provides conditions for such pluralism. 
Intellectuals either enter the political system to directly influence policy, or establish 
new practice standards in the society.  
In our two cases, the intellectuals brought their concern toward the society and 
their vision of a new social order into their actions. And in the process of taking 
action, they seek the alliance with other groups in the society. Having power of 
language, they have much more opportunities to express their voice either to the 
authority or to the common people. Intellectuals help to bring things and events to the 
public, invoking rounds of public debate. 
However, Cheek (1992) also reminds us that “Losing one’s position in the state 
bureaucracy does not make one instantly an independent professional.” Indeed, the 
tragedy of mainland China’s intellectual is, as David Kelly notes, is that they “refrain, 
as a stratum, an artifact of the system they oppose.” Compared to their Western 
counterpart, we found from the two cases that intellectuals are not so critical of the 
government’s policy. Compared to the intellectuals during the 1980s, the intellectuals 
after the 1990s showed a “soft” side. They acknowledge that the state are doing its 
thing and making the right move, and they are hoping that their practice will provide 
real-world experience to the state-government for policy-making or for institutional 
change. Both founder-intellectuals in our case studies are collaborating with the 
government for the transition to a better society.  
How shall we evaluate this soft side? On one hand, the collaborating attitude 
helps establish channels of communication between the intellectuals and the state, 
justify the action of the intellectuals, and institutionalize the intellectuals’ practices 
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into policies and political economic structures. The intellectuals tried to establish a 
relationship with the state-government that would have permitted them to promote 
their blueprints for reforms. On the other hand, this soft attitude discounted their 
claim to hand power back to the people. In the case of the Dingxian Institute of 
Peasant Education, the staff emphasized the economic benefit of the peasant 
cooperative. But actually the form of peasant economic cooperatives carries a 
political meaning. Without the understanding of the rules of the power game in China, 
peasants got confused when they met obstacles from both the government and the 
market. And members tend to blame the leaders for the failure of operation. The 
founder and the staff in the Institute, however, transformed a political issue into a 
technological issue and thus failed to provide the peasants the ideological tool to 
further their collective action and stand firmly for their political economic interests.  
The rural grassroots people are invisible and silent in China. They lack 
appropriate channels to let their voice be heard. Without the grassroots people rising 
up and speaking for themselves, the discourse in China is elite-based, which at least it 
is no longer state-dominated. Intellectuals are playing and will play an important role 
in shaping this discourse. Kluver (1999) believes that “as the influence of the 
Communist Party continues to wane, and is likely to continue to do so in the midst of 
the massive economic and cultural changes, China’s intellectual class is likely to play 
a key role in the formation of a new perspective,” and “although intellectuals as a 
class in China have, at least since the founding of the PRC, been limited in their 
abilities to contribute to a vibrant public discourse, they will in the future be a vital, 
energizing force to China’s emerging society”  
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10.2 State-Society Tension 
Tensions between the state government and the social organizations in both 
cases emerge from the entrance of new actors in the existing political, economic and 
cultural system. The existing system is not a widely open system that has a lot of 
flexibility to accommodate new actors. It is a highly hierarchical, bureaucratic and 
closed system in which actors and form of networks are fixed. Although on paper the 
state-government encourages the entry of new actors into the economic and social 
system, it is selective about the actors it welcomes. It is receptive of those who have 
close relationship with the political elites. Such a system tends to be resistant to new 
actors who are not connected to the political circle, seeing them as outsiders and 
discouraging their entrance. The exclusion is more evidently observed in our first 
case, when there were few non-government educational organizations. The 
government not only regulated public universities, it also owned and managed them. 
Public universities are part of the government system. When private universities are 
established, they are seen as strangers who break into the system. It is like the 
emerging bourgeois class who wanted to enter the aristocrat class in the 17th century 
Europe. The difficulty that private universities met in registration and obtaining the 
use right of the land during its initial stage is part of the process that the government 
adapted itself to accommodate new actors. In our second case, the registration of the 
Institute and land use got approved without much resistance because by the year 2000, 
the number of non-government education organizations has increased dramatically 
and the government has been much more receptive to such organizations.  
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Although it is the state which gives the permission to the social actors, the state-
society tension in the development stage of non-government education organizations 
reflects the lack of trust of the government toward such organizations. In our first 
case, the government did not have trust toward the founders of private universities on 
their motivation of establishing education organizations and their capacity for 
maintaining and improving education quality. The door was closed for the majority of 
private universities to gain the status of bachelor-degree issuing institutions. In our 
second case, the government not only lacks trust toward the Institute of Peasant 
Education, but also senses threat in the educational activities of the Institute for 
peasants. Consequently it failed in the annual review of the municipal Bureau of 
Education.  
The entrance of new actors in the existing power system also led to tension over 
the boundary of power. China since 1949 used to have a strong state and a weak 
society, and the state had power over nearly all activities in the society and the society 
had no say in government policy. However, in the new economic context and 
situation the civil associations want to claim their autonomy as well as take part in the 
arena of public policy. Attempts by non-governmental educational organizations to 
expand the scope of their influence, and the attempts by the government to protect 
their ability to keep things under control apparently are not compatible under many 
situations. In our first case, the private university struggled for more decision-making 
power over student recruitment and diploma issuing, which had been an arena of state 
planning for decades. In our second case, the Institute of Peasant Education aimed at 
influencing the organizational structure of rural society and ways of economic 
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production through education, which also used to be an arena under government 
direction. When the educational organizations seem to get out of government control 
and gain autonomous status, the government used its regulative power to keep the 
institutes on the track they wanted. In our first case, when private universities were in 
expansion and showed their ambition of competing with public universities, the 
government used its power of approving new educational programs to limit the role 
of private universities in higher vocational training; and in the second case when the 
institute of adult education was expanding, the local government used its 
accreditation power to prevent it from carrying on activities that is not focused on 
agriculture technology.  
From the two cases, we could see that the local government has a strong 
regulative power. Since the 1980s, the central government decided to devolve some 
fiscal power and regulative power to the local government. This decentralization and 
deregulation has two aims: first, to mobilize additional resources for public service; 
second, to promote efficiency by giving decision-making powers to those closer to 
the service receivers that are more familiar with their needs and have a better 
understanding of the local setting. Thus the attitude of local government has an 
impact on the development of non-governmental organizations. The two municipal 
governments showed similar attitude at the beginning stage, although the university 
took longer time to get registered. They both took a neglecting attitude toward the 
organizations once the organizations got approved to carry on education activities. 
But we found in the development stage the two local governments took different 
attitudes. Both governments subscribed to the development ideology. The Xi’an 
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municipal government took a supportive attitude toward the University after they saw 
the impact of the University on local development. Although the University’s market-
oriented curriculum design has not been applied in public universities before and is a 
new idea to the education system, the local government see the curriculum as fitting 
the marketization trend in China. With the deepening of market reform in China, this 
education model gets more popular and met the need of economic development. 
Consequently the model was recognized and even encouraged and supported by the 
government. 
In the second case, the DingZhou municipal government expected the Institute 
of Peasant Education to be engaged in education activities that advance agriculture 
technology and skills and promote agricultural production, but disallowed it to pass 
the annual review when it clearly went in a different direction, because the 
government has no other way to control its educational programs. It is more difficult 
for the Institute of Peasant Education to be incorporated into the local administrative 
system since the Institute does not need to get government approval to issue formal 
academic certificates or diploma. The Institute tried to convince the government that 
in the long run the peasant cooperative will benefit rural development, however, for 
the local government the threat of possible social unrest once peasants are organized 
is a greater concern for government officials. Compared to the central government, 
the local government officials directly face complicated social conflict, and are thus 
more sensitive to the change of local power relation, which is typically regarded as a 
threat to their political career. 
 
290 
10.3 Strategies in Dealing with State-Society Tension 
There are differences in the attitude and strategies of different intellectual 
groups who want to achieve social change. In 1980s, confronted with the multitude of 
problems of socialist experiment in China, people experienced cultural and 
psychological shock, and intellectuals lacked theoretical and practical instruments for 
reconstruction of the society. They lamented the loss of aesthetical, humanitarian, and 
moral values of the Communist leadership. They called for the moral rightness of the 
Party leaders and the universal and abstract value of “freedom,” “democracy,” and 
“human rights.” In late 1970s and 1980s, these words appeared in the Big Letter Wall 
Posters and underground literature28. The criticism reached a climax in the late 1980s 
and, when combined with public reaction to corruption, led to the Tiananmen Square 
Incident of 1989. However, the intellectuals failed to propose concrete frameworks 
for the enforcement of these universal values. 
Revisionist Intellectuals in the 1990s were politically and strategically more 
practical. They seldom targeted their criticism directly at the Party or individual 
political leaders. They recognized that for a considerably long period of time, the 
status of the Communist Party would be unshakable. At this time, the risk for 
challenging the Party ideology had reduced. However, intellectuals would risk their 
autonomy and their political prospect by direct political confrontation, which would 
constraint their further plan for social change. Revisionist intellectuals thus placed 
                                                 
28 In November 1978, a spate of wall posters appeared in Beijing, spreading from the Xidan Wall (later 
called the Democracy Wall) to Wang Fujing Street and the TianAnMen Square. The posters were 
written in big letters, criticizing Mao and other leaders, or complaining about arbitrary political 
persecution and miscarriages of justice, or calling for democratic reform. In 1978 and 1979, democratic 
activists organized into groups and started to publish poorly printed, underground journals, to call for 
human rights, democratic reforms, and the necessity of learning from other countries.  
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more emphasis on the role of institution building in reconstructing a social order 
imbued with fairness and justice. Institutional reform may include the introduction of 
new organizational structures for good governance, the change of operation 
procedures to reduce opportunity to conceal corruption, establishment of inter-
organizational networks, as well as more fundamental reforms seeking to change the 
attitudes and beliefs of those who work in an institution. They may take the high road 
or grassroots road, but in either way they did not see the government as a target of 
attack.  
10.3.1 Pragmatic Problem-Solving Attitude  
The founder/intellectuals take a problem solving attitude. They do not just 
pinpoint the problems and accuse the government for not taking the responsibility of 
tackling the problems. In these two cases, the actors are not satisfied with merely 
voicing complaints. They come out with ideas to address the problems and are trying 
to put their ideas into the practice and see how they work. They recognized that social 
problems are complicated, and problem-solving needs not only slogans, but a 
combination of ideas, resources, and innovative institutions. This attitude was 
welcomed by the government, since the reformist government facing these social 
problems also is exploring possible solutions to advance economic growth while 
simultaneously keeping a well-functioning society and letting people live in 
contentment so as to maintain its legitimacy of rule. For the social actors, adopting a 
pragmatic problem-solving attitude also implies that they choose not to be just 
onlookers pressing the government to do a good job. They are active participants in 
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public affairs. And it is the active participation of the social members in public affairs 
that truly keep the government sticking to its responsibilities. 
10.3.2 Trust-Building  
In order to mobilize social members to engage in institutional building efforts, 
the civil associations in our two cases made efforts to gain the trust of the state-
government. In these two cases, the civil associations do not exclude the state-
government from the process of civil society construction, but include it as an 
important actor with whom they need to collaborate on the reconstruction of social 
order. The state-government possesses most of the financial and intellectual resources 
and administrative capacity for enforcing or holding back reform initiatives. Thus 
civil associations tried to win the trust of the government in order that their practice 
can continue and their influence can spread. In these two cases, both organizations 
emphasize the primacy of achieving cooperative and peaceful solutions that are 
grounded in communication, coordination, and collaboration to find points of 
agreement and common ground. They established communication channel with the 
government to transfer their opinions, efforts, strategies, outcomes of practices, and 
suggestions. Their way of persuasion is in agreement with the official discourse in 
order to convince the government that they share the same goals with it. 
Different with the theoretical model of the civil society in the West, the cases 
studied in this paper do not show a state-society dichotomy and “zero-sum” game 
between the state and the society. The ways that the state and social groups serve the 
public interests are not very far from each other. It is the state government that 
realizes the continuation of dictatorial rule would not promote development and thus 
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take initiative to enable the emergence of a non-state sector, and the non-state sector 
also realizes a confrontational attitude may not help to get things done in current 
political economic system. To achieve the systematic social change, they decided that 
can not work alone but need to involve the state government. In China, the transition 
to a democratic future would be a project conducted collaboratively by the state 
government and the civil society groups.  
10.3.3 Self-Strengthening of Civil Associations 
In China, there are problems with the current legal system: (i) a lack of laws to 
protect civil rights, (ii) a disregard for due process, and (iii) the lack of judicial 
independence— judges are appointed by the state and the judiciary system is without 
its own budget, making it difficult to curb the government’s power and leading to 
corruption and abuse of administrative power. The consequence is that those who 
have political power enjoy their rights, and the rights of those who are disconnected 
from the political power centers are not guaranteed. While the government 
acknowledges the need for reform, it has yet to agree upon a method to resolve these 
problems. Reform means institutional change and the sharing of power with other 
entities, which would touch many government officials’ sore spots. The institutional 
reform would meet a lot of resistance from inside the government.  
One role of non-governmental organizations here is to set up new institutions, in 
the first case, the third-party accreditation agency that is in gestation, and in the 
second case, peasant cooperatives as well as the consumer-producer cooperatives. 
Non-governmental organizations rely on networking strategies to achieve incremental 
and widespread changes at many levels and locales, and foster social learning about 
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the importance of certain issues and enable multiple parties to identify common 
grounds. Non-governmental organizations realize that by reaching out to other social 
groups they can initiate innovations in institutional building and the government 
would gradually adapt to the existence of new institutions and finally recognize their 
legitimate status. The government is under pressure to implement institutional reform, 
and it has certain openness to new ideas. Under the prerequisite that its authority is 
not directly challenged, the government has maintained certain tolerance toward 
innovations in institutions, if they help advance economic development success and 
social stability. From this light, the government is seeking a peaceful transition to a 
new social order.  
A strong state and a strong civil society are capable of reinforcing each other 
and providing better prospects for development than if either or both are weak. The 
state had decided to strengthen the part played by the society, and social forces get 
strong to assert themselves and create systems of self-help. When the civil society 
gets stronger, it creates a sphere of public opinions that cannot be ignored by the 
government. While a strong civil society provides a base of legitimacy of new 
practices and new institutions, civil associations are not trying to replace the state—
they need the state for provision of certain services, financial and legal support, and 
institutionalization of new practices. The non-governmental sector is often offered as 
an alternative to state welfare policies, but it is not up to the task. Civil society 
associations alone cannot accomplish the task of serving the public. While civil 
society is valued as a sphere distinct from government, in actual practice, it must 
develop organizational ties to the state. There is tension between values and 
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institutions that must be overcome if civil society associations are to provide solutions 
to contemporary problems.  
10.4 The nature of civil society development in China 
For the economic and social changes in China, the Left and Right in the West 
have different explanations. The Right attributes the economic development in China 
to the market reform and privatization, and the Left regards that the economic 
development is due to the continual strong control of the state on the society which 
perpetuates and reinforces the advantage of socialism. In reality, however, China is 
neither a capitalist nor a socialist society. In the transition to the market economy, the 
state-government spun off many of its traditional social responsibilities to the market, 
such as the individual health, the redress of economic inequities, adult and continuing 
education, and the financial support of art production. But the party-state does not 
want its power to be restricted or challenged. Both before and after the reform, the 
participation of the common people in decision making is limited. The miracle of 
economic growth in China is relate to the high mobilization capacity of the state-
government to allocate resources and accumulate capital, the low “transaction cost” in 
the process of capitalizing resources, and the low resistance it encountered in the 
marketization process compared to its counterparts in Eastern Europe during their 
reform.  
Thus it is misleading to attempt to understand the transition of China from either 
the “Left” or the “Right” Perspectives. The state-government neither promotes 
“freedom” as the “Right” expected, nor “welfare” as the “Left” anticipated. Both such 
“Left” and “Right” prospects may not be auspicious to China. Adopting the leftist 
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ideas, the government will reinforce its power but may not undertake its 
responsibility; adopting the rightist idea, the government will shirk its responsibility 
but not share its power with the society (Qin, 2006). Thus, without the participation 
of the social groups in the social/political change process, policy change will drive the 
government further away from delivering good service to its citizens and 
democratizing the state. 
The party-state adopted market economy to advance the national economic 
development and accordingly to prove its capacity of continual rule of China. 
Nevertheless, the economic reform launched by the party also strengthened the 
capacity of social groups. What classic theorists of civil society did in the 17th and 
18th century in western countries was to deconstruct the fixed and hierarchical 
relationship in feudal regime. And in China, the marketization process combined with 
the global diffusion of ideas is conducting the similar function: to deconstruct the 
hierarchical relationship existing in the central planned economy period. Scholarly 
discussion in China insists that the difference in interests between the state and 
society rather than the unity of interests provided a basic motivation for democracy. 
This awakening of individual interest is facilitated by the marketization process. 
People are claiming self-determination, resenting excessive centralization of the 
government.  
Classic theorists of civil society in the 17th and 18th century in the West did not 
only deconstruct the old social order, but also attempted to reconstruct a social order. 
They constructed alternative sets of values to be followed by people, and alternative 
institutional settings in which people interact with each other. The goal is to channel 
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private interest into public interest in a way that serves justice. What classic theorists 
did not mention is that this reconstruction process needs more contemplation and 
organization than what the marketization can simply achieve. In a country that the 
resources are greatly controlled by the elites and the rules are mainly established and 
enforced by the powerful, the market is far from serving individual interest equally 
and fairly. The Marxist scholar in China referred to Marx’s notion of communism as 
“communities of free people” as justification of their claim of the return of power to 
the society and a free contractual relationship between the government and the people. 
However, they neglected the fact that the state-government could hardly take this 
road by itself, since resistance would come first from those inside the Party who 
benefit from the monopoly of power. Thus, the “first sector”-the government, and the 
“second sector”- the market, could impossibly accomplish the task of reconstruction 
of social order embedded with equality and justice by themselves. The transition from 
a hierarchical society to civil society requires struggling of the powerless with the 
powerful to subvert the pattern of dominance and subservience. Echoing Marxist 
theory, civil society is not an abstract existence; it is the result of history, of long-time 
struggling, negotiation and power wresting.  
And this is what is going on in China: struggling between the civil groups and 
the state government for the reconstruction of a new social order. The western 
theories of civil society and domestic discussion of differentiation of interest and the 
transfer of power to the people are useful because they provide ethical foundation and 
theoretical weapon used by civil groups to justify their existence, their autonomy, and 
their pursuit for fairness and justice. Civil groups are undertaking the task of 
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transferring the theoretical weapon into effective strategies to interact with the state-
government to push for social change. It is true that civil groups are weak, and there 
is no evidence to show real challenges to the party-state to make it resign from power. 
However, the participation of civil groups is the key for the state to get out of the 
stagnation of political reform, and to get away from the “Left-Right” binary. The 
future of Chinese civil society is closely connected to what social groups participate 
and how they participate in the process of social reform. 
The strategies to push for social changes are different across countries, across 
historical time, and across civil groups: the non-violence revolution in India, the 
“Solidarity Movement” in Poland, and the advocacy role of many international civil 
society associations. Many of China’s social groups enter the field of public affair 
without carrying a clear political agenda. However, when they conducted their 
activities, they found out that the institutional environment is out of sync of social 
development needs. And accordingly their continual practice is associated with 
discovery and pursuit of various institutional alternatives to the Party rule. On the 
surface the participation of social groups did not change the political structure of 
China, or it even seems that they consolidated the legitimacy of current regime. But, 
gradually the social groups’ practice is putting the authoritarian control of the party-
state at risk. 
The nature of civil society development in China in current stage can be 
summarized as “incremental adaptations”. From all signs it can be said that the 
system is most likely to be transformed through reform of the Communist Party rather 
than a replacement of it. However, the progress that civil society associations have 
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made in institutional building conveys such a message: each independent initiative by 
citizens, each example of self-organization by people acting outside of party control, 
challenges the monopoly of the state and thereby challenges the basis upon which it 
exercises power. A real, day-to-day community of free people will accumulate 
resistance to the party's propensity to control every corner of social life. The 
associational, ideological, and cognitive dimension of civil society groups 
summarized below demonstrates that we would not expect a dramatic political change 
in the near future, nor would we see collapse of the regime because of the opposition 
from the society, nor would we conclude that China is getting trapped in a 'partial 
reform' as Pei posited in his book China's Trapped Transition (2006). The civil 
society associations constructed a space where the awakening individual interest and 
dissatisfaction toward the monopoly of power by the Party-state are channeled into 
constructive force of institutional innovation.
10.4.1 The Associational Dynamics of the Emerging Civil Society 
In some ways the transition of society in China in the 1990s did not look as 
dynamic as in the 1980s. There were no big-scale long-lasting protests or social 
movements, no loud slogans or eye-catching statements, but just a self-organizing 
space cautiously expanding its territory. The intellectual groups established new 
organizations and cooperated with other groups to make an impact. Although the 
Party-rule would not be challenged for now, the rise of new social forces would 
inevitably have social and political implications. The rise of new social forces has 
shifted the overall balance of the power structure, and led some social actors to speak 
publicly in the society or in the political circle. Through their economic and social 
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ventures the social actors and groups were involved in the overall process of social 
change.  
However, despite efforts to cooperate with each other, the connection between 
different groups is quite loose. Civil associations seldom initiate collective actions for 
certain goals, and even avoid joint appeals for policy change. Different social groups 
share resources, experiences and tools, and communicate with each other in their 
visions for social change as well as in the activities they are conducting. However, 
they do not want to adopt a threatening attitude to the government by explicitly 
joining each other in proposing reform. Even though they have similar proposals, they 
prefer making recommendations separately. This definitely weakens their influence or 
even makes their initiatives invisible to the general public. 
Chinese society is still an elite-based society. The intellectual group is the group 
that has the capacity to compete with the state-government in cultural building and 
institutional innovations, and they are not the marginalized group in the political and 
social system. Hence, they may be co-opted by the government or make compromises 
with the government and give up their stance of defending for the rights of those who 
are in a disadvantaged position. On the path toward a true civil society, those who are 
deprived of benefits need to associate themselves to defend their interests. In the 
second case about the Institute of Peasant Education, peasants associated among 
themselves under the facilitation of intellectuals. And the associations have impacts 
on peasants’ economic and cultural life. Although we observed conflict within the 
peasant associations, it is a natural phenomenon in the transition to a democratic 
society. There is a learning process in which people figure out a way to get along with 
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each other, and co-work on the institutional forms and procedures that guarantee 
fairness and justice. It will take some time for a new form of organization that does 
not rely on political authority but on its promise of fairness and democracy for its 
operation to develop its capacity and gain the trust of people.  
There isn’t a wide coalition among peasants like the Movement for Landless 
Peasants in Brazil, or among the intellectuals like the “Green Party” in Germany, or 
among different social groups like the Solidarity Movement in Poland. These non-
governmental associations are small and do not have close ties among each other. 
Thus, the social forces are growing but the society in general is still weak compared 
to the capacity of the state government.  
10.4.2 The “Apolitical” Politics of the Emerging Civil Society  
The emerging “civil society” in China and other countries finds itself in a 
dilemma: in the transition to a democratic society civil organizations should be 
prepared to challenge the right of the authoritarian state to rule, while for civil 
organizations to thrive it must be nurtured and sustained by a tolerant political 
environment.  
When researchers discuss the state-society relation, they often refer to the 
distinct “Asian culture,” e.g., the emphasis on respect of authority and hierarchy, to 
explain the lack of straightforward resistance to the state and the choice of 
acquiescence towards irrational or suppressive state actions. And they conclude that 
civil society organizations in China lack the ability to maintain an effective challenge 
to the authoritarian state.  
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However, we need to think over the complication of the role of “Asian values” 
in the formation of civil society. The choice of taking action is not only dependent on 
the traditional ethical values, but also heavily on the formal institutions that determine 
the consequence of taking actions. When people need to pay a high cost for resistance, 
such as their jobs or even their lives, people would be very prudent in deciding 
whether to act against the irrational state actions. But in a time when the status and 
reward of a person or institution is less reliant on the state recognition, respect toward 
the state authority may diminish. In these two cases, the educational organizations 
independently practiced their educational ideas and even challenged the government 
power in a certain way. The private university defied the government’s warning of 
not constructing buildings on the land, and later proposed the establishment of a third-
party accreditation agency to replace the government accreditation office. The 
Institute of Peasant Education defied the government decision of discontinuing its 
education activity, and later support the peasant cooperative’s application for project 
grant against the will of the local government.  
But both organizations do not form a political challenge to the government. 
What is especially noticeable in the transformation of China’s political structure is the 
position of intellectuals in this structure. Since usually intellectuals are bearers and 
transmitter of norms and values, their relationship with the state and social groups are 
closely connected to the pace and direction of civil society development. In the 
Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1980s, intellectuals have played significant roles in 
mobilizing people for social solidarity and social justice (Cohen, 1992). But in China 
traditionally intellectuals have a close relationship with the state and enthusiastically 
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served for the state interest. Kelly and He (1992) correctly point out that “it was the 
Confucian scholar-officials who traditionally articulated and disseminated the values 
which secured broad and lasting legitimacy for the imperial state. It was the 
Confucian intellectuals who functioned to hold the society together, and who believed 
in unity” (p. 33).  
The creation of alternative political ideologies met not only with strong 
resistance within the Party but also with caution coming from the enduring traditions 
in the intellectuals' own political culture and political vision. Since the autonomy 
claimed by the social groups was only accepted by the regime as long as it did not 
mix with politics, the new autonomy was far from political freedom under the 
communist rule per se. This prevented the crystallization of any clear-cut conversion 
of the accepted social autonomy into a controversial and conflictual political 
autonomy. And the intellectuals themselves want to keep the deal with the state, that 
is, intellectual groups can enjoy their new autonomy as long as they do not challenge 
the legitimacy of the Party-rule. Thus many scholars call the current society as semi-
civil society or pro-civil society (He, 1993; Zhu, 2004).  
From a positive perspective, Chinese intellectuals tried to find a peaceful way to 
solve tension and conflict. This attitude helps to ease the possible conflictual 
relationship between the defensive state and the emergent social power, safeguarding 
the survival of the latter, as well as creating an environment for constructive 
negotiation between them. It gives time for the social institutions to develop into a 
mature stage and have more influences on the society. Timothy Cheek (1992) 
optimistically convince readers that intellectuals in China are moving from the 
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“priestly” deal of the early People’s Republic of China to a “professional” contract in 
China’s polity, but he reminds that the going will be painfully slow, much slower than 
what happened in Poland (pp. 199-200). 
10.4.3 The Cognitive Prerequisite of Civil Society 
In a system that supports slavery, slaves were attached to their owners and what 
they did served for the interests of the slave owners. In an imperialist regime, people 
were attached to the king and aristocrats, and what they did served the interest of the 
king or the nobles. The self-interest of the common people was subdued, which 
excludes them from the social connections for fulfilling mutual interests. In those 
circumstances, people’s identity was closely related to their relationship with people 
they were attached to, and voluntary collaboration based on shared identity and 
common understanding toward a certain public cause could hardly happen. 
In the planned economy of socialist China, the “collective interest” was 
emphasized to the extreme so that whenever there was a conflict between individual 
interest and collective interest, individuals needed to sacrifice theirs. However, the 
collective interest was not specified by the people in the society themselves, but by 
the authority. And the collective interest was often used as an excuse to suppress the 
resistance of individuals or social groups to unfair treatment.  
In the mainstream culture, obedience to the will of the ruler and the superiors 
was expected, which means hierarchy and inequality was taken for granted. People in 
advantageous position hardly held sympathy toward those in disadvantageous 
positions. Even people in the subordinate classes believed that they were destined to 
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serve the interests of others. And they could hardly take initiatives to change the rules 
of the society and to improve their lives. 
Only when people realize that their self-interests are as equally valuable as that 
of others, and therefore deserve the same level of attention and respect, they would 
stand up and actively cooperate with others in social activities that satisfy their own 
interests as well as others. And they would collectively figure out what the “collective 
interests” are and how to achieve that. The awareness of self-interest is the 
prerequisite for cutting off attachment to others and establishing connections that are 
reciprocal. Only then civil society imbedded with the civic value of equality and 
participative decision-making would be possible. 
It is assumed by mainstream economists that when people pursue their self-
interest, they are non-cooperative and their behavior is narrowly self-serving. 
However, this is a misunderstanding of human nature. To achieve certain goals, 
people would consider the opinions of others toward them. The pursuit of self interest 
may well be compromised by considerations of the interests of others. In our first 
case, Wang connected his personal aspiration for social recognition with his action of 
serving the broader society. In our second case, peasants wanted to improve their 
lives and they invested in establishing the school for the benefit of the whole village. 
How to coordinate the self-interest and public interest has been one of the 
themes in classic civil society theory. There are many factors involved: friendship and 
trust, moral obligations, and rationality. Through these mechanisms, members of a 
community accept certain rules of conduct as part of obligatory behavior toward 
others in the community, and form the sense of identity. After a person obtains the 
306 
sense of identity, it is the person’s identity that motivates, limits, and directs his / her 
behavior. For the intellectual groups in the two cases, the identity of “intellectual” 
make them feel morally obliged to do something for the society. The internal conflict 
in the peasant cooperative implies that peasants had become aware of defending their 
self interest, but they had not figured out a way to coordinate their self-interests and 
integrate them into public interests. Lack of mutual trust is one reason for this 
situation. The lack of financial transparency and absence of effective decision-making 
procedures that prevent financial embezzlement and abuse of power is another reason. 
Institutional building is necessary in aggregating self-interests into public interests, 
where everyone’s interest is equally valued. The failure of seeing the connection 
between the individual’s interest and the group’s interest is the third reason for the 
rise of this conflict.  
Transformation comes only through one's awareness of the social, political and 
economic relations in and out of which one's existence is negotiated, and through 
one’s taking action to challenge those structures and relations of exploiting and being 
exploited (Freire, 1970, p.33). The intellectual groups in our two cases have 
knowledge of principles and practices that advances a social order with more justice 
and fairness and have the cognitive capacity to apply it to public affairs. In our second 
case, intellectuals also want to cultivate core principles and practices of democracy 
among peasants in order to develop and maintain an active community of self-
governing citizens. Randy Kluver (1999) argues that the civic discourse in China is 
elite-based, due to the culture “in which most ordinary citizens see social, political, 
and cultural questions as far from their concerns or abilities.” Common people are 
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used to the thought that institutional change is the affairs of politicians or social elites. 
In our second case, when there was conflict in the peasant cooperative in Zhaicheng, 
the peasants did not actively work on institutional change to solve the conflict. Unless 
the common people have the consciousness of the separation of state-society interests 
and voiced their interests and take actions to defend for their interests, instead of 
relying on intellectuals to speak for them, a truly independent and constructive 
discourse cannot occur between the society and the state. The formation of civil 
society needs the collective efforts across social groups and social classes. 
In conclusion, the society is still divided and dispersed and cannot become a 
real rival to the strong party-state. And sometimes the pursuit of economic benefit 
seems to distract people from the pursuit of democracy. But it is not evidence that 
China is stalled in its way toward the growth civil society. An array of actors, acting 
from modernization or post-modernization perspective, press for official action on 
issues such as the environment, the peasant poverty, the legal procedures, posing 
challenges for various levels of the party and the government.  
The institutional analysis in this dissertation suggests great environmental 
impacts on the behavior of civil society associations, as the theory historical 
institutionalism predicts. The less coercive political atmosphere and loosened 
government control in daily economic and social activities encouraged far more 
participation of social groups in public affairs, and allowed civil society associations 
to take bold steps to expand their influence by reinforcing the cooperation of social 
groups as well as to advocate the deeper level of self-organization of the society in 
replacement of state control and planning. In this dissertation, it is also observed that 
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the cultural context has an impact on the behavior of the civil society groups. 
Influenced by traditional culture that respects harmony, the two educational 
organizations in this dissertation display surprisingly convergence in seeking for 
peaceful ways to solve the tension between the society and the state, instead of direct 
confrontation. But they also display divergence in the thinking of education and the 
way of social change due to the exposure to the diverse educational ideas in the 
global society.  
The institutional analysis in the dissertation also suggests that civil society 
associations do not behave in a passive way to institutional rules. They also actively 
work to produce cumulative impact on the institutional building process. Both 
organizations have a set of strategies for influencing institutional building. The 
private university produced academic research work to influence the thinking of 
higher education, and the institute of peasant education organized seminars and 
forums to spread the ideas of peasant cooperatives and ecological economy. Both 
organizations worked on establishment of innovative voluntary organizations, in the 
first case, the third-party accreditation agency and in the second case, the alliance 
among agriculture producers and the consumer-producer cooperatives. The founders 
of both organizations played a role in advocating the policy-making. They realize that 
only through collaborative efforts with the government they are able to make 
constructive process in institutional building. The associations are not only the result 
of the history; they are also in the history and produce the history.  
Certainly we observed the distance between the reality in China today and the 
ideal democratic country. The concepts of democracy and equal rights have not 
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widely adopted by members in the society; the state power is not effectively curbed; 
there is no direct election system for people to vote for and select their governors; the 
market is connected with political power; and civil associations is far from being 
strong enough to produce nationwide influence and directly impact policy. We not 
possibly observed dramatic political change in the near future. However we do see 
progress on the path toward civil society. People are gradually embracing (i) the value 
of self-determination, that is, people have the right to determine the rules governing 
their living environment; (ii) equity, that is, people should be treated fairly in the 
access to public resources and equal treatment in the laws; and (iii) collaboration, 
which based on voluntary consent rather than imposed command. While people are 
expecting the government to do a better job, the government, under social pressure, 
did enact laws to serve the interests of the public. Civil groups are working on 
reforming the market to make it equally accessible to all people and to ensure that 
economic exchanges be conducted in a fair way. The number of civil associations has 
been quickly increasing. They work on multiple fields in defense of the public 
interests, leading to pluralism in practice, institution, and value.  
For the transition from a semi civil society to a real civil society, there are some 
unpredictable factors: if more grassroots groups are to be included in the discourse 
between the society and the state for social change; if the state government concede 
more power to the civil society groups or take more rigid steps toward them; if civil 
society groups associate themselves more closely, and the plural interests are to be 
channeled into a collective agenda about the direction of change; and if there is 
alternative political ideology accepted by the social members about the wide 
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participation in policy making. Due to these unpredictable factors, we expect that the 
progress toward civil society may not be linear and would go back and forth. But due 
to the scale and influence of civil society associations, even though they are elite-
based and comparatively weak compared to the force of the state government, we can 
optimistically predict that it has been difficult for China to go back to the dictatorial 
rule as in the past thousands of years. 
10.5 Limitations and Implications for Future Research  
This study points out several areas for further research. First, the study focused 
on interaction between the non-governmental associations and the state government, 
but paid less attention to interactions between the non-governmental associations and 
the participants. The dissertation illustrates that the non-governmental organizations 
have crafted a space where cultural value is produced, public discussion is held, and 
state-society collaboration is formed. However, the study does not proceed to 
examine how the participants reacted to the education ideas of the non-governmental 
associations and how they reconstructed their own identities in this process. It would 
be meaningful to examine the effectiveness of the educational programs in 
influencing the students’ attitude and behavior. 
Second, the study did not look into the policy-making process.  Negotiations 
and bargaining used to be going on among a small number of people in the state 
(Tsang, 2000)29. Now more people are involved in the policy-making process. Due to 
the difficulty of access to policy-makers and the sensitivity of the issue of policy-
making, the discussion of policy-making process is a blank field in academic research. 
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The examination of this issue will help reveal the real influence of non-governmental 
groups in policy. The researcher hopes to fill the blank with more social connections 
in the future.   
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